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Status Brief

Developmental Milestones/Developments to Date:

Current Assessment/State of the Field:




Hebert, Joesf H., Chinese-American scientist

Law Enforcement, China, Scientist


Gilligan, Major Matthew J., “Opening the Gate?: An Analysis of Military Law Enforcement Authority Over Civilian Lawbreakers On and Off the Federal InstallationMILITARY LAW REVIEW, Volume 161, September 1999.

  1. “Military commanders have the inherent authority and duty to maintain law and order on military installations and to guarantee the security of the occupants thereon.”
  2. “Congress has specifically granted to military law enforcement officials statutory arrest authority over service members for violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.”
  3. The Posse Comitatus Act “prohibits using military personnel to execute civil laws unless authorized by the Constitution or an Act of Congress.”
  4. Exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act include the Military Purpose Doctrine and a service member assisting as a private citizen

Posse Comitatus Act, Law Enforcement, Military, Law


Grumbel, Andrew, “Judge says sorry to US scientist after spying case turns to farce”, The Independent, September 14, 2000.

  1. “Wen Ho Lee, the American missile scientist falsely accused of passing nuclear secrets to China, was freed yesterday after lawyers finally worked out the terms of a plea bargain, ending his nine-month pre-trial incarceration in solitary confinement.”
  2. “Judge James Parker berated the government agencies that prosecuted Dr Lee and pressed for unusually harsh pre-trial detention conditions even though they had barely a thread of evidence.”
  3. “Dr Lee pleaded guilty to just one of 59 security-related charges after admitting that he improperly downloaded information from a secure computer at the Los Alamos National Laboratories.”
  4. “A suit by Dr Lee’s lawyers alleging racial discrimination – he is a Taiwanese -born US citizen was dropped as part of the plea bargain.”
  5. “The fact that the case had fallen apart indicated he had been labelled as a spy for China because of his race, said one Asian-American leader.”

Law Enforcement


Seto, Yasuo.The Sarin Gas Attack in Japan and the Related Forensic Investigation.Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 14. June 2001

  1. ”Lethal nerve gas attacks in the city of Matsumoto in 1994, and in the Tokyo subway system in 1995, led to the deaths of 19 people, as well as to a large number of injuries.” – page 14
  2. ”Aum Shinrikyo was established by Shoko Asahara, and it disseminated a unique doctrine that taught that one could kill another human being who continues to commit evil deeds, and is thus destined to go to hell. After failing to win support in the 1989 general election, the cult transformed itself into a terrorist group that produced arms in toxic gases.” – page 14
  3. ”While expanding its influence in Japan, Aum also set up branch offices overseas in the United States, Germany, and Sri Lanka.” – page 14
  4. ”Two days after the Sarin incident in Tokyo, a simultaneous raid of Aum facilities was launched by 2,500 police in connection with the imprisonment of a notary public manager who had died while being detained.” – page 15
  5. ”Using established forensic toxicological techniques, it was found that during the Matsumoto incident, Sarin gas was sprayed to murder the local court judges, but nearby residents also became exposed to the toxins.” – page 16
  6. ”In the Tokyo subway Sarin incident, the cult decided to use Sarin in trains on three subway station lines, all of which stop at Kasumigaseki station near the Matsumoto Police Department. The perpetrators boarded the subway trains with plastic bags containing Sarin, and released the gas by prodding the bags open with the metal tips of umbrellas.” – pages 16, 17

Chemical, Bioterrorism, Sarin, Japan, Law Enforcement, Organizations/Groups, WMD


Yoo, John C. and Robert J. Delahunty, “Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States,” OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNCIL, October 23, 2001.

  1. Posse Comitatus “only applies to the domestic use of the Armed Forces for law enforcement purposes, rather than for the performance of military function.” Exception: “allows the use of military when constitutionally or stautorily authorized.”
  2. Constitution “supports deployment of the military domestically, as well as abroad, to respond to attacks on the US.”
  3. PCA “intended to prevent the use of the military for domestic law enforcement purposes. It does not address the deployment of troops for domestic military operations against potential attacks on the US.”

Law Enforcement, Posse Comitatus Act, Military


Bolgiano, David G., “Military Support of Domestic Law Enforcement Operations: Working Within Posse Comitatus,” FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, December 2001, Volume 70, Issue 12, page 16.

  1. Legal issues from law enforcement/military overlap
  2. “encounter military support in counterdrug operations, training, disaster assistance, or search and rescue missions.”
  3. “police officers protect the public safety by investigating criminal activity while the military fights the battles against hostile enemies.”

Posse Comitatus Act, Military, Law Enforcement


Bernadette, Tansey, “U.S. requires scientists to give FBI fingerprints/ Thousands who use bioterror compounds must disclose data for background checksChronicle Staffwriter, SFGate, online March 12, 2003.

  1. “Thousands of established scientists must turn over their fingerprints and personal information to the FBI for background checks — a new requirement for researchers who work with anthrax and other potential bioterror agents.”
  2. “The measure is one of many new federal rules designed to tighten security at U.S. laboratories.”
  3. “Under the new rules, citizens of Iraq, Iran, North Korea and other countries suspected of supporting terrorism are disqualified from handling about 60 biological agents ranging from smallpox to botulism, a neurotoxin that is routinely used to study nerve pathways. Also barred from working with these “select agents” are those with a history of mental illness, illegal drug use, felony convictions or dishonorable discharges from the military.”
  4. “Ronald Atlas, president of the American Society for Microbiology, has warned that the huge initiative to register and investigate as many as 20,000 lab workers this spring could paralyze research just as the government is urging these labs to intensify bioterror defense work.”
  5. “In the aftermath of the 2001 attacks, lawmakers were shocked to find that the government had no clear data on how many U.S. labs possessed anthrax and other deadly germs.”
  6. “As a result, Congress passed new laws requiring up to 1,200 public and private labs to submit to an extensive approval process, install locks and identity checkpoints, and keep accurate inventories of dangerous agents. Scientists who possess the dangerous agents in violation of the rules can draw prison terms up to 10 years and hefty fines.”

Law Enforcement, Bioterrorism


Lecchire, Gary, and Michael A. Wermuth, et al., “Triage for Civil Support: Using Military Medical Assets to Respond to Terrorist Attacks“, TRIAGE, “Legal and Other Barriers to Military Support to Civil Authorities“, 2004.

  1. “State governments and their political subdivisions have primary responsibility for coping with emergencies, including terrorist events.”
  2. Military support for civil authorities, 4 categories allowed: ‘civil disturbance/insurrections, counterdrug operations, disaster relief, counterterrorism/weapons of mass destruction.’
  3. “Under the Stafford Act, a presidential declaration of a major disaster or an emergency triggers federal assistance. The type of federal assistance available depends on whether the situation is considered a disaster or an emergency.”
  4. “In the event of a catastrophic event, particularly when a deadly biological agent is implicated, officials, including military personnel, may need to restrict the civil liberties of Americans, especially freedom of movement, to prevent mass chaos and mitigate public health threats.”

Stafford Act, Public Health, Emergency Response, Posse Comitatus Act, Law Enforcement, Military


Prosser, Andrew, et. al, “The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspective,” June 16, 2004,

  1. “PSI states remain secretive about the methods being employed and the number of actual interdictions being carried out.”
  2. can board vessels “flying a given country’s flaf at sea” that participates in the initiative
  3. the power to stop and seize in high seas is “virtually non-existent”, can stop ships flying own flag and those that aren’t flagged
  4. internal waters, authority diminished in territorial seas
  5. “freedom of navigation on the high seas is limited in situations of slave trading, piracy, illicit narcotics trafficking, and unauthorized broadcasting, while innocent passage is inalienable ‘so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state.”
  6. “where a suspected WMD cargo is transported under the flag of a foreign state that does not wish to grant PSI member countries permission to board its ship, PSI participants will usually not have the authority to act.”
  7. “states not bound by an international treaty prohibiting the transfer of WMD technologies are permitted to transport mass destruction weapons cargoes”
  8. “interception of WMD transfers at sea might be viewed as consistent with UNSC resolutions”
  9. if a country opposes the initiative, PSI operations cannot be carried out

PSI, UNSCR 1540, Nonproliferation, WMD, Law Enforcement, ship boarding agreements


Byers, Michael, “Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 98, No. 3 (July, 2004), pp. 526-545.

  1. “Much of PSI involves nothing more than the consistent and rigorous application of existing rights under national and international law. Concurrently, the initiative promotes the development of new legal authorities by way of bilateral and multilateral treaties.” Pg. 528
  2. “A ship may be forcibly boarded on the high seas if it is reasonably suspected of engaging in piracy or the slave trade; lacks a flag (i.e., a single country of registration); or is broadcasting in an unauthorized manner toward, or is registered in, the state that wishes to board.” Pg. 527
  3. “Ships flagged by non-consenting states may be searched when in foreign harbors if reasonably suspected to be carrying armaments that have not been declared.” Pg. 531
  4. “In certain circumstances, customary international law might already allow for the high seas interdiction of suspected WMD or missile-laden vessels flagged by non-consenting states. These circumstances could arise when the vessel posed an imminent threat, either to the interdicting state or to a third state that requested the interdiction.” Pg. 532
  5. “The problem of non-consenting states such as North Korea will remain, leaving those wishing to take high seas action against vessels flying such flags with three options: securing a United Nations Security Council resolution that authorizes interdiction; claiming that the vessels pose a threat that falls within the scope of an existing, or evolving, customary international law right of preemptive self-defense; or simply violating international law.” Pg. 528
  6. “States may choose to breach the rules without advancing strained and potentially destabilizing legal justifications. By doing so, they allow their action to be assessed subsequently, not in terms of the law, but in terms of its political and moral legitimacy, with a view to mitigating their responsibility rather than exculpating themselves.” Pg. 543

PSI, Law Enforcement, WMD, North Korea


Shane, Scott, “Anthrax Inquiry Draws Criticism From Federal Judge,” NYT, A23, Oct. 8, 2004.

