Executive Order

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Fox, Jeffery C. “What is an Executive Order?ThisNation, http://www.thisnation.com/question/040.html

  1. “Executive Orders have been used by every chief executive since the time of George Washington. Most of these directives were unpublished and were only seen by the agencies involved. In the early 1900s, the State Department began numbering them; there are now over 13,000 numbered orders.”
  2. Executive Orders in general.

Law, Executive Order


Editors, “The National Industrial Security Program report.United States, Information Security Oversight Office. February 28, 2006. Last Accessed April 17, 2016 from http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pur1.32754073515078;view=1up;seq=5

  1. “This report provides information on the current status of the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) as part of the Information Security Oversight Office’s (ISOO’s) responsibilities to implement and monitor the program under Section 102(b) of Executive Order 12829, as amended, “National Industrial Security Program.”
  2. “This is part of our continuing evaluation of Government and Industry’s efforts to achieve the goal of establishing an integrated and cohesive program that safeguards classified information while preserving the Nation’s economic and technological interests”

Personnel Reliability, Classified, Executive Order, Industry


Editors, “National Industrial Security Program Directive No. 1 ACTION Final ruleFederal Register. 6 pages. April 8, 2006.

  1. “The Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), is publishing this Directive pursuant to section 102(b)(1) of Executive Order 12829, as amended, relating to the National Industrial Security Program.”
  2. “This order establishes a National Industrial Security Program (NISP) to safeguard Federal Government classified information that is released to contractors, licensees, and grantees of the United States Government.”
  3. “Redundant, overlapping, or unnecessary requirements impede those interests. Therefore, the NISP serves as the single, integrated, cohesive industrial security program to protect classified information and to preserve our Nation’s economic and technological interests.”
  4. “This Directive sets forth guidance to agencies to set uniform standards throughout the NISP that promote these objectives.”
  5. “The NISPOM applies to release of classified information during all phases of the contracting process.”

Personnel Reliability, Classified, Executive Order


Executive Order (EO) 13486 January 9, 2009.  Working Group on Strengthening the Biosecurity of the United States

  1. “Mission of reviewing, evaluating, analyzing and making recommendations to the President regarding the current laws, regulations, guidance, and practices of laboratories (including clinical and environmental facilities) that conduct research on, handle, store, or transport biological select agents and toxins in the United States. Within 180 days, the Working Group must issue a report to the President containing “recommendations for any new legislation, regulations, guidance, or practices for security and personnel assurance” and “options for establishing oversight mechanisms.'”
  2. The report will also include a comparison of personnel security and reliability programs for access to biological select agents and toxins to similar programs in other fields and industries. Given the importance of biosecurity to protecting public health and agriculture, a public consultation meeting is being held to discuss biosecurity issues related to the Select Agent Regulations (The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services regulations for Select Agents and Toxins, 42 CFR Part 72, and the United States Department of Agriculture regulations for Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 9 CFR Part 121).
  3. Topics will include the definition of select agents, transportation of select agents, physical and personnel security of select agent entities, oversight and inspections of laboratories, and fostering a culture of security and responsibility.”

Organizations/Groups, Executive Order


The President, “Executive Order 13546-Optimizing the Security of Biological Select Agents and Toxins in the United States”, Federal Register Vol. 75No. 130, July 8, 2010. www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13546.pdf

  1. “BSAT shall be secured in a manner appropriate to their risk of misuse, theft, loss, and accidental release; and Security measures shall be taken in a coordinated manner that balances their efficacy with the need to minimize the adverse impact on the legitimate use of BSAT.”
  2. “…the Secretaries of Health and Human Services and Agriculture each, no later than 27 months from the date of this order, promulgate final rules and guidance that clearly articulate security actions for registrants who possess, use or transfer Tier 1 agents or toxins.”
  3. “Establishment, Operation, and Functions of the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel…To assist Secretaries of Health and Human Services and Agriculture and the Attorney General in implementing the policies…no later than 4 months from the date of this order, provide consensus recommendations concerning the SAP on…the establishment of appropriate practices to ensure reliability of personnel with access to Tier 1 agents and toxins at registered facilities.”

