Export Control

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Status Brief

Developmental Milestones/Developments to Date:

Current Assessment/State of the Field:




McDaniel, Douglas, “United States Technology Export Control: An assessment,Praeger Security International, 1993

  1. “Furthermore, export trade in general, and East-West trade in particular, has long been more significant to the Western Europeans than to the United States, and the political and economic rationale for such trade sometimes causes friction among the Western allies.”
  2. “The COCOM system and postwar U.S. East-West trade policy were elements in an overarching containment policy that was now subject to domestic criticism and debate.”
  3. “For example, the strong Congressional and business interests favoring liberalized East-West trade during the 1960s and early 1970s, a policy supported by presidents Johnson and Nixon, were challenged by reinvigorated antitrade interests in the 1970s.”
  4. “An assertive Congress blocked presidential initiatives in East-West trade by passing the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments, partly in response to interest group pressure.”
  5. “These acts authorized the DOD to deny any export of technology development of which was funded by the DOD, and also authorized the DOD to review exports of dual-use technology to controlled countries.”
  6. “Unacceptable Soviet domestic and foreign policy behavior was punished by selective tightening and loosening of trade in commodities for which the U.S.S.R. was thought uniquely dependent on U.S. supplies.”
  7. “For example, the Soviets understood that Western democracies could be pressured by myopic domestic trade interests to dismantle multilateral controls and subsidize unprofitable trade with the Soviet bloc at bargain rates.”
  8. “The resignation of several top conservative policymakers from key posts in the U.S. administration bolstered the influence of more pragmatic advisors who were relatively less skeptical of the benefits of U.S.-Soviet trade and deemphasized political constraints on trade.”
  9. “U.S. business interests, long unhappy with the scope of export controls, lobbied a sympathetic Congress—concerned by ballooning trade deficits—and achieved a series of reforms designed to ease regulatory burdens and liberalize trade.”
  10. “The economic dividend—including export-generated employment during the recessionary 1970s and early 1980s—continues to be an influential factor and might well increase in importance should future prolonged recessions limit other export opportunities.”
  11. “Bonn remains hesitant to mimic the U.S. practice of differentiation through trade concessions and different sets of export licensing requirements, and encourages signs of East-West rapprochement since a calm systemic condition is essential for the furtherance of Ostpolitik.”
  12. “By the late 1970s, anger over U.S. legal practices had grown to such a degree that several European countries enacted so-called blocking legislation—such as the U.K.’s Protection of Trading Interests Act—specifically designed to bar extraterritorial enforcement.”
  13. “Under the territoriality principle, all states have the right to exercise ‘supreme authority’ over individuals, things, and acts located and taking place within the state’s territory.”
  14. “Only the state itself can impose limits within its territorial jurisdiction and no foreign state may limit another state’s territorial supremacy.”
  15. “Under Section 5 of the 1979 EAA, “the President, may, in accordance with the provisions of this section, prohibit or curtail the export of any goods or technology subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
  16. “In the 1969 version, the President was merely authorized to restrict “‘exportation from the United States,” whereas the 1979 EAA authorizes restrictions on exports by any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction andby foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies which are “controlled in fact” by the U.S. parent.”
  17. “…the scope of U.S. requirements is unique among the Western allies. For example, a European firm that purchases controlled U.S.-origin components to be included as part of machinery destined for Eastern Europe could be required under U.S. regulations to apply for a U.S. reexport license even after the firm’s government has licensed the transaction. Under the system used by most of the allies, the end user’s government is responsible for preventing diversions and not the nation that initially obtained and retransferred the technology.”
  18. “Because of the extra time and cost stemming from the licensing process, allegedly intrusive U.S. audits of license holders, and U.S. regulations governing use or domestic resale—implying that the United States does not trust the applicant’s national export control authorities—foreign companies are wary of contracting with U.S. firms for fear of sudden U.S. export prohibitions and import sanctions.”
  19. “The EC rejected the assertion that technology retained its original nationality after export from its “birthplace.”
  20. “Submission clauses contractually agreed to by European companies, in which the latter voluntarily agreed to comply with U.S. export regulations prior to export, are denied any basis under international legal practice.”
  21. “For example, U.S. reexport regulations are perceived as hampering the free flow between EC states of goods containing U.S.-origin technology.”
  22. “The act was interpreted to require elimination of all barriers to trade within the EC, including export controls and end-use verification.”
  23. “However, the national security provisions of the Rome Treaty (articles 36 and 223) do give EC members the right to exercise regulations in the interest of national security even if they are contrary to the goals of free trade among members.”
  24. “In January 1988, a COCOM agreement to decontrol lower-level technologies for COCOM destinations, in exchange for better residual enforcement, followed by subsequent agreements at meetings in 1989–90, were efforts to address the 1992 changes in the EC and suggested that all parties were anxious to reach an accord.”
  25. “The legal and administrative frameworks governing export controls in the principal COCOM countries reflect differing policy priorities.”
  26. “Furthermore, in contrast to the widely diffused character of export control authority in the United States, where numerous executive agencies and Congressional committees have responsibility for regulation, rule and lawmaking authority is, generally speaking, more concentrated within European governments.”
  27. “Authority for U.S. national security export controls derives from the 1979 Export Administration Act, as amended (1979 EAA),which embodies several significant themes.”
  28. “In Section 3(1), U.S. policy is declared to be one of minimizing “uncertainties in export control policy and to encourage trade with all countries with which the United States has diplomatic and trading relations.”
  29. “This is followed by Section 3(2), which authorizes national security controls on exports that endanger national security by making a “significant contribution to the military potential” of an adversary or adversaries.”
  30. “This language reveals contradictory policy goals that simultaneously mandate expansion and restriction of exports as means of promoting national welfare and security.”
  31. “In it, the President is authorized to impose national security controls on goods and technology that “would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other country or combination of countries which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States.”
  32. “Furthermore, the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act mandated decontrol of most (but not all) exports to COCOM countries subject to a determination by the Secretary of Commerce that the other members had adequate controls.”
  33. “For example, while the DOC has responsibility for day-to-day evaluation and licensing of most commercial high technology and data, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the Central Intelligence Agency advise the DOC regarding commercial exports.”
  34. “Adding to the political cross-pressures and tending to politicize and publicize export control issues in the United States is the significant oversight role played by Congress.”
  35. “The principal committees with jurisdiction over export controls are the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy.”
  36. “Another significant feature relates to the degree to which U.S. business interests lobby Congress (with varied success) to seek regulatory reform and relief from controls.”
    This grant in effect gives the DOD a veto over exports deemed injurious to national security, although in practice the DOD’s review jurisdiction is limited to the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and a few selected noncommunist countries.”
  37. “Created in 1982, the DOC’s Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) was given increased status with the appointment of a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement.”
  38. “The Customs Service was also assigned an expanded role under the Reagan administration in 1981, and it launched Operation Exodus, a publicized and controversial effort to prevent contraband from leaving the United States.”
  39. “In early 1988, agreement in COCOM to reduce intra-COCOM controls while bolstering enforcement was a step toward recognizing the reality of 1992.”
  40. “U.S. export control regulations and procedures also allegedly damage the nation’s economic competitiveness and defense-related industries.”