  1. Judge reviewed classified update from FBI.
  2. Hatfill civil suit for being called a “person of interest.”

Anthrax, Classified, Law Enforcement


Budowle, B. “Genetics and Attribution Issues that Confront the Microbial Forensics Field,” Forensic Science International 146S, 2004:S185-S188.

  1. “Laboratory stocks may show less diversity than samples found in nature.”
  2.  “It may not be possible to uniquely identify a source based on genetics alone.”

Attribution, Law Enforcement


Zilinskas, Raymond, et. al., “A Discussion Of Findings And Their Possible Implications From A Workshop On Bioterrorism Threat Assessment And Risk Management,Risk Analysis, vol. 24, No. 4, pgs. 901-909, 2004.

  1. “A quantitative bioterrorism risk assessment would need data or well-informed judgments on the intent of terrorist groups or individuals, their technical capabilities, the attributes of pathogens or toxins that might be used in a biological attack, target characteristics, and the occurrence (frequency) of various attack scenarios.”
  2. “A search of the CNS Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism database…revealed that out of 383 incidents in which biological, chemical, nuclear, or radiological agents were used by criminals or terrorists during the time 1900 to the present, only 77 biological ‘events’ were perpetrated. Of these, just four post-1945 events generated more than 10 casualties.”
  3. “Bioterrorism involves the use of pathogens or toxins against human, animal, or plant populations by a terrorist group to achieve political, social, or religious aims.”
  4. “Biocriminality involves the use of pathogens or toxins by an individual or group to attack human, animal, or plant populations for reasons of greed, blackmail, revenge, or other apolitical motives.”
  5. “The likely low rate of future attacks involving pathogens also makes it very difficult to calibrate, much less validate, whatever assessment methodology might be developed.”
  6. “By putting together data derived from content analysis of the threatening statement, an assailant’s history, and interviews of persons who are or were acquainted with the assailant, sufficient information can be collected for a fairly robust assessment of the threat that assailant presents to society in general and to a particular target.”
  7. “This process (vulnerability analysis) may also be referred to as logic modeling, problem formulation, or conceptual modeling. Available information might include: pathogens or toxins that might be used to harm the target area’s population and/or contaminate its environment, methods that might be used to disperse pathogens or toxins to achieve attack objectives, and the means attackers would use to emplace mechanisms for dispersing pathogens or toxins so as to have the highest probability of harming the target population and contaminating environs.”
  8. “For a longer-term project, we suggest augmentation and enhancement of vulnerability studies through the application of quantitative risk estimation techniques, supported by use of modeling exercises.”
  9. “Risk estimation then gathers what quantitative data are available regarding the attack scenario and proceeds through four steps–hazard characterization, hazard identification, exposure assessment, and risk characterization.”

Biosurveillance, Bioterrorism, Law Enforcement, WMD


Benjamin D. Kern, “101 Whacking, Joyriding and War-Driving: Roaming use of Wi-Fi and the Law” November, 2004, Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal Last Checked January 7, 2012.

  1. “’Whackers’ …will be defined as users who intentionally access a Wi-Fi network for destructive, malicious, theft or espionage purposes.”
  2. “Roaming Wi-Fi users include “joyriders” that use an open Wi-Fi connection to access the Internet,…”
  3. “’War-drivers,’ who scan, locate, and map Wi-Fi access points, and accidental users, who unintentionally connect to a Wi-Fi network.”
  4. “The term “hacker” is popularly used in the media to refer to a malicious computer or network user, although use of the term in technology circles is considerably more nuanced.”
  5. “A “whacker” is a hacker that uses wireless technology.”
  6. “Laws applicable to roaming Wi-Fi use will facilitate and encourage roaming, while deterring destructive behavior and providing remedies to any network operator injured by a malicious or destructive user.”
  7. “Several men pled guilty to violations of the CFAA and other statutes after accessing credit card information stored in the computer systems of Lowe’s hardware store by accessing a store’s open Wi-Fi network from the parking lot of the store.”
  8. “Internet-related legislation has clarified that those who provide access to the Internet to third-parties are not liable for the acts of these third-parties.”
  9. “The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) and Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) both include safe harbors that clarify that Internet service providers are not liable for content transmitted through their services, potentially including all of the types…”
  10. “Pre-DMCA case law makes clear that network operators that do not have knowledge of the content passing through their networks have little danger of being liable for copyright infringement.”
  11. “The Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (“CAN-SPAM”) clarifies that liability for spam sent by a user of an open Wi-Fi network would rest with the user, not the network operator.”
  12. “Whether or not the CDA, DMCA, and CAN-SPAM Acts expressly apply to all materials that may be transmitted through an open Wi-Fi network, courts have recognized that Congressional intent to absolve service providers has been very broad.”
  13. “The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (“CFAA”) prohibits unauthorized access to a computer or network in a number of specific situations.”
  14. “To violate the most widely applicable provisions of the CFAA, a user must intentionally access a network without authorization, and must either obtain information or cause damage and a loss exceeding a threshold amount.”
  15. “Many state statutes, as well as the CFAA, prohibit intentional unauthorized access, but do not clarify what level of mens rea applies to the unauthorized nature of the user’s access.”
  16. “Most states have statutes that prohibit intentional, unauthorized access to, or use of, computer networks.”
  17. “Current federal and state laws may apply to the use of Wi-Fi networks for whacking activities, and to roaming use of open Wi-Fi networks for purposes of accessing the Internet, and, at least in California, to war-driving.”
  18. “A lack of clarity and consistency among existing laws threatens to have a chilling effect on this important direction of future growth for the Internet.”

Cybersecurity, Law, Hacker, Law Enforcement


USA Today, “Lowe’s hardware hacker gets nine years” 15 December, 2004, Last Checked 29 December, 2011.

  1. “One of three Michigan men who hacked into the national computer system of Lowe’s hardware stores and tried to steal customers’ credit card information was sentenced Wednesday to nine years in federal prison.”
  2. “The government said it is the longest prison term ever handed down in a U.S. computer crime case.”
  3. “Brian Salcedo, 21, of Whitmore Lake, Mich., pleaded guilty in August to conspiracy and other hacking charges.”
  4. “Salcedo’s sentence… exceeds that given to the hacker Kevin Mitnick, who spent more than 5½ years behind bars, according to a Justice Department Web site that tracks cyber-crime prosecutions.”
  5. “Adam Timmins, became one of the first people convicted of “wardriving,” in which hackers go around with an antenna, searching for vulnerable wireless Internet connections.”
  6. “Prosecutors said the three men tapped into the wireless network of a Lowe’s store in Southfield, Mich., used that connection to enter the chain’s central computer system in North Wilkesboro, N.C., and installed a program to capture credit card information.”
  7. “The case was prosecuted in Charlotte because it is home to an FBI cyber-crime task force.”
  8. “Mitnick led the FBI on a three-year manhunt that ended in 1995 and is said to have cost companies millions of dollars by stealing their software and altering computer information.”
  9. “Victims included Motorola, Novell, Nokia and Sun Microsystems.”
  10. “I think the massive amount of potential loss that these defendants could have imposed was astounding, so that’s what caused us to seek a substantial sentence against Mr. Salcedo, …”

Cybersecurity, Hacker, Law Enforcement


Ronald M. Atlas, “Biosecurity concerns: Changing the face of academic research,” Chemical Health & Safety, May/June 2005.

  1. “Biosecurity concerns are starting to exceed those of biosafety.”

