Industry

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Status Brief
History/Origins:

Developmental Milestones/Developments to Date:

Current Assessment/State of the Field:

Problems/Challenges:

Proposals:

1986

Supreme Court of the United States, DOW CHEMICAL CO. v. UNITED STATES, BY AND THROUGH ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, No. 84-1259, 476 U.S. 227, Decided May 19, 1986.
The an unsuccessful challenge to a warrantless aerial surveillance technique, the U.S. Supreme noted that,

  1. “Congress has vested in EPA certain investigatory and enforcement authority, without spelling out precisely how this authority was to be exercised in all the myriad circumstances that might arise in monitoring matters relating to clean air and water standards. When Congress invests an agency with enforcement and investigatory authority, it is not necessary to identify explicitly each and every technique that may be used in the course of executing the statutory mission.” P. 233.

Law, Chemical, Industry

2006

Editors, “The National Industrial Security Program report.United States, Information Security Oversight Office. February 28, 2006. Last Accessed April 17, 2016 from http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pur1.32754073515078;view=1up;seq=5

  1. “This report provides information on the current status of the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) as part of the Information Security Oversight Office’s (ISOO’s) responsibilities to implement and monitor the program under Section 102(b) of Executive Order 12829, as amended, “National Industrial Security Program.”
  2. “This is part of our continuing evaluation of Government and Industry’s efforts to achieve the goal of establishing an integrated and cohesive program that safeguards classified information while preserving the Nation’s economic and technological interests”

Personnel Reliability, Classified, Executive Order, Industry

 

Hillen, JohnDefense Trade ControlsDISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management, Volume 28, Issue 2. 83-88. Winter 2006.

  1. “The following are excerpts of the address to the 18th Annual Global Trade Controls Conference November 3, 2005” – page 83
  2. “We are here today at this conference to talk about export controls, which are nonproliferation in action.” – page 83
  3. “It is clear that combating the twin threats of terrorism and proliferation will be one of the central tasks of the new century… All our energies must be bent to prevent this sort of situation.” – page 83
  4. “Enemies of modernism and open societies are on the move. They are constantly changing their tactics, locales, modalities, technologies, command structures, and methods of procurement” – page 83
  5. “This year, two Iranians, Mahoud Seif and Shahrazed Mir Gholikhan, were indicted in a U.S. court and convicted in an Austrian court for attempting to smuggle Generation III night vision goggles to Iran.” – page 83
  6. “This year, dual Lebanese-Canadian citizen Naji Antoine Khalil pled guilty in a U.S. court to attempting to export night vision equipment and infrared aiming devices to Hizballah.” – page 83
  7. “This year, Colombian citizen Carlos Gamarra-Murillo pled guilty in a U. S. court to brokering and exporting defense articles without a license.” – page 83
  8. “One of the responsibilities of the Bureau of Political Military Affairs … is to conduct a program to destroy Man-portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) to keep them out of terrorist hands” – page 83
  9. “Defense export controls are an integral part of our broader security agenda, whether it is the global war on terrorism, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, or bolstering regional stability around the globe.” – page 84
  10. “First and foremost, we’re responded to these complexities in part through more aggressive compliance efforts” – page 85
  11. “Where the export control sins aren’t sufficiently serious to require criminal prosecution, we can resort to civil enforcement actions.” – page 85
  12. “We also encourage industry to self-report violations uncovered by their internal compliance programs, and last year we received 396 of these voluntary disclosures, more than one a day, every day, including Christmas”
  13. “… we have instituted an expedited licensing procedure for the urgent needs of our Coalition partners in Afghanistan and Iraq” – page 85
  14. “One step we have taken to meet this growth is our new system for fully electronic defense trade, which is making our export licensing process faster, simpler, and more efficient” – page 86
  15. “Not only has defense trade become more complex, but the nature of what is being exported has become more sophisticated as well. For the most part, “defense articles” used to mean weapons themselves and their component parts. But today the most sensitive defense exports don’t necessarily go “bang.” – page 86
  16. “Given the increasingly global nature of defense trade, a key element of our defense export policy is to strengthen international export controls, which is also a major pillar of our broader nonproliferation policy” – page 87

Export Control, Nonproliferation, WMD, Military, Compliance, Industry

2012

Beers, Rand, ”Testimony before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy regarding the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to regulate the security of high-risk chemical facilities under the Chemical Facility Anti-terrorism Standards”, National Protection and Programs Directorate Under Secretary. Release Date: February 3, 2012, available at http://ipv6.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/20120203-1a-nppd-cfats.shtm, Last checked June 20, 2012.