Export Control


Mongelluzzo, Bill. “Traders’ Customs Specialists Urged to Take Control of Compliance PlansJournal of Commerce, Special Report. October 7, 1998.

  1. “Customs takes steps, some subtle, some blatant, to constantly remind the trade community that it is serious about fostering compliance with the commercial regulations governing imports and exports”
  2. “Companies that shortchange the government on import duties or have numerous errors in their documentation can expect that a high percentage of their shipments will be pulled aside at ports, airports and border crossings for inspection.”
  3. “For some offenses, such as failure to produce adequate records to back up classification and valuation decisions, Customs resorts to penalties.”
  4. “Fines range from $10,000 per offense for negligence to $100,000 per offense for fraud.”
  5. “Although fostering compliance has always been a mission of the Customs Service, it took on added importance with the passage of the Customs Modernization and Informed Compliance Act in December 1993.”
  6. “Under the Mod Act, the responsibility for classifying and assigning value to merchandise now rests with the importer.”
  7. “The goal of any compliance program is to have a plan and procedures in place to comply consistently with commercial regulations and prove to Customs that the importer or exporter takes these issues seriously”

Compliance, Export Control


Morehead, Jere W., and David A. DismukeExport Control Policies and National Security: Protecting U.S. Interests in the New MillenniumTexas International Law Journal Volume 34. 173. January 4, 1999.