Law, Law Enforcement, Open Science, Biosecurity, Academia



  1. “Al-Qa’ida documents recovered from a training camp in Afghanistan show interest in a variety of biological agents and mentioned plague, anthrax, cholera and tularemia.”
  2. “To determine threat, we examine an actor’s capability and intent. We assess capability based on factors such as the actor’s level of skill or knowledge, their ability to acquire a biological agent, the materials necessary to grow the agent and their capacity to effectively disseminate a biological agent. For intent, in addition to the actor’s desire to simply use biological weapons, we discern which agents they are more likely to pursue, their preferred method of deployment and which targets they intend to attack.”
  3. “Last month one of our analysts provided some of the Committee members with a classified briefing on the specifics of the current bioterrorist threat to the Homeland.  I will not be able to revisit this classified threat assessment in this open forum but we would be happy to provide this information to additional members in a closed session.”
  4. “On occasion, we require quick access to information that does not reside within IA. In these cases, our analysts are supported to the Biodefense Knowledge Center (BKC)—a 24×7 support cell based at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and sponsored by the S&T Directorate. The BKC possesses vast repositories of biological technical information and is able to access SMEs from around the country, such as the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense (USAMRICD), and the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), in support of a tasking from IA. The BKC compiles the appropriate information and relays it to our analysts who integrate the information into their finished intelligence analysis.”
  5. “Our analysts regularly collaborate with other intelligence agencies, particularly NCTC, DIA, FBI, and CIA.  We also work with experts from government, academic, and private institutions and partner with scientists who keep us abreast of their potential areas of concern and the trends they see.  Interaction with outside public and private sector institutions keeps us well-informed of new and emerging technology that may be exploited or misused by malicious actors.  For example, IA recently hosted a workshop on emerging biotechnologies and the future biological threat.  This provided a forum for non-governmental experts to provide IA with information of which they believe we should monitor.”
  6. “Our analysts are broadly focused and access a wide array of information in gathering source material for our assessments. They use all-source intelligence, scientific and technical information, terrorist profiles, historical trends, and open source information such as media reports and scientific journal articles.”
  7. “We keep current on foreign State biological weapons program developments as these activities may have implications for future terrorist events. We look at the intent of the enemy, their capabilities, potential scenarios, and attack vectors. Working with counterterrorist experts in the Community, we develop link charts on potential associates here in the United States of operatives abroad who may have received training in WMD capabilities or have knowledge of WMD programs.”
  8. “we assessed the implications of the H2N2 influenza shipment in which a U.S. contractor sent a highly virulent strain of influenza to hundreds of laboratories worldwide. We also recently published an Information Bulletin advising State and local Law Enforcement officials of
    indicators of covert anthrax production. Generally, our products fall into two categories: threat assessments and feasibility assessments.”
  9. “Threat Assessments. Threat assessments are written on known actors and are based on specific intelligence. To determine threat, we examine an actor’s capability and intent. We calculate capability based on factors such as a particular actor’s level of skill or knowledge; their ability to acquire a biological agent and the materials necessary to grow the agent; and their capacity to effectively disseminate a biological agent. For intent, we consider more than just an actor’s desire to use biological weapons. We attempt to discern which agents they are more likely to pursue, their preferred method of deployment, and which targets they intend to attack.”
  10. “Feasibility Assessments. Intelligence is never complete or all-knowing and we cannot wait until intelligence is received in order to consider plausible scenarios or the impact of a particular technique or technology on a bioterrorist’s capability. To move beyond this limitation, IA, in partnership with S&T, conducts assessments of biological processes, emerging technologies, and techniques and determines their feasibility for use in a bioterrorism event.  These assessments include indicators that will help to identify if a particular scenario begins to unfold so we can prevent or disrupt events before they occur. In conjunction with the feasibility assessment, we are producing unclassified excerpts with the indicators which are distributed widely to local, State, Federal officials as well as the private sector to enhance awareness in the field and to increase suspicious activity reporting and trigger investigations where necessary.”
  11. “IA also has produced several bioterrorism-specific ‘‘red team’’ products, which explore issues from a terrorist’s perspective using nongovernmental experts and creative thinkers. These topics have included terrorist use of genetically modified food and recombinant DNA technologies to damage the U.S. food supply; possible terrorist exploitation of a U.S. flu vaccine shortage; and the safety and security impacts of a pandemic influenza outbreak.
  12. “Under the BioShield legislation, DHS is charged with assessing current and emerging threats of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents; and determining which of such agents present a material threat against the United States population. S&T, supported by IA, has been conducting Material Threat Assessments (MTAs) and Material Threat Determinations (MTDs) in order to guide near term BioShield requirements and acquisitions.”
  13. “MTAs … are speculative and represent a best estimate of how an adversary may create a high-consequence event using the agent/weapon in question. Currently, MTAs are drafted by the S&T and IA provides comments on the assessment before it is provided to HHS. In our review, we ensure that the assessment reflects what IA assesses is the general capability of terrorist groups that are pursuing biological weapons.”
  14. “MTAs result in an estimate of the number of exposed individuals, the geographical extent of the exposure, and other collateral effects. If these consequences are of such a magnitude to be of significant concern to our national security, the Secretary of DHS then issues a formal Material Threat Determination to the Secretary of HHS, which initiates the BioShield process. To date, one MTA has been completed for anthrax and MTAs for plague, botulinum toxin, tularemia, radiological devices and chemical nerve agents are underway and an MTA for viral hemorrhagic fevers will be initiated next month. MTDs have been approved for four agents: smallpox, anthrax, botulinum toxin, and radiological/nuclear devices.”
  15. “IA, in cooperation with NCTC and the FBI, is providing WMD outreach briefings around the country. These briefings outline the terrorist WMD threat, including descriptions of the types of weapons used and indicators and warnings aimed at increase awareness and reporting. In the near future, we hope to expand these briefings to other audiences such as academia and the private sector to further increase awareness and reporting.”
  16. “IA will be playing a key role in supplying current intelligence to the National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) operations center once it begins operation later this summer. NBIS will fuse information on human, plant, and animal health with environmental monitoring of air, food, and water systems. This information will be integrated with threat and intelligence information to provide real-time situational awareness and identify anomalies or trends of concern to the Homeland Security Operations Center.”

Project Bioshield, Al-Qaeda, Information Policy, Academia, Lab Safety, Flu, Vaccination, Law Enforcement, WMD, Plague, Anthrax, Biosurveillance, Nuclear, Radiological Surveillance, Cholera, Tularemia


Peek, Laura, “Chemist suspect cornered in CairoThe Daily Mail, online July 17, 2005.

  1. “Magdy Al Nashar, 33, was arrested in a dawn raid on his parents’ home by Egyptian secret service agents following a request for help from the British authorities.”
  2. “The Chemistry PhD student has been missing since June 30. He helped the fourth suicide bomber to rent a flat in Leeds last month. Al Nashar who has studied biochemistry at Leeds University since 2000 and his lodger, Jamal Lindsay, disappeared a week before the bombs.”
  3. “Lindsay carried out the attack which killed at least 25 people at Russell Square. On Tuesday police raided the housing association flat in Burley, Leeds, and evacuated neighbours after finding explosives.”
  4. “Egyptian security services spokesman General Mahmoud El Fishawi told the Daily Mail: ‘We just do not know if he is guilty or innocent. If we find a link with the London bombings, he will be sent back to Britain.’There was a series of secret meetings between the bombers at the Burley flat believed to be their bomb factory in the weeks leading up to the attacks.”
  5. “There was a series of secret meetings between the bombers at the Burley flat believed to be their bomb factory in the weeks leading up to the attacks.”
  6. “Police carried out a controlled explosion at the flat on Tuesday. Detectives found traces of evidence from all four bombers.”
  7. “The Arab Al-Maadi district of Cairo where Al Nashar grew up has been described as a hotbed for fanatics because it is so easy to disappear in its maze of narrow dusty streets.”

Law Enforcement, Academia, Europe, U.K.


Editors, “Freed chemist worried over return to UK,” Daily Mail, Aug 10, 2005.

  1. ”An Egyptian chemist released without charge yesterday after three weeks of questioning over the July 7 London bombings said he wants to return to the UK.”
  2. ”Egyptian authorities found no evidence to link the former Leeds University student to the attack or to Al Qaeda.”
  3. ”He knew two of the suicide bombers casually – helping find Lindsey Germaine a place to live in Leeds – but said he was innocent of any involvement.”
  4. ”He was detained in Cairo after Britain notified Egyptian authorities they suspected he may have had links to some of the terrorists, three of whom were from Leeds.”
  5. ”El-Nashar had returned to Egypt on holiday a week before the attacks; Egyptian authorities arrested him on July 14, a week after the bombings.”

Law Enforcement, Academia, Europe, U.K.


Reitze, Arnold, Jr., “Emergency Response and Planning Requirements Applicable to Unpermitted Air Pollution Releases,” 2005 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1075, P. 1184.

  1. “CAA section 112(r)(1) includes a general duty clause that imposes on owners and operators of stationary sources handling extremely hazardous substances a general duty in the same manner and to the same extent as section 654 of Title 29 [OSH Act] to identify hazards which may result from such releases using appropriate hazard assessment techniques, to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases, and to minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do occur. n865”
  2. ”… It places a burden of prevention and minimization on owners or operators without regulatory action by the EPA, and it prevents shifting of liability to the government because of the EPA’s approval of risk management plans. n867”
  3. ”…The clause imposes three obligations: (1) identify hazards from potential accidental release; (2) design and maintain a safe facility in taking the necessary steps to prevent release; and (3) minimize damage from actual accidental releases. n868 The general duty clause itself does not prescribe how these measures will be achieved. n869 The clause is performance-based; it places the burden on those using these substances to demonstrate safe practices regarding accidental releases. n870” …
  4. ”Because the general duty clause is based on the OSH Act, n873 the case law construing the Act, including the decisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, are applicable. n874 Importantly, however, only the EPA and DOJ can enforce the general duty clause. n875 States, even with delegation of risk management programs, cannot enforce the clause. n876”
  5. p. 1187 ” The DOJ was to review the effect of Clean Air Act (CAA) regulations on the prevention of chemical releases, including those that may be released as a result of chemical activity. It also was to develop, test, and validate a protype vulnerability assessment methodology to assess the security of chemical facilities against terrorist and criminal acts. n887 On May 30, 2002, nearly two years late, the DOJ submitted its interim report. It was based on a study of only eleven of the 15,000 chemical manufacturing facilities subject to the CAA’s RMP provisions; therefore, the study cannot be generalized to the industry as a whole. The DOJ determined the report’s release would pose a threat to national security, and, based on the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(7)(H)(xi)(III)), it would not make the report public. n888 On May 6, 2002, the EPA’s Administrator was given the authority in an administrative order to classify as “secret” any information that might pose a national security risk. n889 The legislation establishing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) exempts from public disclosure information about physical and cybersecurity for information submitted voluntarily to DHS. n890”
  6. P.1190 “The CAA section 112(r), both the general duty clause and section 112(r)(7)(A), could be used to deal with terrorist threats. However, it is not clear that an intentional targeting of a facility or a population was intended to be covered by section 112(r)’s planning requirements; nor is it clear that the general duty clause, which is [*1191] based on OSHA’s general duty clause, was ever intended for use as a homeland security measure. A legislative fix is needed, but it has been a difficult task to develop a comprehensive bill that a majority in Congress would support. To date, only narrowly focused legislation has been enacted.”

