Developmental Milestones/Developments to Date:
Current Assessment/State of the Field:
Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002, Public Law 107-188, title II, subtitle B (Sec. 211 et seq.), 116 Stat. 647, 7 U.S.C. 8401, June 12, 2002.
- The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 was signed into law by the President on June 12, 2002.
- ”Title II- Enhancing Controls on Dangerous Biological Agents and Toxins”
- PL 107-188 Sec. 212(a)”The Secretary of Agriculture shall by regulation establish and maintain a list of each biological agent and each toxin that the Secretary determines has the potential to pose a severe threat to animal or plant health, or to animal or plant products.”
- The Act further requires that all persons in possession of any listed biological agent or toxin must, within 60 days of the publication of that regulation, notify the Secretary of such possession.
- Criteria: PL 107-188 Sec. 212(a)(B) “In determining whether to include an agent or toxin on the list under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall consider—(I) the effect of exposure to the agent or toxin on animal or plant health, and on the production and marketability of animal or plant products;(II) the pathogenicity of the agent or the toxicity of the toxin and the methods by which the agent or toxin is transferred to animals or plants; (III) the availability and effectiveness of pharmacotherapies and prophylaxis to treat and prevent any illness caused by the agent or toxin; and (IV) any other criteria that the Secretary considers appropriate to protect animal or plant health, or animal or plant products; and consult with appropriate Federal departments and agencies and with scientific experts representing appropriate professional groups.”
- Regulation of Transfer of Listed Agents and Toxins- PL 107-188 Sec. 212(b) “The Secretary shall by regulation provide for—(1) the establishment and enforcement of safety procedures for the transfer of listed agents and toxins, including measures to ensure— (A) proper training and appropriate skills to handle such agents and toxins; and (B) proper laboratory facilities to contain and dispose of such agents and toxins; (2) the establishment and enforcement of safeguard and security measures to prevent access to such agents and toxins for use in domestic or international terrorism or for any other criminal purpose; (3) the establishment of procedures to protect animal and plant health, and animal and plant products, in the event of a transfer or potential transfer of such an agent or toxin in violation of the safety procedures established under paragraph (1) or the safeguard and security measures established under paragraph (2); and (4) appropriate availability of biological agents and toxins for research, education, and other legitimate purposes.”
- Limiting Access To Listed Agents and Toxins- PL 107-188 Sec. 212(e)(2) “Requirements under paragraph (1) shall include provisions to ensure that registered persons—(A) provide access to listed agents and toxins to only those individuals whom the registered person involved determines have a legitimate need to handle or use such agents and toxins; (B) submit the names and other identifying information for such individuals to the Secretary and the Attorney General, promptly after first determining that the individuals need access under subparagraph (A), and periodically thereafter while the individuals have such access, not less frequently than once every five years; and (C)(i) in the case of listed agents and toxins that are not overlap agents and toxins, limit or deny access to such agents and toxins by individuals whom the Attorney General has identified as within any category under paragraph (3)(B)… and (ii) in the case of listed agents and toxins that are overlap agents— (I) deny access to such agents and toxins by individuals whom the Attorney General has identified as within any category referred to in paragraph (3)(B)(i); and (II) limit or deny access to such agents and toxins by individuals whom the Attorney General has identified as within any category under paragraph (3)(B)(ii)…”
- Biological agents and toxins determined to have the potential to pose a severe threat to both human and animal health, to animal health, or to the production and marketability of animal products: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2002/08/fr081202.html
- Overlap Agents and Toxins
- Bacillus anthracis.
- Brucella abortus, B. melitensis, B. suis.
- Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) mallei.
- Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) pseudomallei.
- Clostridium botulinum.
- Coccidioides immitis.
- Coxiella burnetii.
- Eastern equine encephalitis virus.
- Equine morbillivirus (Hendra virus).
- Francisella tularensis.
- Rift Valley fever virus.
- Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus.
- Botulinum toxins.
- Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin.
- Staphylococcal enterotoxins.
- T-2 toxin.
- Animal Agents and Toxins
- African horsesickness virus; African swine fever; Akabane virus; Avian influenza (highly pathogenic);
- Bluetongue virus (exotic);
- Bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent;
- Camel pox virus;
- Classical swine fever;
- Cowdria ruminantium (heartwater);
- Foot-and-mouth disease virus;
- Goat pox virus;
- Japanese encephalitis virus;
- Lumpy skin disease virus;
- Malignant catarrhal fever;
- Menangle virus;
- Mycoplasma capricolum /M. F38/M. mycoides capri (contagious caprine pleuropneumonia);
- Mycoplasma mycoides mycoides (contagious bovine pleuropneumonia);
- Newcastle disease virus (exotic);
- Nipah virus;
- Peste des petits ruminants;
- Rinderpest virus;
- Sheep pox;
- Swine vesicular disease virus;
- Vesicular stomatitis (exotic)
Barry, Dan, “Weed Heroes: The War on the Invader Congograss,” NYT, A 10, September 21, 2009.
- “It [congograss] can take over fields and forests, ruining crops, destroying native plants, upsetting the ecosystem. It is very difficult to kill. It burns extremely hot. And its serrated leaves and grainy composition mean that animals with even the most indescriminate palates — goats, for example — say no thanks.”
- “Left unchecked, he says, ‘It could spread all the way to Michigan.'”
- “For a while, government officials encouraged the use of congograss as a forage crop and as a way to stem soil erosion. These efforts failed, a state document says, and ‘the plant unfortunately was allowed to escape’ — across southern Alabama, into Florida, Mississippi, and beyond.”
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