  1. “The uproar over the Clinton Administration’s recent decision to export satellite technology to China highlights the national security interests implicated by U.S. export control policy.” – page 173
  2. “Controlling the export of such weapons and the technology to make them has been the cornerstone of U.S. policy since the conclusion of World War II.” – page 174
  3. “…this article will explore some of the deficiencies inherent in the current U.S. export control regime, particularly in the areas of shared licensing and enforcement responsibility.” – page 174
  4. “…Wassenaar Arrangement is the most important multilateral export control device in existence since the demise of COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls), and it is here to stay for the forseeable future. – page 178
  5. “Although it may only be capable of slowing proliferation, the EAA has remained a useful tool while the United States searches for other devices to prevent the proliferation of dangerous weaponry.” – page 178
  6. “At the very least, export controls add costs and delays to those nations or terrorist groups pursuing such items” – page 178
  7. “This convoluted system of shared responsibility for licensing makes effective export controls problematic. Rather than one central authority having control over strategic export decisions the current system makes it very easy for delays, confusion, and mistakes to occur.” – page 180
  8. “…the Department of Commerce has two bureaus that exist with conflicting duties: the Bureau of Export Administration, which is responsive for licensing exports of dual-use items and enforcing export controls, and the International Trade Administration, which is in charge of Commerce’s primary function – trade promotion activities.” – page 181
  9. “Dr. Bryen… argued that the appropriate course of action is to remove licensing responsibility from the Commerce Department” – page 182
  10. “The General Accounting Office (GAO) cited several advantages to granting primary responsibility for export enforcement to Customs: it would eliminate overlapping jurisdiction and duplication of effort; it would utilize Customs’ vast domestic and overseas resource bases; it would employ Customs’ unique enforcement tools, such as warrantless search authority; and it would erase potential conflicts of interest stemming from Commerce’s role in both trade promotion and control.” – page 185
  11. “The only solution that would work is divorcing export promotion from export controls” – page 186

Export Control, Dual Use


Bohm, Nicholas, Ian Brown, and Brian GladmanStrategic Export Controls: The Impact on CryptologyComputer Law & Security Review, Volume 15, Issue 2. Pages 75-85. June 2, 1999

  1. “One of the proposals in the White Paper is that existing controls on the export of goods should be extended to control the publication or export of information” – page 75
  2. “This paper examines one important controlled technology, cryptography, and the impact of extending the existing control in the way proposed by the White Paper” – page 75
  3. “Surveys such as the Graphic, Visualization, & Usability Center’s 8th WWW User Survey have identified security of the Internet as a widespread concern of members of the public contemplating its use” – page 75
  4. “The effective deployment of cryptographic technology to provide improved safety and security in Internet use is now a crucial step in achieving the public confidence on which its future benefits depend.” – page 76
  5. “There are no general legal controls on the domestic sale, possession or use of cryptographic equipment or software in the United Kingdom” – page 76
  6. “UK export control is imposed by statutory instruments made either under the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939 or under the European Communities Act 1972 pursuant to the requirements of the EC Dual-Use Goods Regulation … known as the Wassenaar Arrangement” – page 76
  7. “Although cryptographic products are in no sense weapons they are nevertheless subject to controls under the terms of the Arrangement” – page 77
  8. “Because most research on cryptography is conducted through publication, meetings and electronic exchanges, export controls on cryptography have had no significant impact on pure academic research” – page 79
  9. “The UK White Paper on Strategic Export Controls proposes that documents transferred abroad containing controlled technology should be subject to export licensing requirements, whether exported physically or by fax or electronic mail” – page 79
  10. “Export controls on cryptographic products have been very effective in impeding the widespread use of cryptography. Despite all the interest in better security on the Internet, only an insignificant proportion of the traffic involved is cryptographically protected, even though the need for this is now widely recognized.”- page 81
  11. “There is no evidence to suggest that cryptographic export controls have had a major impact on the ability of criminals, terrorists or belligerent states to obtain cryptographic software products, since these are widely and easily available to those with the skills, motivation and resources for implementing security systems in a non-commercial environment” – page 81
  12. “Given the adverse impact of existing and proposed export controls on cryptography, we conclude that no adequate case has been made by government to justify them.” – page 81
  13. “…breaches of export control are no mere administrative infractions, but serious criminal offences for which a sentence of imprisonment is required for a first offender of good character whose offence causes no particular harm…” – page 82
  14. “…controls on intangibles cannot work without the support of controls on freedom of speech and publication.” – page 82

Cybersecurity, Export Control, Dual Use, U.K.