Law, Chemical, Information Policy, Law Enforcement


Pine, Art. “Should Congress Scrap Posse Comitatus?U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. December 2005. Last Checked. September 9, 2012

  1. ”Posse Comitatus is not the only governing statute on this issue, however. The 1974 Stafford Act broadly permits the president to use federal troops at home whenever he declares a disaster to be “an incident of national significance” — something Bush did the Saturday before Katrina struck.”
  2. “The 1956 Insurrection Act enables him to send U.S. forces to deal with civil disorders, even without a request from a state’s governor. And other titles permit the White House to send troops to deal with emergencies involving nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. The Pentagon, too, has directives that authorize such action.”
  3. ”Eventually, the military response to Katrina included about 50,000 National Guard troops, 22,000 active-duty forces, about 350 military helicopters, and 20 ships. The flaw was in how long it took to get permission for them to deploy.”
  4. ”Some say the 1878 law is a relic of a different age that ties the hands of the military during natural disasters and should be repealed or revised. Others say that the statute still serves an important purpose. Meanwhile, paratroopers from the Army’s 82d Airborne Division (at left) were assisting civilian search-and-rescue personnel after Hurricane Katrina.”
  5. ”Few question that the military is best equipped to cope with major calamities such as Katrina when the impact spreads beyond what state and local agencies can handle. The armed forces already have a broad command structure and communications system in place, with an array of helicopters, trucks, and medical facilities, along with sufficient manpower to quell civil disorders.”
  6. ”Indeed, a recent study cited some 167 incidents over the past 200 years in which presidents have used federal troops to enforce the law, from suppressing insurrections and quelling race riots to breaking strikes and enforcing civil rights legislation.”

 Posse Comitatus Act, Law Enforcement, Military, Emergency Response


Sullivan, Eileen, “DOD Sees Larger Role in Disaster Support if Civilian Responders Can’t Handle Job“, CQ HOMELAND SECURITY, May 15, 2006.

  1. “The Department of Defense will have a larger role in providing civil support during disasters or catastrophes, but only if local, state and federal civilian responders do not have the resources or expertise to handle the disaster themselves.”
  2. “DOD cautions that there should not be too much reliance on military support during disasters, because military assets – first and foremost – exist for DOD’s national security mission and may not be available for domestic response.”

Military, Emergency Response, Law Enforcement, Homeland Security


Berger, Matthew, E., “Lawmakers Uneasy About White House Plan for Combatting Pandemic Flu,” CQ Homeland Security, May 16, 2006.

  1. Jursidiction for HHS & DHS.
  2. “DHS in charge of law and order.”
  3. supplies and distribution: masks, vaccination, response.

Law Enforcement, Homeland Security, Flu, Vaccination, Jurisdiction, Pandemic


CBP Media Services, “Container Security Initiative 2006-2011 Strategic Plan“, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, August 2006:

  1. primary system of global trade = containerized shipping, protected from terrorists
  2. pre-screen containers posing a potential threat before leaving foreign ports for US
  3. began in January 2002
  4. Goals: identify high risk containers through intelligence, prescreen and evaluate containers before shipped, use X-ray, Gamma ray, and radiation detection devices to prescreen, and use more secure containers to identify containers tampered with
  5. 44 ports worldwide use CSI as of August 2006
  6. “The World Customs Organization, the EU, and the G8 support CSI expansion and have adopted resolutions to introduce and implement security measures and non-intrusive inspection standards similar to CSI at ports throughout the world.”
  7. part of CBP’s mission to “prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the US” through maritime containers
  8. “Examinations of cargo or persons do not require search warrants, probable cause, or particularized suspicion” * hope to have around 70 ports use CSI by 2010

Homeland Security, Export Control, Law Enforcement, CBP, Interdiction, CSI



  1. “During a bioterrorism incident, 68.9% of hospitals would contact EMS, 68.7% percent law enforcement, 61.6% fire departments, 58.1% HAZMAT, and 42.8% all four. About 74.2% had staged mass casualty drills with EMS, 70.4% with fire departments, 67.4% with law enforcement, 43.3% with HAZMAT, and 37.0% with all four.” (Pg. 1)
  2. “Federal funding through HRSA for hospital preparedness, including mass casualty drills, has fallen from a high of $514.9 million in fiscal year 2004, to $474.2 million in FY 2006.8 But the HRSA National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program continues to encourage integration of hospitals with public safety organizations, such as fire departments, EMS, and law enforcement” (Pg. 4)
  3. “Farmer and Carlton (2006) commented that a major factor working against developing a better interface between hospitals and communities in disaster planning was cultural differences between public and private entities, with 95% of police, fire, and EMS systems being public and 95% of the medical capability being private” (Pg. 5).
  4. “The majority of hospitals involve public safety organizations in their emergency plans and drills, but some types of hospitals are more likely to do so than others. Higher hospital bed capacity was the characteristic most predictive of drilling with these organizations.” (Pg. 5)

Bioterrorism, Public Health, Emergency Response, Law Enforcement


Epstein, Gerald L., “Law Enforcement and the Prevention of Bioterrorism: Its Impact on the US Research Community,” GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE IMPACT OF UNSCR 1540, Eds. Bosch, Olivia and Peter van Ham, Brookings Institution Press: 2007.

  1. Law enforcement aims to prosecute offenders, tighten security and increase preventitive measures for bioterrorism.
  2. concern over biological research use
  3. The AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: regualting transport of biological agents, prevent access for criminal use.
  4. imbalanced rules in science vs. law enforcement, restrictions on biological research impeding/infringing upon research creativity
  5. Tomas Foral, Thomas Butler, Steven Kurtz

Bioterrorism, Lab Safety, UNSCR 1540, Law Enforcement


Guilfoyle, Douglas, “Maritime Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW, 2007, Volume 12, No.1, pages 1-36.

  1. Maritime law enforcement- stop and search a vessel at sea “potentially seizing cargo and arresting persons aboard.”
  2. flag vessels enforced by their states, flag-state consent
  3. “a coastal state can enforce its criminal law against ships bound for, or leaving, its internal waters.”
  4. “so long as the acts of a vessel situated within the contiguous zone produce an infringement of a coastal state’s customs, fiscal, sanitary, and immigration laws within the territorial sea, ‘control’ could be asserted to punish those acts.”
  5. “In 1992, the Security Council identified the ‘proliferation of all WMD’ as a ‘threat to international peace and security.’”

PSI, UNSCR 1540, Law Enforcement, Law, Nonproliferation, WMD, UN Convention on the Law of the Sea


Hodgkinson, Sandra L., “Challenges to Maritime Interception Operations in the War on Terror: Bridging the Gap,AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, Washington College of Law, 22 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 583, 2007.

  1. MIOs- Maritime interception Operations – to deter, deny, disrupt movement of terrorists and terrorist related materials
  2. maritime interdiction as “anticipatory self-defense”
  3. PSI – more than 75 participating nations
  4. “PSI does not specifically establish any boarding authority and does not provide participating states with any new legal authority to conduct interdictions in intl waters”
  5. SOSAN incident helped in the development of PSI – Spanish forces found “fifteen scud missiles” along with the reported cement on a North Korean ship; brought to the attention of Spanish forces
  6. “PSI was officially announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003 in Krakow, Poland”
  7. BBC China – German owned ship – thousands of “gas centrifuge components that can be used to enrich uranium” were found and recovered; brought to attention of US and British intelligence, components recovered in Italy
  8. Post October 2003 – US has formed bilateral boarding agreements with 6 nations

Nonproliferation, PSI, WMD, Law Enforcement, Interdiction


Kemsley, JyllianFBI Reaches Out To Campuses”, C&EN, online July 16, 2007.

  1. “Thomas Mahlik, notes that classified research usually starts off as unclassified, often in a university environment. Traditionally, the FBI and other law enforcement agencies have focused on classified information only and would react after a leak had occurred. “In that case, it’s too late,” Mahlik says. “The secret’s gone.”
  2. “In an effort to stem such losses, the FBI in 2005 launched the Counterintelligence Domain Program. The domain in question is research, information, and technologies that are not classified but still have potentially critical importance to U.S. economic and military power. The goal of the program is to reach out to researchers and build relationships, especially with an academic community historically wary of law enforcement.”
  3. “One component of the counterintelligence program is the Academic Alliance. Directed at U.S. colleges and universities, the goal is not to dictate to researchers what they should and should not do, but to foster communication between national security agencies and the researchers generating technology.”
  4. “We want to break down all the barriers of the past,” the FBI’s Mahlik says. “We need to come to terms as to what’s the right balancing mechanism to have information exchange that doesn’t spike great paranoia. If we agree to disagree that’s fine, but at least we’re talking about it and not waiting for an incident to occur. The toughest time to build relationships is in a time of crisis.”
  5. “Concern expressed by university leadership was the vague nature of what they were being asked to look for in terms of identifying security risks. There weren’t any clear examples that the FBI was able to give the academics.”
  6. “Now, what the FBI and others are trying to establish is more of a needed communication. Instead of responding because of compliance or contract, communities respond because it’s the right thing to do.”