Executive Order


Editors. “New Executive Order to Prompt Changes in Security Standards for Biolabs.Steptoe & Johnson LLP. September 3, 2010 http://www.steptoe.com/publications-7140.html

  1. “Following a comprehensive review of the nation’s preparedness for biological attacks, the Obama administration issued in July Executive Order 13546 (July 2, 2010) (the “EO”). This EO directs the departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services (HHS) to identify and implement ways to enhance the security of the nation’s sensitive biological laboratories.”
  2. “In addressing this issue, the President and Congress are responding in part to the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission report issued in December 2008 warning Americans that a biological weapons attack likely will occur by 2013. That report contemplates something more destructive than the 2001 anthrax attacks that the FBI concluded were perpetrated by a U.S. Army researcher at Fort Detrick, Maryland.”
  3. “Some in Congress, however, believe that DHS should play a greater role in this process. Senator Lieberman, Chairman of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, along with ranking member Susan Collins, thus have sponsored the Weapons of Mass Destruction Prevention and Preparedness Act (S. 1649). The Senate bill would charge DHS with drafting the new regulations identifying and tightening restrictions on the Tier 1 agents. DHS also would gain authority to conduct independent inspections of biological laboratories for compliance with the new Tier 1 provisions. Many advocates for the nation’s biological research labs have expressed skepticism toward the bill, however, and have argued that Agriculture and HHS possess the appropriate expertise and experience to oversee these matters.”

Personnel Reliability, Homeland Security, Executive Order


Subcommittee on Consequence Assessment and Protective Actions (SCAPA). Highlights SCAPA Teleconference 10-05.  October 21, 2010 http://orise.orau.gov/emi/scapa/files/Highlights/2010Dec16.pdf

  1. “The Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel (FESAP) working groups were convened by NIH and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to follow up on Executive Order 13546, “Optimizing the Security of Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) in the United States,” signed by President Obama in July 2010… The recommendations of these working groups are not yet final, but it can be generally said that recommendations from the working groups will not be radically out of line with DOE/NNSA practices for PR and physical/cyber security programs.”
  2. “Tier 1 bio-agents will have the highest PR requirements. Tier 1 will be a select group of bacterial and viral agents. However, it is unsure how much loosening of recommendations may occur for Tier 2. Compliance with the new guidelines should be easy for national laboratories but will be much harder for the academic/university laboratories. Of particular difficulty for them is the issue on how to handle medical and psychological information collected to reduce the insider threat. They need to worry about compliance with HIPAA requirements and how to fund the costs associated with an enhanced PR program.”
  3. “On the PR working group, there are a lot of heavy hitters who know a great deal about establishing PR programs at various federal agencies. The PR program for biosafety at LANL is based on the PR program established for the nuclear program. It includes medical assessment, a psychological evaluation, etc.”

Personnel Reliability, Biosecurity, Executive Order


Editors, “Export Control Reform Followup,” 11 May 2011, Space Politics http://www.spacepolitics.com/2011/05/11/export-control-reform-followup/ Last Visited 2 August 2011.

  1. “[N]ew legislation introduced last week to reform satellite export controls by giving the president the ability to remove satellite and related components from the US Munitions List (USML), although still prohibiting their export to China. However, some caution that the introduction of that legislation doesn’t mean reform is right around the corner.”
  2. “During a meeting of the Export Controls Working Group of the FAA’s Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC), congressional staffers . . . warned that a couple of obstacles will hinder any near-term progress.”
  3. “One is the so-called ‘Section 1248 report.’” . . .  “[T]he FY2010 defense authorization act that required the Defense Department to prepare ‘an assessment of the national security risks of removing satellites and related components from the United States Munitions List.’”
  4. “That report was due in April 2010, but only in the last few days has Congress received an ‘interim’ report.”
  5. “That interim report, according to one staffer, concluded that there are “no unacceptable security risks” of moving commercial satellites and related components off the list.”
  6. “Until the administration releases a final report, not expected until late this year, though, that staffer expected Congress not to act on any reform effort.”
  7. “The second factor is the administration’s ongoing export control reform efforts, which seek to unify various export control lists and systems. (That work is one reason why the Section 1248 report is so late.) Such an effort is a major, and slow, process. “This is a momentous undertaking,” said a panelist.”
  8. “The thinking on Capitol Hill . . . is that Congress prefers to wait to see how that reform effort works out before moving to make changes of its own.”
  9. “There’s also skepticism that the reform effort will work out as the administration has proposed: while there’s support for a unified IT system and even a single, tiered export control list, there’s less support for two other major aspects of the reform effort, creation of a single licensing agency and single enforcement agency.”
  10. “Panelists also noted one of the challenges for proponents for export control reform has been the difficulty in identifying specific negative impacts on US industry caused by moving satellites and related components to the USML n the late 1990s.”
  11. “[V]arious reports on export control policy have not been able to quantify the [sic] effect on American industry.”