  1. ”As you are aware, the Department’s current statutory authority to implement CFATS – Section 550 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, as amended — was recently extended through October 4, 2012.”
  2. ”Section 550 of the FY 2007 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act directed the Department to develop and adopt, within six months, a regulatory framework to address the security of chemical facilities that the Department determines pose high levels of risk. Specifically, Section 550(a) of the Act authorized the Department to adopt rules requiring high-risk chemical facilities to complete Security Vulnerability Assessments (SVAs), develop Site Security Plans (SSPs), and implement protective measures necessary to meet risk-based performance standards established by the Department. Consequently, the Department published an Interim Final Rule, known as CFATS, on April 9, 2007. Section 550, however, expressly exempts from those rules certain facilities that are regulated under other federal statutes, specifically those regulated by the United States Coast Guard pursuant to the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities as defined by Section 1401 of the Safe Water Drinking Act and Section 212 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and facilities owned or operated by the Departments of Defense or Energy, as well as certain facilities subject to regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).”
  3. ”Implementing this program means tackling a sophisticated and complex set of issues related to identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities and setting security goals. This requires a broad spectrum of input, as the regulated facilities bridge multiple industries and critical infrastructure sectors. By working closely with members of industry and academia, and partners in the federal government, we leveraged vital knowledge and insight to develop the regulation.”
  4. ”The CFATS rule includes enforceable risk-based performance standards (RBPS). High-risk facilities have the flexibility to develop appropriate site-specific security measures that will effectively address risk by meeting these standards. NPPD’s Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD), the Division within NPPD responsible for managing CFATS, will analyze all final high-risk facility SSPs to ensure they meet the applicable RBPS and will approve those that do. If necessary, ISCD will work with a facility to revise and resubmit an acceptable plan.”
  5. ”On November 20, 2007, the Department published CFATS’ Appendix A, which lists 322 chemicals of interest—including common industrial chemicals such as chlorine, propane, and anhydrous ammonia—as well as specialty chemicals, such as arsine and phosphorus trichloride. The Department included chemicals based on the potential consequences associated with one or more of the following three security issues:
    (1.) Release – Toxic, flammable, or explosive chemicals that have the potential to create significant adverse consequences for human life or health if intentionally released or detonated;
    (2.) Theft/Diversion – Chemicals that have the potential, if stolen or diverted, to be used as or converted into weapons that could cause significant adverse consequences for human life or health; and
    (3.) Sabotage/Contamination – Chemicals that, if mixed with other readily available materials, have the potential to create significant adverse consequences for human life or health.”
  6. ”The Department also established a Screening Threshold Quantity for each chemical of interest based on its potential to create significant adverse consequences to human life or health in one or more of these ways.”
  7. ”Implementation of the CFATS regulation requires the Department to identify which facilities it considers high-risk. In support of this, ISCD developed the Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT) to help it identify potentially high-risk facilities and to provide methodologies those facilities can use to conduct SVAs and to develop SSPs. CSAT is a suite of online applications designed to facilitate compliance with the program; it includes user registration, the initial consequence-based screening tool (Top-Screen), an SVA tool, and an SSP template.”
  8. ”Through the Top-Screen process, ISCD initially identifies high-risk facilities, which the Department then assigns to one of four preliminary risk-based tiers, with Tier 1 representing the highest level of potential risk. Tiered facilities must then complete SVAs and submit them to the Department for approval, although preliminary Tier 4 facilities may submit an Alternative Security Program (ASP) in lieu of an SVA. Each SVA is carefully reviewed for its description of how chemicals are managed and for physical, cyber, and chemical security risks.”
  9. ”After completing its review of a facility’s SVA, ISCD makes a final determination as to whether the facility is high-risk and, if so, assigns the facility a final risk-based tier. Each final high-risk facility is then required to develop for ISCD approval an SSP or, if it so chooses, an ASP, that addresses its identified vulnerabilities and security issues and satisfies the applicable RBPS. ISCD’s final determinations as to which facilities are high-risk, and as to their appropriate tier levels, are based on each facility’s individual consequentiality and vulnerability as determined by its Top-Screen, SVA, and any other available information. The higher the facility’s risk-based tier, the more robust the security measures it will be expected to adopt in its SSP. Risk tier will also be a factor in determining the frequency of inspections.”