Oppenheimer, AndyCBRN Weapons: The Growing ThreatNATO’s Nations & Partners for Peace, Volume 48 Issue 3. Pages 14-23. 2003

  1. “Before and since the September 11 attacks, evidence has mounted that terrorist groups and terrorist-sponsoring nations are developing or acquiring CBRN capabilities.” – page 16
  2. “North Korea created an international crisis in late 2002, when an official admitted to a US envoy that his country had restarted a programme to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU)” – page 16
  3. “The crisis gathered pace when North Korea withdrew from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); expelled inspectors from the United Nations-backed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and announced it had restarted its nuclear reprocessing plant at Yongbyon to produce plutonium.” – page 16
  4. “The world’s attention is now on Iran, on which pressure is mounting from not just the US, but also from the UN, the EU, and Russia, to sign an Additional Protocol to the NPT to allow the IAEA more access to Iran’s nuclear sites.” – page 16
  5. “…Iranians continue to insist that they are developing a nuclear power industry only, claiming it needs to save its vast oil reserves for export.” – page 16
  6. “The actions of North Korea and Iran threaten to consign the NPT to history if they continue in their current nuclear direction.” – page 17
  7. “Iran also has a well-established CBW (chemical and biological weapons) programme… it has stocks of up to 2,000 tonnes of weaponized CW agents, including choking, blister, and blood agents. The US believes that Iran has also produced the nerve agent Sarin.” – page 17
  8. “Syria is believed to have one of the developing world’s most extensive CW programmes, having allegedly received CW assistance and chemical agents from Egypt in the 1970s, and by 1986 had an indigenous capability to produce and weaponise sarin and VX nerve agents, and mustard blister agent.” – page 17
  9. “Unlike several of its Arab neighbors (Iran, Iraq, and Libya), Syria has never tested CW.” – page 17

NPT, WMD, Export Control, Iran, North Korea, Syria


U.S. Government Publication, “Container Security Initiative 2006-2011 Strategic Plan“, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, August 2006: http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/csi_strategic_plan.ctt/csi_strategic_plan.pdf

  1. primary system of global trade = containerized shipping, protected from terrorists
  2. pre-screen containers posing a potential threat before leaving foreign ports for US
  3. began in January 2002
  4. Goals: identify high risk containers through intelligence, prescreen and evaluate containers before shipped, use X-ray, Gamma ray, and radiation detection devices to prescreen, and use more secure containers to identify containers tampered with
  5.  44 ports worldwide use CSI as of August 2006
  6. “The World Customs Organization, the EU, and the G8 support CSI expansion and have adopted resolutions to introduce and implement security measures and non-intrusive inspection standards similar to CSI at ports throughout the world.”
  7.  part of CBP’s mission to “prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the US” through maritime containers
  8. “Examinations of cargo or persons do not require search warrants, probable cause, or particularized suspicion”
  9.  hope to have around 70 ports use CSI by 2010

Homeland Security, CSI, Law Enforcement, CBP, PSI, Container Security, Export Control


Borman, Matthew, “Implementation in the Export Administration Regulations of the United States’ Rescission of Libya’s Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism and Revisions Applicable to IraqFederal Register, Volume 71, Issue 169. 51,714. August 25, 2006

  1. ”The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the June 30, 2006 rescission of Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.” – page 51714
  2. ”This action is the latest in a series of steps taken by the U.S. Government to reflect the improvement in the bilateral relationship since Libya’s announcement in December 2003 that it was renouncing terrorism and giving up its weapons of mass destruction programs.” – page 51714
  3. ”On April 29, 2004, BIS published an amendment to the EAR that allowed for the licensing and authorization of the export or reexport of dual-use items to Libya.” – page 51714
  4. ”On May 15, 2006, the President submitted a report to Congress certifying that Libya had not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding 6 months and that Libya had provided assurances that it would not support future acts of international terrorism.” – page 51715
  5. ”Items controlled only for anti-terrorism (AT) reasons on the commerce control list (CCL) will no longer be subject to a licensing requirement for export or reexport to Libya, except for the end-use and end- user requirements.” – page 51715
  6. ”Under the terms of the revisions in regards to Iraq, items covered by eight ECCNs which previously required a license for export or reexport to Iraq, or transfer within Iraq, for AT reasons now require a license for export or reexport to Iraq, or transfer within Iraq, for Regional Stability (RS) reasons.” – page 51716

Export Control, U.S. Foreign Policy, WMD, Libya, Iraq


Editors, “Container Security Initiative (CSI)“, GLOBALSECURITY, 2007: http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/csi.htm