Export Control, Executive Order


Hansson, Leigh; Lowell, Micheal, “Top Ten Things to Know About Export Control Reform,” 1 June 2011, Association of Corporate Counsel http://www.acc.com/legalresources/publications/topten/Export-Control-Reform.cfm Last Checked 2 August 2011.

  1. “The current export control system operates under two different control systems: the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) and the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”).”
  2. “In addition to the EAR and ITAR, exporters must consider a third agency with jurisdiction over transactions. The U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) administers a number of sanctions programs based on the destination, end-user, or end-use for the proposed export.”
  3. “The Obama Administration has decided to reform the system largely through harmonization, consolidation, and lessening of export controls to encourage U.S. exports and narrow the focus of U.S. Government control efforts to the most critical goods and technologies.”
  4. “[T]he Export Control Reform Initiative, was launched following an interagency review of the current export control system. The interagency review determined that the current export control system was “overly complicated,” redundant, and “in trying to protect too much, diminishes our ability to focus our efforts on the most critical national security priorities.”
  5. “The [initiative] includes three phases of reform resulting in a consolidation of four key aspects of export controls: (1) a single control list; (2) a single licensing agency; (3) a single information technology system; and (4) a single primary enforcement agency.”
  6. “If successful, it appears that the reform would result in an end of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR Parts 120-130 (‘ITAR’).”
  7. “The reform would also likely lead to a significant loosening of controls on a large number of items that currently require authorization from the U.S. Government prior to export.”
  8. “The reform will be rolled out in three phases. Phases I and II will involves reconciliation of definitions, regulations, and policies primarily relating to the ITAR and EAR. Phase III will be implementation of the single control list, licensing agency, enforcement coordination, and a single IT system.”
  9. Moving to a Single Control List
  10. “Currently, there are two primary lists of export-controlled items: the EAR’s Commerce Control List (“CCL”) and the ITAR’s U.S. Munitions List (“USML“).”
  11. “The new export control system will include the development of ‘new criteria for determining what items need to be controlled and corresponding policies for determining when a license is required.’”
  12. “The new list will be ‘positive’ — that is, the list will describe items ‘using objective criteria (e.g., technical parameters such as horsepower or microns) rather than broad, open-ended, subjective, catch-all, or design intent-based criteria.’”
  13. “The list will also be tiered such that the most critical or sensitive items will be subject to the highest controls (Tier One) with a sliding scale of controls for items that might be more broadly available overseas and therefore less sensitive (Tier Three).”
  14. “It is not clear whether the export controls administered by other federal agencies, including controls affecting the nuclear industry, food and drugs, and controlled substances, will be included in the proposed consolidated list.”
  15. Single Restricted Party List
  16. “The current system includes a number of different restricted party lists — those lists of persons with whom U.S. persons may be prohibited from doing business or have other restrictions on transactions.”
  17. “These lists are maintained by the Commerce Department, the State Department, and OFAC. Despite some overlaps, the lists are unique and none is a comprehensive resource for exporters.”
  18. “As part of the Export Control Reform Initiative, the U.S. Government has consolidated the restricted party screening lists into a consolidated list”
  19. Single Information Technology System
  20. “All three of the primary agencies involved in U.S. export controls maintain separate internal information technology (“IT”) systems for managing export license applications and a separate external portal through which exporters can apply for licenses.”
  21. “For the internal systems, the U.S. Government has decided to migrate licensing to the U.S. Department of Defense’s USXPorts system. Work has already begun to migrate DDTC to USXPorts and completion of the migration is expected in 2012.”
  22. “A consolidated IT system is expected to result in increased efficiency, cooperation, and transparency in the export licensing process.”
  23. Single Primary Enforcement Agency
  24. “On November 9, 2010, Executive Order 13558 established theExport Enforcement Coordination Center. The Center is expected to coordinate and strengthen export enforcement by the U.S. Government by minimizing duplication of efforts and increasing inter-agency cooperation on enforcement.”
  25. “At this point, there is no indication that DDTC, BIS, or other agencies will lose enforcement responsibilities, although that would seem likely if a single licensing agency is actually created.”
  26. Single Licensing Agency
  27. “Currently, DDTC, BIS, and OFAC each have their own responsibility for export licensing and, although rare, some transactions require licenses to be approved by more than one agency depending on the mix of items included in the transaction (ITAR-EAR) or the destination, end-use, or end-user (EAR-OFAC). To increase transparency, cooperation, and to minimize bureaucratic waste, the Initiative proposes to consolidate the licensing jurisdiction of these agencies, which would have the added benefit of a single license application form, rather than the multiple forms that exist under the current system.”
    The Export Control Reform Initiative Might Not be Successful
  28. “Until recently, there was very little indication that the U.S. Congress would oppose the Initiative. However, in May 2011, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.) remarked that ‘[t]o date, a compelling case has not been made for the wholesale restructuring of our current system, especially one that would include the creation of a costly and perhaps unaccountable new federal bureaucracy.’”