Law Enforcement, Academia


Van Ham, Peter & Olivia Bosch, “Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism : The Tole of Resolution 1540 and Its Implications“, GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE IMPACT OF UNSCR 1540, Eds. Bosch, Olivia, and Peter van Ham, Brookings Institution Press: 2007.

  1. “Because international law does not apply to individuals, non-state actors are subject only to prohibitions laid down in an often ambiguous patchwork of domestic law.”
  2. “The process of ratification means that a state makes the international treaty obligations part of its domestic law and national regulations.”

Nonproliferation, UNSCR 1540, Law Enforcement


Song, Yann-Huei, “The U.S.-Led Proliferation Security Initiative and UNCLOS: Legality, Implementation, and an Assessment”, Ocean Development & International Law, 38: 101-145 (2007).

  1. “UNCLOS, which is considered ‘[a] Constitution for the Oceans,’… has been praised as the most comprehensive political and legislative work ever undertaken by the United Nations.” (pg.102)
  2. “There is nothing in UNCLOS that explicitly prohibits the possession or transportation of ‘WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials’ by a foreign-flagged vessel.” (pg115)
  3. “‘PSI requires participating countries to act consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks,’ which includes the law reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.’” (pg.113)
  4. “Three major factors should be considered in determining if a PSI interception is permissible under international law: first, the nature of the cargo transferred or transported by the intercepted vessel; second, the location where the interception action takes place; and third, the nationality of the intercepted vessel.” (pg.114)
  5. “In order to legally intercept WMD-related cargos, PSI participating countries must present reasonable evidence showing that the WMD-related cargoes are being transferred or transported to and from ‘states and non-state actors of proliferation concern’ and will be used for nonpeaceful purposes.” (pg.115)
  6. “An interdiction is legal under UNCLOS if the vessel that is being interdicted flies the flag of the interdicting country or flies the flag of a state that consents to the interdiction.” (pg.118)
  7. “It would also be legal for a PSI participating country to stop a vessel flying no flags or more than one flag in its national waters or international waters.” (pg.118)
  8. “Interdictions can be undertaken in different maritime zones, including internal waters, territorial sea, archipelagic waters, contiguous zone, straits used for international navigations, EEZs, and the high seas.” (pg.116)
  9. “There are other international treaties, regimes, and frameworks that can be relied on if interdiction actions against suspect vessels that carry or transport ‘WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials’ to and from ‘states and non-states of proliferation concern’ are necessary.” (pg.125)
  10. “The United States maintains that the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles are consistent with the UN Security Resolution 1540, operative paragraph 10 which ”’calls upon” all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials.’” (pg.113)
  11. “The legality of an interdiction action must be examined on a case-by-case basis.” (pg.122)

Law, WMD, Law Enforcement, PSI, UNSCR 1540



”’Fowler, Daniel”’, CQ Homeland Security, January 14, 2008, “ACLU, HHS Debate Pandemic Preparedness Strategies,” -Avian [[Flu]]- /leaning toward law enforcement and national security/George Annas/Wendy K. Mariner/Wendy E. Parmet/civil liberties/[[Public Health]]/disaster/catastrophe/
”’Hafer,Nathaniel, Vos, Cheryl J., Stebbins, Michael, McAllister, Karen, Lorenzi, Gretchen, Moore, Christopher, Berger, Kavita M”’., Science Progress, “How Scientists View Law Enforcement,” Dec. 22, 2008. []
*”Our survey shows that scientists share many of the common stereotypes held of law enforcement by the general public. More interestingly, it elucidates some issues that are specific to the science community, such as a general expressed reluctance to discuss research with law enforcement, despite an expressed willingness to share expertise to aid in criminal investigations.”
*”Increasing scientific literacy among law enforcement personnel who work with scientists may be one important avenue to ensure a strong relationship and clear communication between the law enforcement and science communities.”
**”See also”: ”’Central Intelligence Agency Report”’: “The Darker Bioweapons Future,” OTI SF 2003-108, 3 November 2003.
**”Most panelists [ A panel of life science experts convened for the Strategic Assessments Group by the National Academy of Sciences] agred that the US life sciences research community was more or less ‘over its Vietnam-era distrust” of the national security establishment and would be open to more collaboration.”
”’Hakim, D., Peters, J.W.”’ “Scientist for State Police Kills Himself,” The New York Times, May 24, 2008.
*“A State Police scientist hanged himself in his garage Friday, law enforcement officials said, the second time in a little over a week that someone with ties to the agency has killed himself.”
*“Mr. Veeder appeared to have been distressed about an unrelated investigation of evidence handling by the State Police crime lab in Albany, according to a published report. The report, which appeared Friday on the Web site of The Times Union of Albany, said a suicide note written by Mr. Veeder cited his concerns about the investigation.”
*“Lieutenant Miner did confirm, however, that the police had begun an investigation of the lab after recently finishing an audit of its policies and procedures to meet national accreditation requirements. He gave no details of what was learned in the audit that prompted an investigation.”
*“The episode is the latest to weigh on the agency, which is now facing investigations on multiple fronts. Mr. Veeder’s suicide is the third to hit the State Police in less than two months.”
*[[Law Enforcement]], [[Misconduct]]
”’Sands, Derek”’, “Former DOE counterintelligence official faults security at nuclear laboratories,” Platts Inside Energy, September 29, 2008.

* “Terry Turchie, a distinguished FBI agent who led the “Unabomber” case and who previously served as the head of counterintelligence at DOE’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, charged in a letter that Congress is being misled by DOE on the “true nature” of the effectiveness of counterintelligence at the laboratories.”
* “In his letter, Turchie outlined problems at the labs, and said that he left DOE over the “dangerously chaotic state of counterintelligence” within the department. He said DOE’s decision to merge the intelligence and counterintelligence operations at the department and at the National Nuclear Security Administration has meant “the vulnerability of DOE personnel and facilities to hostile intelligence entities has increased exponentially.” Turchie left Livermore in September 2007.”
* “Gregory Wilshusen, of the Government Accountability Office, unveiled a report that praised some physical and computer security progress at Los Alamos National Laboratory, but also expressed skepticism that the progress could be sustained.”
* “The DOE nuclear weapons labs — Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, and Los Alamos national laboratories — have been the target of criticism from GAO and DOE’s inspectors general for years over problems securing their computer hardware and their information over networks, as well as their ability to repel possible terrorist attacks.”
* “There have been a number of computer-related security breaches at Los Alamos in recent years, including the theft of hard drives containing sensitive data by an employee, as well as the loss of nine data disks by lab contractors.”
* “The vulnerability of yellow networks has been brought into sharp relief by recent DOE security exercises, according to Glenn Podonsky, director of DOE’s Office of Health, Safety and Security. For example, a “red team” of six DOE computer experts managed to take over the yellow networks at two of DOE’s non-nuclear science labs and download over 40,000 documents, including sensitive material, Podonsky said at the Dingell hearing. The team also took over the network of a DOE lab site office, he said.”
* [[Law Enforcement]], [[Nuclear]], [[Lab Security]]

”’Townsend, Mark”’, “Terrorists try to infiltrate UK’s top labs: The security services have intercepted up to 100 suspects posing as postgraduate students who aim to acquire weapons material and expertise,” The Observer, online November 2, 2008

*”Dozens of suspected terrorists have attempted to infiltrate Britain’s top laboratories in order to develop weapons of mass destruction, such as biological and nuclear devices, during the past year.”
*”The security services, MI5 and MI16, have intercepted up to 100 potential terrorists posing as postgraduate students who they believe tried accessing laboratories to gain the materials and expertise needed to create chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, the governments has confirmed.”
*”Extensive background checks from the security services, using a new vetting scheme, have led to the rejection of overseas students who were believed to be intent on developing weapons of mass destruction.”
*”A spokesman for Universities UK, which represents vice-chancellors, said the security scheme had so far proved effective.  He added: ‘It is important to protect the UK from people who may wish to use technology and materials here inappropriately.’”
*”’Law Enforcement”’, [[WMD]]
”’Martin, Timothy”’, “Drawing Lines in the Sea”, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2008, Vol. 134 Issue 12, p58-62.
*“PSI is a cooperative although informal arrangement, without a formal treaty. All states party to this arrangement agreed to the 2003 Statement of Interdiction Principles (SIP), which gives guidance on the interception of vessels under accepted international law as laid out in the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Participating states agree to abide by these principles, but the SIP does not authorize states to conduct interdictions at sea.”
*“Determining what cargo is ‘reasonably suspected’ is likely to be contestable, as many states reserve the right to ship military, nuclear, and other material by sea, and there is nothing in UNCLOS that specifically prohibits the transport of WMDs through international waters.”
*“To determine acceptable measures for law enforcement and interdiction in international waters requires that common perceptions exist regarding the level of threat, and that the national interests of states have been considered.”
*“Vessels registered or flagged to a particular state retain that state’s sovereign protection. So when authorities interdict a suspicious vessel, they must pay attention to these limitations, or risk being accused either of violating a foreign state’s territorial jurisdiction, or breaching international conventions on freedom of the seas.”
*“International agreements greatly accelerate the process by which law enforcement officials from one state can board suspect vessels flying the flag of another, especially when the flag state is unable to exercise control over the vessel due to its location or other factors, or maintain contact with suspect vessels entering national waters and airspace.”
*[[PSI]], [[Law Enforcement]], [[WMD]], [[Military]]