  1. “cargo containers in our ports are potentially threats to security as they can hold nuclear weapons that can be detonated”
  2. “terror in a box”
  3. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
  4. “shippers commit to improving the security of their cargo shipments, and in return, they receive a range of benefits from our government”
  5. “however, shippers who have promised to take security measures don’t usually get cargo searched and it is not determined whether they actually carried out the security measures.”
  6. “CSI screens containers that pose a risk before they depart for US ports of entry by using intelligence information”
  7. “screening process done by CBP (Customs & Border Patrol) officials”
  8. “US has a reciprocal program with other nations who send their officials to the US to oversee that cargo going to their home country is secure”
  9. “CBP has bilateral agreements shares information with CSI participants globally”

Homeland Security, CSI, Nonproliferation, CBP, Container Security, Export Control


Cheadle, Shawn. “Are you up to Date on Export Compliance?Military Microwaves Supplement. 8. August, 2008

  1. “To export defense articles or technical data, companies must remain compliant with regulations enforced by the US State Department (State), US Customs Agency, Department of Commerce (Commerce), the Office of Foreign Asset Controls (OFAC), Homeland Security, and the Census Bureau among others.” – page 8
  2. “Technical data is defined as follows by the EAR: information that is required for the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification of controlled items requiring a license to export.” – page 9
  3. “The penalties for exporting without a license may be severe, including both criminal and civil penalties to the corporation and even the individuals involved.” – page 9
  4. “US companies found guilty of violating the various laws will generally be debarred from exporting for three years, and may be debarred for much longer.” – page 9
  5. “The State Department uses both the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to control exports.” – page 9
  6. “Primarily, under the EAR, you must classify your products against the Commerce Control List to see if they have an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) or will be designated as “EAR99.”” – page 14
  7. “Just because you have classified products as EAR99 does not necessarily mean that the products may ship as no license required (NLR). You still must consult several prohibitions checklists to determine whether a license is nevertheless required.” – page 14
  8. “All records associated with the review of each export, re-export, deemed export, or exports conducted under a license exception, should be retained by the company and the responsible individuals for five years from the date the item is exported” – page 18

Export Control, Compliance, Military, Homeland Security, State Department, Information Policy

Wall, Christopher. “Effects of Foreign-Policy Based Export ControlsFederal Register Volume 73 Issue 174. 52,006. August 29, 2008.

  1. ”The current foreign policy- based export controls maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) are set forth in the EAR, including in parts 742 (CCL Based Controls), 744 (End-User and End-Use Based Controls) and 746 (Embargoes and Special Country Controls).” – page 52006
  2. ”Under the provisions of section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), as amended, export controls maintained for foreign policy purposes require annual extension. Section 6 of the EAA requires a report to Congress when foreign policy-based export controls are extended.” – page 52006
  3. ”The Department of Commerce, insofar as appropriate, is following the provisions of section 6 by reviewing its foreign policy-based export controls, requesting public comments on such controls, and preparing a report to be submitted to Congress. In January 2008, the Secretary of Commerce, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, extended for one year all foreign policy-based export controls then in effect.” – page 52006
  4. ”Among the criteria considered in determining whether to continue or revise U.S. foreign policy-based export controls are the following: the likelihood that such controls will achieve the intended foreign policy purpose; whether the foreign policy objective of such controls can be achieved through negotiations or other alternative means; the compatibility of the controls with the foreign policy objectives of the United States; whether the reaction of other countries to the extension of such controls is not likely to render the controls ineffective in achieving the intended foreign policy objective; the comparative benefits to U.S. foreign policy objectives versus the effect of the controls on the export performance of the United States; and the ability of the United States to enforce the controls effectively.” – page 52007
  5. ”BIS is particularly interested in receiving comments on the economic impact of proliferation controls.” – page 52007
  6. ”The Entity List provides notice to the public that certain exports and reexports to parties identified on the Entity List require a license from BIS and that availability of License Exceptions in such transactions is limited” – page 52007

Export Control, U.S. Foreign Policy


Joiner, Jamie A., and Mark C. JoyeComplying with U.S. Export Controls: Practical Considerations and Guidelines for BusinessesInternational Trade Law Journal. Winter 2008