Export Control, Executive Order


Editors, “Fact Sheet: Global Health SecurityThe White House. Sept. 22, 2011.

  1. ““We will focus on the health of mothers and children. And we must come together to prevent, detect, and fight every kind of biological danger – whether it is a pandemic like H1N1, a terrorist threat, or a treatable disease. This week, America signed an agreement with the World Health Organization to affirm our commitment to meet this challenge.””
  2. “This week President Obama addressed the United Nations General Assembly and urged the global community come together to prevent, detect, and fight every kind of biological danger, whether it is a pandemic, terrorist threat, or treatable disease.’”
  3. “Improving capacities to detect, report and respond to infectious diseases quickly and accurately lies at the heart of the global community’s ability to address all infectious disease threats”
  4. “The BWC Revcon offers an important opportunity to revitalize international efforts against these threats, helping to build global capacity to combat infectious diseases, prevent biological weapons proliferation and bioterrorism, and bring security, health, and scientific communities together to raise awareness of evolving biological risks and develop practices to manage them.”

Public Health, Bioterrorism, Biodefense, Biosecurity, Developing Countries, Executive Order, Pandemic, Emergency Response


Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Implementation of Export Control Reform“, March 8 2013, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/08/fact-sheet-implementation-export-control-reform, Last Checked March 8 2013.

  1. “Today, the Administration announced two key steps to further the goals of President Obama’s Export Control Reform Initiative, which is a common sense approach to overhauling the nation’s export control system.  President Obama signed an Executive Order today to update delegated presidential authorities over the administration of certain export and import controls under the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and yesterday the Administration notified Congress of the first in a series of changes to the U.S. Munitions List.”
  2. “The President’s new Executive Order updates delegated authorities consistent with the upcoming changes to our export control lists.  It supersedes and replaces Executive Order 11958 and amends Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001, that pertains to the Department of Commerce-administered controls.
  3. “Consolidation of All Brokering Responsibilities with the Department of State:  The Arms Export Control Act requires the registration and licensing of brokering activities for defense articles and services for both exports and imports.  A broker is a person who acts as an agent for others in negotiating or arranging contracts, purchases, sales or transfers of defense articles or services.  The Executive Order consolidates and delegates to the Secretary of State all statutory responsibility for maintaining registration and licensing requirements for brokering of defense articles and services on either the State or ATF lists which both control defense articles and services under the Arms Export Control Act.  This one-stop approach provides better clarity for the defense trade community and makes it easier for industry to comply and for the U.S. Government to enforce”
  4. “Elimination of Possible “Double Licensing” Requirements:  Today the Department of State licenses entire systems, including any accompanying spare parts, accessories, and attachments, yet many of these items will be moved to the Commerce list which may mean that an exporter would need two licenses instead of one.  The President’s delegation, via an amendment to Executive Order 13222, will allow the Department of State to authorize those accompanying items that may have moved to the Commerce list and prevent any potential double-licensing requirement.  This ensures that the prioritization of our controls, in which we facilitate secure trade with Allies and partners, does not add new red tape.  Items licensed or otherwise approved by the Secretary of State under this delegation remain subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce, including for enforcement purposes.”
  5. “Congressional Notification Process:  The President has directed that the Department of Commerce establish procedures for notifying Congress of approved export licenses for a certain subset of items that are moved or that may move from the State list to the Commerce list.  A key feature of the President’s reform initiative is to enhance transparency with Congress and the public in the administration of our export control system.  This Executive Order ensures that, going forward, the Executive Branch will continue this transparency and notify Congress about export licenses for those certain items that, while no longer subject to the statutory notification requirements of the Arms Export Control Act, warrant continued transparency and notification to Congress.”
  6. “Other Administrative Updates:  The Executive Order delegates to the Attorney General the functions previously assigned by Executive Order 11958 to the Secretary of the Treasury, reflecting the 2003 move of ATF to the Department of Justice from the Treasury (accommodated by Executive Order 13284).  It also makes a number of other necessary updates to ensure that the authorities to administer our export control system are current.”
  7. “The cornerstone of the President’s Export Control Reform Initiative is the rebuilding of the two primary export controls lists, State’s USML and the Department of Commerce’s Commerce Control List (CCL) which primarily controls dual-use items, i.e., commercial items with possible military applications, and some military items of lesser sensitivity.”