  10. ”The RBPS cover the fundamentals of security, such as restricting the area perimeter, securing site assets, screening and controlling access, cybersecurity, training, and response. Each high-risk facility’s security strategy and SSP will be unique, as they depend on the facility’s risk level, security issues, characteristics, and other facility-specific factors. In fact, ”’under Section 550, the Department cannot mandate a specific security measure to approve the SSP”’
  11. ”To date, ISCD has reviewed more than 40,000 Top-Screens submitted by chemical facilities. Since June 2008, ISCD has notified more than 7,000 facilities that they have been initially designated as high-risk and are thus required to submit SVAs; and ISCD has completed our review of approximately 6,500 submitted SVAs. (Note, not all facilities initially designated as high-risk ultimately submit SVAs or ASPs, as some choose to make material modifications to their chemical holdings, or make other changes, prior to the SVA due date that result in the facility no longer being considered high-risk.) In May 2009, ISCD began notifying facilities of their final high-risk determinations, risk-based tiering assignments, and the requirement to complete and submit an SSP or ASP.”
  12. ”In May 2009, ISCD issued 141 final tier determination letters to the highest risk (Tier 1) facilities, confirming their high-risk status and initiating the 120-day time frame for submitting an SSP. After issuing this initial set of final tier determinations, ISCD periodically issued notifications to additional facilities of their final high-risk status. To date, more than 4,100 additional facilities have received final high-risk determinations and tier assignments, and several hundred that were preliminarily-tiered by ISCD were informed that they are no longer considered high-risk.”
  13. ”As of January 6, 2012, CFATS covers 4,458 high-risk facilities nationwide; of these 4,458 facilities, 3,727 have received final high-risk determinations and due dates for submission of an SSP or ASP. ISCD continues to issue final tier notifications to facilities across all four risk tiers as we make additional final tier determinations.”
  14. ”It should be noted that since CFATS’ inception, more than 1,600 facilities completely removed their chemicals of interest, and more than 700 other facilities have reduced their holdings of chemicals of interest to levels resulting in the facilities no longer being considered high-risk.”
  15. ”Under CFATS, Administrative Orders are the first formal step toward enforcement. An Administrative Order does not impose a penalty or fine but directs the facility to take specific action to comply with CFATS—for example, to complete an overdue SSP within a specified timeframe. If the facility does not comply with the Administrative Order, the Department may issue an Order Assessing Civil Penalty of up to $25,000 each day the violation continues and/or an Order to Cease Operations. In June 2010, ISCD issued its first Administrative Orders to 18 chemical facilities for failure to submit an SSP. During the remainder of the year ISCD issued an additional 48 Administrative Orders to chemical facilities that had failed to submit their SSPs in a timely manner under CFATS. We are pleased to report that all 66 facilities complied with the Administrative Orders issued. As CFATS implementation progresses, we expect to continue to exercise our enforcement authority to ensure CFATS compliance.”
  16. ”To date, ISCD inspectors have conducted nearly 900 Compliance Assistance Visits and have held more than 3,000 informal introductory meetings with owners and/or operators of CFATS-regulated facilities. ISCD staff have presented at hundreds of security and chemical industry conferences; participated in a variety of other meetings of relevant security partners; established a Help Desk for CFATS questions that receives between 40 and 80 calls daily; put in place a CFATS tip-line for anonymous chemical security reporting; and developed and regularly updated a highly regarded Chemical Security website (www.DHS.gov/chemicalsecurity), which includes a searchable Knowledge Center. ISCD has also offered regular SSP training webinars to assist high-risk facilities to complete their SSPs.”
  17. ”ISCD also continues to collaborate within DHS and with other federal agencies in the area of chemical security, including routine engagement among the NPPD’s subcomponents and with the USCG, the Transportation Security Administration, the Department of Justice’s FBI and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the NRC, and the EPA. An example of this coordination includes the establishment of a joint ISCD/USCG CFATS-MTSA Working Group to evaluate and, where appropriate, implement methods to harmonize the CFATS and MTSA regulations. Similarly, ”’NPPD has been working closely with the EPA to begin evaluating how the CFATS approach could be used for water and wastewater treatment facilities, should the water and wastewater treatment facility exemption be revised by Congress in future versions of chemical facility security or water facility security legislation”’.”
  18. ”The Department supports a permanent authorization for the CFATS program and is committed to working with Congress and other security partners to establish a permanent authority for the CFATS program in Federal law.”
  19. ”In August 2011, the American Chemistry Council (ACC) conducted a survey of CFATS-regulated facility owners covering approximately 800 facilities and received over 139 responses. Among other things, the ACC survey found that the majority of respondents believe extending CFATS will improve chemical security at CFATS-regulated facilities, and that companies have made substantial investments in security upgrades as a result of CFATS, and plan to make additional investments following ISCD approval of their SSPs.”