  1. “Export control training will guarantee that all employees, all compliance officers, and all managers of the corporation remain up-to-date on export controls.”
  2. “There are two primary separate export control regimes in the United States that businesses operating in or with the U.S. must be aware of. The first is the regime for dual-use exports, which is administered and enforced by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).”
  3. “BIS administers and enforces the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) which cover “dual-use” items.”
  4. “The second is the regime for defense articles and services, which is administered and enforced by the U.S. Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC).”
  5. “DDTC administers and enforces the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which covers military items including items that have a military use.”
  6. “The EAR imposes dual-use controls for several purposes, including national security, foreign policy, nonproliferation, and U.S. economic interests.”
  7. “The EAR includes general export and reexport requirements, processes and prohibitions, as well as penalties.”
  8. “The EAR also contains the Commerce Control List (CCL) which is a list of the items that the U.S. Government has designated as “dual-use” items.”
  9. “Items listed on the CCL contain one or more Control Codes which indicate the reason(s) for control of that item.”
  10. “The ITAR is the primary set of regulations containing the defense-related export controls, and the ITAR applies to manufacturers and exporters of defense articles and services.”
  11. “The ITAR includes the U.S. Munitions List (USML), a list of the defense articles and technical data controlled for export under the ITAR.”
  12. “There are at least two major types of foreign laws that relate to U.S. export controls that businesses should be aware of. The first type is complementary to U.S. export controls and these are the export control laws that are maintained by certain foreign countries that are fairly consistent with and similar to U.S. export controls.”
  13. “These multilateral export control Conventions and Agreements include: The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, The Australia Group, The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and On Their Destruction, also referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention, and The Missile Technology Control Regime”
  14. “The second type, on the other hand, are foreign “blocking” statutes which essentially prohibit the foreign country’s citizens, including businesses, from complying with certain U.S. economic or trade sanctions, such as the U.S. embargo of Cuba.”

Export Control, Compliance, Military


Delury, JohnNorth Korea: 20 Years of SolitudeWorld Policy Journal Volume 25, Issue 4. Pages 75-82. Winter 2008

  1. “The current framework for dealing with North Korea evolved back in the late 1980s in the wake of two game-changing developments: the end of the Cold War and the birth of the North Korean nuclear weapons program” – page 75
  2. “The last two decades have shown that neither isolating North Korea nor halfheartedly negotiating with Pyongyang works. Instead, North Korea stands as one of the most striking failures of post–Cold War U.S. foreign policy” – page 76
  3. “…my suggestion would be for the Obama administration to dispatch a peace mission to Pyongyang. Vice President Joe Biden has a long record of working on the Korean issue, and might be a good candidate to act as the senior American emissary” – page 77
  4. “Biden would initiate substantive peace talks, including the establishment of a U.S. Liaison Office in Pyongyang. Biden could also pave the way for Pyongyang to do the same in Washington.”- page 77
  5. “The liaison offices would be initial steps in a broader initiative to peel away legal restrictions on travel and commerce between the two countries, with requisite care to restrict drug, counterfeit, and arms trade” – page 77
  6. “We are likely to see Beijing playing a steady, supportive role in the Korean peace initiative” – page 78
  7. “President Obama’s immediate task is to keep that positive momentum going, and enlist Beijing’s leadership in transforming the Six Party Talks into the Korean Peace Process.” – page 79
  8. “The conservative government in Seoul leans toward a “tough” line on the North, and Pyongyang has reciprocated with relentless invective against President Lee Myung-bak since his inauguration in February. This poses an obvious and immediate problem for the United States, as it is crucial to align our peace initiative with the democratically elected government in Seoul” – page 80
  9. “In brokering a peace, we should look for opportunities to nurture the economic synergy between the North, which is rich in mineral resources and cheap labor, with South Korea’s strengths in agriculture, exports, and services.” – page 80
  10. “Involving Japan in the endeavor to alter North Korean relations may prove trickiest of all. Prime Minister Taro Aso is a long standing hawk on North Korea. Japanese public opinion also continues to harden, centering on two concerns—the abduction issue and the security threat.” – page 81
  11. “The solution to the myriad problems created by North Korea’s long isolation is, quite simply, to end the isolation” – page 82
  12. “…a middle course of robust, determined engagement, embracing the bilateral relationship while coordinating the multilateral diplomacy, has the potential to reverse 20 years of failed foreign policy.” – page 82

Nuclear, North Korea, U.S. Foreign Policy, Export Control


Rood, John C. “Improvements to the Defense Trade Export Control SystemDISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management, Volume 30, Issue 4. 83-89. Winter 2008.