Export Control, Executive, Executive Order


Burditt, Arthur K, “U.S. Arms Exports Catapult While Obama Tweeks Controls,” April 1, 2013, The Hammill Post, Last Checked April 24, 2013. http://www.hammillpost.com/2013/04/u-s-arms-exports-catapult-while-obama-tweeks-controls/#.

  1. “Executive order 11958 delegates authority to control exports of defense articles and services to the secretary of State and also extends comparable authority to control arms imports to the secretary of the Treasury.”
  2. “EO 11958 updates delegated authorities consistent with the upcoming changes to U.S. export control lists.  It supersedes and replaces EO 11958 and amends EO 13222 of Aug. 17, 2001, which pertains to Commerce Department-administered controls.”
  3. “The president’s delegation, via an amendment to executive order 13222, will allow the Department of State to authorize accompanying items that may have moved to the Commerce list. It will also prevent any potential double-licensing requirement in order to prevent additional red tape.”
  4. “A central element of the president’s Export Control Reform Initiative is the rebuilding of the two primary export controls lists: State Department’s USML and Commerce Department ’s Commerce Control List, which primarily controls dual-use items. These are mainly commercial items with possible military applications, and some military items of lesser sensitivity.”
  5. “An intended benefit of the revised USML is to enable the U.S. to better focus its resources on items that deserve the highest levels of export protection and in  its destinations of concern. This is intended to provide American companies with a streamlined export authorization process for thousands of parts and components.”
  6. “Military sales overseas primarily take two forms: Foreign Military Sales, which is a program of the U.S. government; and direct commercial sales. FMS covers the transfer of defense articles, services, and training to other sovereign nations and international organizations. Under FMS, the government actually procures defense articles and services on behalf of foreign customers.”
  7. “New U.S. foreign military sales are growing at breakneck speed and may grow even faster if a Defense Department policy easing exports of unmanned aircraft to 66 countries gets interagency and Congressional approval.”

Export Control, Executive, Executive Order


Major, AlexanderCyber-Breach & NISPOM Conforming Change 2 – It’s What’s On the Inside That Counts.Mondaq.com NEWS. 6 pages. November 23, 2014.

  1. “While an insider breach is not necessarily a common event, when it does happen, it tends to happen on a large scale.”
  2. “Recognizing that internal threats are real, the issue, then, is how to stop these threats from manifesting”
  3. “In October 2011, the President signed Executive Order 13587, Structural Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information, followed, a year later, by a Presidential Memorandum, National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs.”
  4. “These directives mandate insider threat programs in federal agencies that handle classified information. They also provide guidance for insider threat mitigation programs premised on “responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified data,” with guidelines for programs that will “deter, detect, and mitigate actions by employees who may represent a threat to national security.””
  5. “Although not the first attempt to address insider threats, the Department of Defense implemented the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs via directive (DoD D 5205.16) on September 30, 2014”
  6. “The National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, or NISPOM, provides the baseline standards for protection of classified information released or disclosed in connection with classified contracts under the National Industrial Security Program.”
  7. “To stay ahead of things (and make the most of the inevitable short timetable), the standards suggest the following baseline needs:
    1. Designation of an Insider Threat Program Manager (a U.S. citizen with appropriate clearance)
    2. Be prepared to provide HR and network data records pertinent to insider threats (e.g. personnel files, security files, polygraph examinations and disciplinary files)
  8. Conduct insider threat training within 30 days of hiring that includes:
    1. The importance of detecting and reporting insider threats;
    2. Counterintelligence and security fundamentals such as applicable legal issues;
    3. Procedures for conducting insider threat response actions;
    4. Laws and regulations on gathering, integration, retention, safeguarding and use of records and data, and the consequences of misuse of such information; and
    5. Legal, civil liberties and privacy policies.
  9. Conduct monitoring of user activity on classified networks that is:
    1. Intended to detect activity indicative of insider threat behavior;
    2. In accordance with guidance issued by the Cognizant Security Agency (“CSA”), including the tools or capabilities required by the CSA; and
    3. Adherent to federal systems requirements as specified by FISMA, NIST, CNSS and others.”
  10. “When examining data security efforts, a key thing to know is that the “requirements” of FISMA, NIST, and others standards serve only as a starting point upon which contractors must build their secure data solutions; standing alone, they will not – and will never be – sufficient”

Personnel Reliability, Classified, Executive Order