Chemical, Industry, Law, Compliance, Cybersecurity

2014

Niquette, Mark, Snyder, Jim, and Drajem, Mark, “West Virginia Spill Prompts Drive for Tougher Regulations” Bloomberg. January 14, 2014. Last checked January 14, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-14/west-virginia-spill-sparks-drive-for-tougher-chemical-regulation.html

  1. “A chemical spill that left 300,000 people in West Virginia unable to drink their water is reviving calls for more stringent regulation of thousands of chemical storage sites in the U.S., especially those near water supplies.”
  2. “Residents in nine West Virginia counties were ordered not to drink, cook or bathe with municipal water after about 7,500 gallons of a chemical used in coal processing leaked Jan. 9 from a tank near the Elk River, upstream of a treatment plant for the West Virginia division of American Water Works Co.”
  3. “There are potentially tens of thousands of storage tanks in communities around the U.S. filled with chlorine, natural gas and other materials and states are primarily responsible for their safety, said Sheldon Krimsky, an environmental policy professor at Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts.”
  4. “The American Chemistry Council, a Washington-based lobbying group whose members include Eastman Chemical Co. (EMN) and Dow Chemical Co. (DOW), said federal, state and local agencies should improve their coordination to ensure current laws are enforced.”
  5. “‘If our investigation reveals that federal criminal laws were violated, we will move rapidly to hold the wrongdoers accountable,’ Booth Goodwin, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of West Virginia, said yesterday in a statement. ‘Our drinking water is not something you can take chances with, and this mess can never be allowed to happen again.’”

Chemical, Industry, Law Enforcement, Homeland Security

 

Brunnstrom, David & Lange, Jason, “U.S. offers $5 million for Chinese businessman accused of Iran dealings,Reuters, April 29, 2014, available at Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/29/us-usa-sanctions-iran-idUSBREA3S0KI20140429 Last checked May 4, 2014.

  1. ”The United States offered a reward of up to $5 million on Tuesday for a Chinese businessman accused of supplying missile parts to Iran, and targeted companies from China and Dubai for allegedly helping Iran evade weapons and oil sanctions.”
  2. ”The U.S. State Department said it was offering a reward of up to $5 million for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of Li, who is also known as Karl Lee.”
  3. ”The State Department said the announcement of the bounty for Li was coordinated with Treasury and the Justice Department, which unsealed an indictment against him on charges including conspiracy to commit money laundering, bank fraud, and wire fraud.”
  4. ”According to the Indictment, he (Li) controls a large network of front companies and allegedly uses this network to move millions of dollars through U.S.-based financial institutions to conduct business in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, which prohibit such financial transactions,’the State Department said in a statement.”
  5. ”Iran and a group of world powers reached a temporary deal in November under which Tehran would get about $7 billion in sanctions relief in return for steps to restrain its nuclear activities.”
  6. ”A U.S. official, however, told Reuters last month Iran had pursued a longstanding effort to buy banned components for its nuclear and missile programs in recent months, even while it was striking an interim deal with major powers to limit its disputed atomic activity.”
  7. ”Vann Van Diepen, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for international security and non-proliferation, added that Li had continued to supply such items despite U.S. pressure on China to tighten export controls. Contacted by Reuters on Feb 4, 2013, for an earlier story about his business, Li said he continued to get commercial inquiries from Iran but only for legitimate merchandise. Li said his metals company, LIMMT, had stopped selling to Iran once the United States began sanctioning the firm several years ago.”

Export Control, Law Enforcement, Nuclear, Iran, China, State Department, Industry

 

Bednar, Joseph. “Trade Secrets: Massachusetts Export Center Helps Firms do Business OverseasBusiness West, Volume 30, Issue 24. Pages 27-55. May 19, 2014

  1. “International exports account for $2.2 trillion dollars in the U.S. economy, and Massachusetts has become an exporting success story in recent year, with Bay State companies growing their overseas business by almost 5% from 2012 to 2013.” – page 27
  2. “Massachusetts companies exported more than $26.8 billion in goods last year – a 4.63% increase over 2012 – and ranks as the 17th highest exporting state in the U.S.” – page 27
  3. “Every time you get a $125,000 increase in export sales, a job is created somewhere in the network” – page 29
  4. The Massachusetts Export Center (MEC) provides a broad range of services, including: export counseling and technical assistance, international market research and assessment, international business-development assistance, and export training programs. – page 29
  5. “Partners for trade, the state’s official export training initiative, is a regional collaborative between the MEC, chambers of commerce, trade associations, economic-development agencies, and the private sector, working together to present frequent seminars on international trade.” – page 30
  6. “We’ve helped companies in every industry there is, from agriculture to guns to butternut squash to cosmetics to precision machining – you name it… and whether a client needs a license or legal assistance or any of a host of other requests, I connect them with somebody who can help them” – page 30
  7. “The MEC recently launched another program, called Compliance Alliance, a forum for exporting firms that offers periodic briefings that address a variety of regulatory compliance issues and provide an opportunity for exporters to network and share best practices with one another, conferences and seminars that provide in depth training across a broad range of compliance and operational issues, speakers including exporters, law firms, consulting firms, and representatives from government export regulatory authorities, an e-newsletter containing updates about current compliance issues and events, and online resources such as a member directory, a compliance resource library, and a job board.” – page 30
  8. “… the agency won both the Presidential E Award for excellence in exporting – the highest honor the federal government issues in the exporting arena, and the SBA’s Service Excellence in Innovation Award.” – page 55

Export Control, Compliance, Industry