  1. “The following are excerpts of remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, February 26, 2008” – page 83
  2. “I am excited to discuss with you the significant changes that this Administration has undertaken which we believe will maintain the United States’ ability to control sensitive military technology and at the same time, permit U.S. companies to export their products in a more timely and predictable manner and collaborate more effectively with foreign companies” – page 83
  3. “We changed our licensing policy so that employees of foreign companies who are nationals from NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] or EU [European Union] countries, Japan, Australia [or] New Zealand are now considered authorized under an approved license or TAA (Technical Assistance Agreement).” – page 84
  4. “We also are working with the Department of Commerce to clarify the application of U.S. munitions export controls to parts and components certified by the Federal Aviation Administration” – page 84
  5. “Similarly, we are reviewing internal review processes within the Department with the objective of eliminating internal bottlenecks where they may exist” – page 84
  6. “And, as you know, the Administration also signed landmark treaties with the United Kingdom and Australia on Defense Trade Cooperation this year.” – page 86
  7. “The goal was to create the ability for our respective militaries and security authorities and companies to freely exchange information and technologies. To accomplish this, we have created an entirely new structure for most defense exports” – page 87
  8. “Exports of most classified and unclassified U.S. defense goods, technology, and services will be permitted to go into and to move freely within this community without the need for government approvals and export licenses when in support of:
    1. Combined military and counterterrorism operations
    2. Cooperative security and defense research, development, production, and support projects
    3. Specific security and defense projects where HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] is the end-user
    4. And USG only end-use” – page 88
  9. “This will be a big change from today’s export licensing system where numerous government approvals are often necessary for companies to hold discussions about potential projects, to pursue joint activities, to ship hardware and know-how to one another, and even sometimes to move engineers and other personnel within branches of the same company on both sides of the Atlantic” – page 88
  10. “One important highlight of the treaty is that it will include the ability for both governments to effectively enforce it against violators” – page 88

Export Control, Dual Use, Military, Compliance, NATO


Barry, Ellen, “Some Russian Professors Chafe at Order to Screen Scholarly Exports,” NYT, A6, Oct. 28, 2009.

  1. “a document signed Oct. 1 … [states that] professors must provide their academic department with copies of texts to be made public outside Russia, so that they can be reviewed for violation of intellectual property laws or potential danger to national security.”
  2. “Administrators say they are simply bringing the university into line with Russia’s 1999 law on export control, passed after a decade in which some impoverished scientists sold strategic technology to foreign customers.”
  3. “The St. Petersburg order applies to the humanities as well.”
  4. “Several St. petersburg professors said they worried that the rule would be applied selectively to penalize specific faculty members.”
  5. “compliance [with export controls] remains weak , a particular danger in an era in which civilian laboratories produce ‘dual-use technologies’ that can be used in weapon manufacture said Igor Khripunov.”

Open Science, Export Control, RussiaAcademia


Barry, Ellen, “Major university In Russia Eases Fears on Rules,” NYT, A7, Nov. 2, 2009.

  1. “The authorities at St. Petersburg State University issued a statement last week announcing that researchers in the humanities and social sciences would not be required to submit to an export-control screening before publishing their work overseas, easing fears that new procedures would constrain academic freedom.”
  2. “A statement released by the university on Friday explained that the export-control procedures applied only to research involving ‘dual-use technology,’ nonmilitary techniques that could have military applications.”

Open Science, Export Control, RussiaAcademia


Potter, M.Changing Arm Controls Laws To Help ExportsCBS  News.  December 4,  2009 http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-36144371/changing-arm-controls-laws-to-help-exports/?tag=mncol;lst;5

  1. “…the U.S. and its Allies have developed laws and rules limiting technology exports to other countries. One of these is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). When this was originally developed the guided and ballistic missile were the primary delivery systems for nuclear and other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The MTCR limits what systems and pieces can be sold overseas in case they are used to become delivery vehicles. Obviously the desire of U.S. companies to sell overseas can be limited by these kind of laws.”
  2. “… many large U.S. defense contractors are lobbying the Government o renegotiate or change the MTCR to allow exports of bigger and more advanced UAV systems. This is being driven by a desire to make sales to other countries. The rationale they are using is that most UAV are subsonic, maneuver and fly like aircraft and are not the same kind of threat as a ballistic or cruise missile.”
  3. “Currently a company can apply to sell a system through the Government and get release from the restrictions of the MCTR…but a process like that takes time and money and a relaxation of the restrictions would make it easier to conduct marketing and sales.”
  4. “There is no doubt that the U.S. military would benefit if these UAV systems were sold overseas. The more purchased would lower procurement costs while development could be shared with other customers….At the same time the U.S. must be careful not to sell technology or systems that could be modified to attack it.”

Export Control, Military, Nuclear, WMD


Lieggi, Stephanie; Sabatini, Richard, “Malaysia’s Export Control Law: A Step Forward, But How Big?,” 10 May 2010, NTI http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_malaysia_export_control_law.html Last Checked 1 August 2011.