== 2009 ==
”’Asada, Masahiko”’, “Security Council Resolution 1540 to Combat WMD Terrorism: Effectiveness and Legitimacy in International Legislation”, JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW, Oxford University Press, 2009.
* desperate need for nuclear security
* each state should make certain acts punishable by law with penailties equal to the crime
* problems with creating a national treaty to combat terrorism, proliferation of WMDs.
* [[UNSCR 1540]], [[WMD]], [[Nonproliferation]]
”’Editors”’, “Ebola vials found in car trunk: Ex-Winnipeg scientist arrested at U.S. border,” Toronto Star, A29, May 14, 2009,
*” Konan Michel Yao, 42, is in U.S. custody charged with smuggling.”
*” The U.S. Centers for Disease Control, which has possession of the missing vials, has determined some contain small amounts of genetic Ebola material, said Plummer.”
*”Dr. Frank Plummer, head of the Winnipeg lab, said Yao did not have security clearance to work with high-level pathogens such as the Ebola virus. But he was allowed to work on an Ebola vaccine project in the facility’s special pathogens unit.”
*”The vials, according to court documents, were in a glove, wrapped in aluminum foil and placed in a plastic bag. They were found in the trunk of the scientist’s car.”
*”But he [Plummer] added the material poses no risk to public health. ‘It was not infectious,’ Plummer told reporters yesterday. ‘The only thing (Yao) could have done with it would be to make an Ebola vaccine.’”
*“Yao left work in January when his research fellowship ended and he signed a document swearing he had not taken any government property, said Plummer.”
*[[Law Enforcement]], [[Ebola]], [[Lab Security]], [[Canada]]
”’Brumfiel, Geoff”’, “Particle Physicist ‘Falsely Accused’, Claims Brother,” Nature, online October 13, 2009.
*”French authorities placed Adlene Hicheur, a postdoc at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL), under formal investigation for possible ‘criminal association in relation to a terrorist undertaking’, He has been held since 8 October, after a raid at his family’s home in the town of Vienne, southeastern France.”
*”According to press reports, anti-terrorism police apparently have evidence that the 32-year-old may have had e-mail correspondence with ‘al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’ -the North African branch of the terrorist organization al-Qaeda –about potential targets for terrorist attacks within France.”
*”Based on conversations with other family members, Halim believes that Adlene’s arrest is probably connected to a land purchase in Algeria.  Halim told Nature that just before the police raid, Adlene withdrew E13,000 (US$19,200) in cash with which to purchase land near the family’s ancestral home of Setif in northeastern Algeria.  He says that the police were initially asking about the money.”
*”In a statement, CERN said that it ‘does not carry out research in the fields of nuclear power or nuclear weaponry’ and that it addressed ‘fundamental questions about the nature of matter and the Universe’.  The physicist who worked with Adlene adds that there is nothing from Adlene’s high-energy physics training that could have been used in a terrorist attack.  ‘We don’t have any material or anything you could use for bad things,’ he says, ‘except maybe a hammer.'”
*[[Law Enforcement]], [[Academia]], [[Nuclear]], [[al-Qaeda]], [[France]], [[Algeria]]
”’Bremner, Charles, Sage, Adam”’, “Hadron Collider physicist Adlene Hicheur charged with terrorism,” TimesOnline, october 13, 2009. []
*”However, his arrest last week has sparked a furious row among France’s anti-terrorist magistrates. Judge Teissier’s critics say that he missed an opportunity to obtain invaluable information about Aqim networks by moving to detain the suspect at an early stage in his investigation. They said that he should have held off and kept the man under surveillance.”
*”Brice Hortefeux, the French Interior Minister, is also being criticised for publicising the arrest. Detractors say that the publicity will have driven the suspect’s contacts underground.”
*”Residents in the suspect’s home town of Vienne, in eastern France, said that his success had made him a role model for young Muslims. ‘They are good boys,’ said one neighbour of the suspect and his brother. ‘They are from a family of six children and from a very moderate Muslim family which is seen as a model of integration.’”
*”The suspect’s brother is reported to have graduated from the University of Paris with a degree in biomechanics.”
*”He was placed under surveillance by French officers last year after US intelligence services intercepted internet messages he allegedly sent to contacts close to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Aqim).”
*[[Law Enforcement]], [[Misconduct]], [[France]], [[Physics]]
”’Harris, Gardiner”’, “Dissidents at F.D.A. Complain of Inquiry,” The New York Times, newspaper January 28, 2009.
*“Nine dissident scientists at the Food and Drug Administration who say they were forced to approve high-risk medical devices sent a letter to President Obama on Monday stating that agency officials might have made them the targets of a criminal investigation into their complaints.”
*“The letter is the latest escalation in a highly unusual internal battle that has been simmering for nearly a year within the agency’s device division. The nine scientists have banded together and charged that agency officials have acted illegally and that patients are routinely put at risk from high-risk medical devices that are approved for sale even though manufacturers have never proved that the products are either safe or effective.”
*“The scientists complained in May to Dr. Andrew C. von Eschenbach, who was then the F.D.A. commissioner, and the agency began an internal review that continues. Dissatisfied with the pace and results of that review, the scientists wrote a letter to Congress in October pleading for an investigation, and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce announced in November that it would begin one, which also continues.”
*“It can be a crime for agency employees to reveal documents or information considered confidential by companies seeking agency approval for medical products.”
*“Critics have long bemoaned the agency’s device approval process, which allows most devices to be approved with minimal testing. Manufacturers say the agency is already overly restrictive.”
* [[Misconduct]], [[Law Enforcement]]
”’Hernandez, N., Tyson, Scott A.”’, “Army Nearly Done with Probe of Fort Detrick,” The Washington Post, April 23, 2009.
*“Army investigators are close to closing a probe into the disappearance of deadly pathogens at Fort Detrick’s infectious disease laboratory in Frederick and have found no evidence yet of criminal misconduct, the Army’s Criminal Investigation Command said yesterday.”
*“Since last year, investigators have been trying to discover what happened to three small vials of Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus that were unaccounted for, according to Caree Vander Linden, the spokeswoman for the lab.”
*“The virus that causes Venezuelan equine encephalitis is mosquito borne and usually causes a mild flulike illness but can also cause brain inflammation and death. It has potential for use as a biological weapon but is far less lethal than some other agents the lab works with.”
*“Vander Linden said that when one scientist left the institute several years ago, he handed down his materials to another scientist, who left three years later. Last year, a successor took an inventory of the samples and found three vials missing, triggering an investigation, she said. The vials were probably missing because a freezer in which they were kept failed, destroying the batch, she said.”
*“Alan Schmaljohn, a longtime scientist at the lab who is now a professor at the University of Maryland, said he had been questioned two or three months ago as someone who once had access to the virus.”
*“Schmaljohn said he hadn’t. He said the quantity of missing material was relatively small and easy to lose, especially if one of the freezers fails, requiring the vials to be rearranged.”
*[[Lab Safety]], [[Law Enforcement]]
”’McNeil, Donald, Jr.”’, “[[China]]: Swine [[Flu]] Campaign, First in world, Begins in Beijing,” NYT, A11, September 22, 2009.
*”The Health Ministry said it hoped to vaccinate 65 million people, about 5 percent of the population, by year’s end.  Besides students, other groups with top priority include border and customs guards, transit workers, the military and the police, and people with heart and lung diseases.  The Health Ministry has reported over 13,000 confirmed cases of the flu across the nation.”
* [[Vaccination]], [[Law Enforcement]]
”’Mintz, Howard,”’ “UCSC scientist files suit vs. FBI” Online, March 29, 2009.
*” A UC Santa Cruz scientist has sued NASA Ames Research Center and the FBI, saying in a federal lawsuit that his career and reputation have been destroyed by what he contends are false accusations of being a “security threat” to government programs.”
*” Su, a Chinese national and U.S. citizen, alleges in the lawsuit that he was never told why he was deemed a security threat after a “cryptic and unwarranted joint NASA-FBI investigation.” But his lawyer expressed concern he was targeted because he’s a Chinese national, given the lack of any other explanation.
* [[Law Enforcement]], [[Academia]]
”’Committee on Laboratory Security and Personnel Reliability Assurance Systems for Laboratories Conducting Research on Biological Select Agents and Toxins”’, National Research Council of The National Academies, Report Released September 30, 2009. []
*”The Committee was asked to consider the appropriate framework of laboratory security and personnel reliability measures that will optimize benefits, minimize risk, and facilitate the productivity of research.”
*”Recommendation” 1: “…personnel with access to select agents and toxins should receive training in scientific ethics and dual-use research.”
*”Recommendation” 2: “… a Biological Select Agents and Toxins Advisory Committee (BSATAC) should be established. … [to]… Promulgate guidance of the Select Agent Program; … Promote harmonization of regulatory policies and practices.”
*”Recommendation” 3: “The list of select agents and toxins should be stratified in risk groups according to the potential use of the agent as a biothreat agent, …mechanisms for the timely inclusion or removal of an agent or toxin from the list are necessary and should be developed.”
*”Recommendation” 4: “Because biological agents have an ability to replicate, accountability is best achieved by controlling access to archived stocks and working materials. …[as opposed to] counting the number of vials.”
*”Recommendation” 5: The appeals process for Security Risk Assessments should be broadened beyond mere checks for factual errors.
*”Recommendation” 6: “… define minimum cross-agency physical security needs.”
*”Recommendation” 7: Dedicated funding should support an independent evaluation of the Select agent Program to assess benefits and consequences of the program.
*”Recommendation” 8: “Inspectors of select agent laboratories should have scientific and laboratory knowledge and experience, as well as appropriate training in conducting inspections specific to BSAT research.  Inspector training and practice should be harmonized across federal, state, local, and other agencies.”
*”Recommendation” 9: A  separate category of support should be allocated for BSAT research due to the costs of security.
* [[Ethics]], [[Dual Use]], [[Misconduct]], [[Law Enforcement]], [[Lab Security]], [[Law]]

”’Overbye, Dennis”’, “French Investigate Scientist In Formal Terrorism Inquiry,” NYT, A13, Oct. 14, 2009.
*”A French court placed a phycisist working at CERN, the huge research center in Switzerland, under formal investigation on Monday for suspected ‘conspiracy with a terrorist enterprise.”
*”…identified him as Adlene Hicheur, 32, a French particle phycisist born in Algeria … [was] arrested on Thursday in hi home in Vienne, France, on suspicion of having contacts with a member of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, a Sunniextremeist group based in ALgeria that has affiliated itself with Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network.”
*”some incriminating evidence was in the form of e-mail messages and other communications obtained at the time of Dr. Hicheur’s arrest.”
*”Dr. Hicheur is part of a 49-member team from the Laboratory for High Energy Physics at the Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne that is working on one experiment at CERN’s large Hadron Collider, as part of a 700-member international group.”
*”The research [for his Ph.D. from university of Savoie] was done at the Stanford Linear Collider in California, where he worked for several months in 2002 as part of the BaBar collaboration.”
*”In principle, antimatter could be used to make a powerful bomb, because particles and their antiparticles annihilate each other into pure energy on contact.”
*”A spokesman for the technical school in Lausanne characterized Dr. Hicheur’s colleagues as being ‘extremely surprised adn in emotional shock’ at the possibility that he was a suspect.”
*[[Law Enforcement]], [[Misconduct]], [[France]], [[Physics]]
”’Broad, William, J”’., “Property of Nuclear Critic Is Seized by Federal Agents,” NYT, A23, oct. 21, 2009.
*”Federal agents have seized six computers, two cameras, two cellphones and hundreds of files from a Los Alamos, N.M., physicist who has criticized the government’s nuclear agenda as misguided.”
*”The physicist, P. Leonardo Mascheroni, said he was told that the seizures were part of a criminal investigation into possible nuclear espionage.”
*”[He has] championed an innovative type of laser fusion, which seeks to harness the energy that powers the sun, the stars and hydrogen bombs.”
*”The secrets of hydrogen bombs and laser fusion can be similar, and the federal investigation appears to center on whether Dr. Mascheroni broke federal rules in discussing his proposed laser with a man who called himself a representative of the Venezuelan government.”
*”a man claiming to be a Venezuelan representative agreed to pay him $800,000 for a laser study.  Dr. Mascheroni said he delivered the unclassified study but was never paid.”
*[[Law Enforcement]], [[Nuclear]], [[Information Policy]], [[Nuclear]], [[Venezuela]], [[Classified]]
”’Wilber, Del Quentin”’, “Scientist accused of espionage to remain in jail, judge decides;
Authorities detail Md. man’s access to U.S. secrets”, online October 21, 2009.

*“A federal judge ordered that a Chevy Chase scientist remain jailed on a charge that he tried to pass national secrets to the Israeli government in exchange for $11,000.”
*“Stewart D. Nozette, 52, was arrested Monday afternoon on a charge of attempted espionage after authorities accused him of passing classified information to an undercover FBI agent posing as an Israeli intelligence operative. U.S. Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson ordered Nozette detained until a preliminary hearing Oct. 29.”
*“The scientist held security clearances as high as top secret and had access to classified material as recently as 2006, authorities said.”
*“In early September, an FBI agent posing as an Israeli intelligence officer called Nozette, and the scientist said he would be willing to work as a spy, authorities said. Over the next few weeks, the agent paid $11,000 in cash, left in two installments in a post office box in the District. Nozette took the cash and questions left by the FBI agent, authorities alleged.”
*“He returned, the FBI said, with envelopes containing classified information he recalled handling. That included details about U.S. satellites, early warning systems and defense strategy, the FBI wrote in court papers.”
*”’Law Enforcement”’, [[Israel]].
”’Associated Press”’, ‘Spy Probe nabs Md. Scientist: Researcher has worked at Goddard, Elsewhere,” Baltimore Sun, 6, October 20, 2009.
*”A scientist who worked for the Defense Department, a White House space council and other agencies was arrested Monday on charges of passing along classified information to an FBI agent posing as an Israeli intelligence officer.”
*’Stewart David Nozette,  52, of Chevy Chase was charged in a criminal complaint with attempting to communicate, deliver and transmit classified information, the Justice Department said.”
*”At Energy, Nozette held a special security clearance equivalent to the Defense Department’s top secret and ‘critical nuclear weapon design information’ clearances.”
*”an unnamed colleague of Nozette who said the scientists told him taht if the U.S. governemnt ever tried to put him in jail for an unrealted criminal offense, he would go to [[Israel]] or another country and ‘tell them everything’ he knows.”
*[[Law Enforcement]], [[Classified]]
”’Madigan, Nick”’, “Ex-UM Researcher Whose Fiancee Died is Indicted,” Baltimore Sun, 5, Oct. 27, 2009.
*”A Baltimore grand jury indicted a former University of Maryland School of Medicine researcher Monday on 14 drug-related counts.”
*”McCracken was charged by police after the Sept. 27 death of his 29-year-old fiancee, Carrie John, a fellow doctoral lab researcher at Maryland.  [According to McCracken]…she injected herself with … a fluid containing the narcotic buprenorphine.  … McCracken also possessed with intent to distribute the stimulant methlphenidate and the anti-anxiety drug clonazepam.  …McCracken is no longer employed by Maryland.”
[[Law Enforcement]], [[Lab Security]], [[Misconduct]]
”’Sang-Hun, Choe”’, “Discredited Cloning Expert Is Convicted of Fraud in South Korea,” NYT, A11, Oct, 27, 2009.
*”Hwang Woo-suk, a disgraced cloning expert from South Korea who had claimed major breakthroughs in stem-cell research, was convicted Monday of falsifying his papers and embezzeling government research funds.”
*”His school, Seoul National university, disowned him in 2005, saying that he had fabricated the papers he had published to global acclaim.”
*”Dr. Hwang, a veterinarian by training, became known as an international pioneer in stem-cell research in 2004 when he and his colleagues published a paper in the journal Science claiming that they had created the world’s first cloned human embryos and had extracted stem cells from them.”
*[[Misconduct]], [[Law Enforcement]], [[South Korea]]
”’Associated Press”’, “Espionage Suspect Admits Overbilling: Scientist Entered Secret Plea Deal,” USA Today, 6A, Oct. 27, 2009.
*”A former government scientist accused of attempted espionage pleaded guilty to overbilling NASA and the Department of Defense more than $265,000 for contracting work.”
*”Seperately, Nozette was arrested last week and accused of trying to sell classified information on U.S. defense secrets to an undercover FBI agent posing as an Israeli intelligence operative.”
[[Misconduct]], [[Law Enforcement]], [[Classified]]
”’Johnston, David”’, “2 in Chicago Held in Plot To Attack In Denmark,” NYT A17, Oct. 28, 2009.
*”The most serious charges, conspiracy to murder and maim in a foreign country, were filed against David Coleman Headley, who was born in the United States, lived in Pakistan and now resides in Chicago.”
*”Mr. Rana is a businessman who was born in Pakistan and is now a Canadian citizen living legally in Chicago [is charged with providing material support.”
*”Davis S. Kris …said the case was a reminder of the threat posed by international terrorism organizations.”
*[[Jurisdiction]], [[Law Enforcement]], [[Homeland Security]]
”’Dow, Jay”’, WCBS TV, “NYPD: Tests Suggest Powder Scare Not A Threat: First Round Of Tests Show No Danger In White Powder, But Emergency Response Was Very Real,” [] Nov. 10, 2009.
*”Fire officials say someone sent three envelopes filled with white powder to three foreign consulates. They were all postmarked from Dallas and contained at least one note referencing al-Qaida. But investigators now say initial field tests suggest they’re a hoax.”
[[Law Enforcement]], [[Anthrax]]
”’Clavert, Scott”’, “Researcher did not die of overdose autopsy says: Allergic reaction, not bupe, killed UM pharmacologist,” Baltimore Sun, P. 1, Nov. 13, 2009.
*”University of Maryland pharmacologist Carrie John died from an allergic reaction and not because she injected a seemingly tainted batch of the narcotic buprenorphine.”
*”The [autopsy] results suggest that McCracken, 33, might have unwittingky bought phony narcotics.”
*”Her death stunned the school, where the two postdoctoral fellows did brain research and she studied drug abuse.”
*”He (McCracken] said he and and John soaked a 2 mg pill in water, filtered it, then filled two syringes with the solution.”
*”The couple met as graduate students at Wake Forest University.  …Before that he was at the University of Pittsburgh.  he is no longer at Maryland.”
*[[Law Enforcement]], [[Lab Security]], [[Misconduct]]
”’McNeill, Donald, G., Jr.”’, “Shifting Vaccine For Flu To Elderly,” D1, NYT, Nov. 24, 2009.
*”reports of price gouging have grown more frequent.  That also happened in 2004, when sterility problems at a British plant cut the American flu vaccine supply in half; prices shot up as high as $90 a dose, from the normal level of $8 to $9.”
*”Gouging is illegal in about half the satets, but each state varies in how big a price increase constitutes gouging and as to whether an emergency must have been declared for the law to kick in.”
*”‘To pursue a case, we need to show it’s not just a couple of dolars but is very significant,’ said Attorney General Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, who has opened an investigation.”
*”‘if distributors were ‘masquerading or fraudulently claiming to have vaccine,’ that could end in criminal charge.”
*[[Law Enforcement]], [[Flu]], [[Vaccination]]
”’Rees, Nick”’, “U.S. Postal Service to be in charge of drug delivery in the event of a bioattack,” BioPrepWatch [] December 31, 2009.
*”Following an executive order released Wednesday, the U.S. Postal Service will be put in charge of delivering drugs and other medical aid to Americans in the event of a large-scale biological weapon attack.”
*”President Obama’s order states that the postal service will be in charge of dispensing “medical countermeasures” for biological weapons in the event of an attack because of its ability to deliver to U.S. citizens rapidly.”
*”Federal agencies are required to develop a response plan within 180 days including possible law enforcement escorts for postal service workers under the order, which cites anthrax as a primary threat consideration. The order would see local law enforcement supplemented by local federal law enforcement officers.”
*[[Biodefense]], [[Law Enforcement]], [[Anthrax]]
”’Ling, Philip”’, “Scientist faces smuggling charges; Man found with 22 vials used in Ebola research”, online May 14, 2009.
*“A Canadian scientist was stopped at the U. S. border last week after authorities found 22 vials used in Ebola research from Canada’s National Microbiology Lab in his possession, officials said yesterday.”
*“Konan Michel Yao, 42, was apprehended by U. S. officials as he attempted to enter the United States at the Pembina, N. D., border crossing from Manitoba on May 5. Mr. Yao faces U. S. criminal charges for smuggling and is currently in the custody of the U. S. Marshals service. Mr. Yao was carrying unidentified biological materials in vials wrapped in aluminum foil inside a glove, wrapped in a plastic bag in the trunk of his car, U. S. Customs and Border Patrol spokesman Mike Milne told the Reuters news agency.”
*“Mr. Plummer said Mr. Yao was working at the agency’s special pathogens laboratory on an Ebola vaccine project when his research term ended in January.”There was a small amount of genetic material from the Ebola virus in the material that he took off with, but it posed no risk of infection and no risk to the health of the public.”
*“Mr. Yao said in an affidavit obtained by Reuters that he took the vials with him when he left the lab at the end of his contract on Jan. 21, to help him get a head start on his research at his new job at a U. S. disease research lab.”
*”’Law Enforcement”’, [[Canada]], [[Ebola]]

== 2010 ==
*“Since 2001, the U.S. government has devoted considerable time and effort identifying potential vulnerabilities to biological attacks, promoting prevention strategies, and anticipating how best to respond should a large-scale biological attack ever occur.” (Pg. 2)
*““The more that sophisticated capabilities, including genetic engineering and gene synthesis, spread around the globe, the greater the potential that terrorists will use them to develop biological weapons . . . . Prevention alone is not sufficient, and a robust system for public health preparedness and response is vital to the nation’s security.’” (Pg. 3)
*“The changes generally grant broad sweeping powers to state governors and health officials, including the power to order forced treatment and vaccination without specifying which exemptions….Such changes could increase the chances for state abuse of power and lead to confusion during a mass vaccination campaign.” (Pg. 3)
*“Currently, the federal government lacks authority to exert control over a state’s emergency vaccination plans, regardless of whether the plans are too lenient and severely risk the public’s health or too rigid and unnecessarily restrict individual liberty” (Pg. 4)
*“Maryland, the state’s attorney summoned parents of more than 1,600 children to court, giving them a choice between vaccinating their children and facing penalties of up to ten days in jail and fifty dollars a day in fines.” (Pg. 7)
*“Three key factors determine the percentage of the population that must be immunized in order to reach the herd immunity threshold: (1) the degree of the disease’s infectiousness; (2) the population’s vulnerability; and (3) the environmental conditions.” (Pg. 8)
*“The Court explained that the state had a duty to protect the welfare of the many and to refrain from subordinating their interests to those of the few.”(Pg. 12)
*“The Court determined that an individual’s belief qualified as a religious belief, if it was “sincere and meaningful” and it “occupied in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption.”” (Pg. 20)
*“The district court warned that while an individual may possess sincerely held beliefs, instead of being rooted in religious convictions, those beliefs may merely be framed in religious terms to feign compliance with the law.” (Pg. 21)
*“The Sherr case raises two issues. First, how much proof an individual must provide to demonstrate to the government the sincerity of the individual’s religious beliefs. Second, how public health officials in an emergency will determine quickly and fairly whether an individual meets the requisite burden of proof.” (Pg. 22)
*“Current state public health emergency laws inadequately address mass vaccination situations and leave wide-open the potential for the abrogation of individuals’ rights” (Pg. 29)
*“The model law, drafted by The Center for Law and the Public’s Health, at Georgetown and John Hopkins Universities, seeks to “grant public health powers to state and local public health authorities to ensure strong, effective, and timely planning, prevention, and response mechanisms to public health emergencies (including bioterrorism) while also respecting individual rights.” (Pg. 31)
*“Additionally, MSEHPA fails to address the need for a consistent and coordinated nationwide approach to mass vaccination in a multi-state emergency…..”To prevent the spread of contagious or possibly contagious disease the public health authority may isolate or quarantine . . . persons who are unable or unwilling for reasons of health, religion, or conscience to undergo vaccination.”‘ (Pg. 31)
*“The Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (“PHEMCE”)”  is likely the most appropriate government body to be in charge of implementing the new informed consent requirements, the medical and religious exemptions, and the right of refusal conditioned on a discretionary requirement of isolation or quarantine” (Pg. 35)
*[[Bioterrorism]], [[Public Health]], [[Vaccination]], [[Law Enforcement]], [[CDC]], [[Quarantine]], [[Pandemic]]
”’Doyle, Michael”’, “Agriculture Department chemist successfully fights guilt-by-association,” January 19, 2010, Mc Clatchy, Suits & Sentences Blog, available at []   Last checked august 11, 2012.
*”Going about his everyday business in a Midwestern office of the Food Safety and Inspection Service, Poett applied to obtain certain toxic chemicals. But in August 2006, the FBI informed Poett’s supervisors that he was deemed to be a ‘restricted person’ who ‘has involvement with an organization that engages in domestic or international terrorism or international crimes of violence.’”
*”Poett filed Freedom of Information Act requests to get to the bottom of it all. As Poett ultimately determined, the FBI’s career-crimping determination stemmed from his past, passing involvement with a group called the Irish Northern Aid Committee in America, also known as Noraid. Way back in 1992, Poett had written the British ambassador to the United States, saying he regretted the possibility that ‘the funds others and I have solicited may have fallen into the wrong hands’ and adding that he would ‘pray for the peaceful resolution between the British and Irish People.’”
*” Kollar-Kotelly noted Monday that the government determined that ‘the FBI no longer reasonably suspects Plaintiff of knowing involvement with an organization that engages in domestic or international terrorism or with any other organization that engages in intentional crimes of violence and that Plaintiff is now eligible for access to select agents or toxins.’”
*[[Scientist]], [[Select agent]], [[Agriculture]], [[Northern Ireland]], [[Oversight]], [[State Department]], [[Law Enforcement]], [[Law]]
”’Markoff, John”’, “Google Asks Spy Agency for Help With Inquiry Into Cyberattacks,,”February 5, 2010, New York Times, []. last checked 12/10/11
*”Google has turned to the National Security Agency for technical assistance to learn more about the computer network attackers who breached the company’s cybersecurity defenses last year, a person with direct knowledge of the agreement said Thursday.”
*” By turning to the N.S.A., which has no statutory authority to investigate domestic criminal acts, instead of the Department of Homeland Security, which does have such authority, Google is clearly seeking to avoid having its search engine, e-mail and other Web services regulated as part of the nation’s “critical infrastructure.”
*” Systems designated as critical infrastructure are increasingly being held to tighter regulatory standards.”
*”On Jan. 12, Google announced a ‘new approach to China,’ stating that the attacks were ‘highly sophisticated’ and came from China.”
*”At the time, it gave few details about the attacks other than to say that a theft of its intellectual property had occurred and that a primary goal of the attackers had been to gain access to the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists.”
*”A number of computer security consultants who worked with other companies that experienced attacks similar to those of Google have stated that the surveillance system was controlled from a series of compromised server computers based in Taiwan.”
*”An N.S.A. spokeswoman said, ‘N.S.A. is not able to comment on specific relationships we may or may not have with U.S. companies,’ but added, the agency worked with “a broad range of commercial partners’ to ensure security of information systems.’
*”’This is the other side of N.S.A. — this is the security service that does defensive measures,’ said the specialist, James A. Lewis, a director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. ‘It’s not unusual for people to go to N.S.A. and say ‘please take a look at my code.’ ‘ ”
*” On Thursday, the organization [Electronic Privacy Information Center] filed a lawsuit against the N.S.A., calling for the release of information about the agency’s role as it was set out in National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 , a classified 2008 order issued by President George W. Bush dealing with cybersecurity and surveillance.”
*”The relationship that the N.S.A. has struck with Google is known as a cooperative research and development agreement, …. These were created as part of the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 and are essentially a written agreement between a private company and a government agency to work together on a specific project.”
*”In addition to the N.S.A., Google has been working with the F.B.I. on the attack inquiry,…”
*[[Cybersecurity]], [[Hacker]], [[Law Enforcement]], [[China]], [[Taiwan]], [[Classified]], [[Law]], [[Homeland Security]]

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