  1. “In April 2010 . . . the Malaysian government announced that it had enacted the Strategic Trade Act, intended to strengthen Kuala Lumpur’s ability to curb the export and transshipment of WMD related materials.”
  2. “Critics have consistently accused Malaysia of giving insufficient attention to its nonproliferation-related trade controls. This is a serious problem because proliferating states and non-state actors are known to seek out and take advantage of weak links in the global security chain in order to procure sensitive WMD-related technologies. Inadequate strategic trade controls can provide states and terrorist organizations ample opportunity to acquire components used in chemical, biological and nuclear weapons with little risk of being caught.”
  3. “Economic prosperity and development have tended to trump concerns about potential illicit trafficking issues in Malaysia, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.”
  4. “The popularity of Malaysian ports noticeably increased after the port of Dubai in the UAE—previously the transit point of choice for Iranian and Pakistani based traffickers—increased its transshipment controls under pressure from the United States and other international partners.”
  5. “Iranian entities in particular appeared to be transshipping sensitive goods through Malaysia as a means to route them to Tehran without arousing the suspicion of the original supplier.”
  6. “Malaysia has been far from alone in its reluctance to impose stronger nonproliferation-related trade controls. Throughout Southeast Asia, attempts to implement UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 have met resistance or lukewarm interest.
  7. “Malaysia—along with most Southeast Asian states—submitted its national report to the 1540 Committee in 2004.”
  8. “The Malaysian report showed a weak and disjointed system without a significant unifying law, and little understanding of the importance of transshipment and brokering controls.”
  9. “The report also stated that Malaysia lacked a comprehensive WMD export control system and that export control laws and regulations were primarily “based on economic reasons.”
  10. “Despite strong international concern regarding the overall efficiency and effectiveness of its trade control system at the time, Malaysia’s 1540 report did not reference any weaknesses within its system. Specifically, Malaysia asserted in its initial report that it “does not require assistance in implementing” UNSCR 1540 but indicated a willingness to consider requests from other states for assistance.”
  11. “The limited implementation of UNSCR 1540 in Southeast Asia and elsewhere derives from insufficient financial and technical resources.”
  12. “Malaysia long perceived export and transshipment control requirements as largely negative, potentially resulting in lessened economic progress and development.”
  13. “[I]n the last few years, Malaysia has shown more interest in cooperating internationally on strategic trade controls. Malaysia and the United States have worked through the State Department administered Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) to help Malaysian officials draft effective regulations and establish a workable licensing system.”
  14. “Malaysia has also been a regular participant in the Japanese government sponsored Asian Export Control Seminar. In 2008, the German Federal Office of Economics and Export Control, which implements the European Commission’s assistance projects related to export controls, identified Malaysia as an important partner within its outreach program.”
  15. “Despite this interaction with foreign partners, Malaysia’s new export control system was slow to get up to speed. Highlighting the continued problem of lax transshipment controls in the Malaysian system, allegations of illegal Malaysian involvement in exports of sensitive dual-use items to Iran emerged in 2008.”
  16. “Since taking office last year, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak has sought to create warmer relations with the United States and recognized that Malaysia’s lax nonproliferation-related trade controls was a serious impediment to bilateral relations.”
  17. “The new Strategic Trade Act outlaws the shipment of weapons of mass destruction related materials through Malaysian territory and represents a significant step towards fuller compliance with UNSCR 1540.”
  18. “The new legislation, which was drafted with the support of U.S. experts and officials, was one of the numerous “house gifts” that countries brought to Washington during the summit showing their support for President Obama’s efforts in this area.”
  19. “The law authorizes the appointment of a Strategic Trade Controller to establish and coordinate a more unified licensing system for trade in strategic materials. The law further extends the control of the system over strategic items being transshipped through Malaysian ports, and creates a basis for controlling brokering activities of Malaysian entities.”
  20. “Under the Strategic Trade Act, prison sentences of no less than five years and considerable fines have been set for those designated as violators of the law.”
  21. “Given the critical importance of exports of high-tech goods to Malaysia’s economy, many within the domestic system will remain reluctant to block shipments without clear proof that the goods in question are destined for a weapons purpose—a very difficult standard to meet.”

Export Control, UNSCR 1540, WMD, Biosecurity


Erlanger, Steve, ”France Denies Deal With Iran for Teacher’s Release”, NYT, May 16, 2010,  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/world/europe/17france.html?ref=world

  1. “French officials have said the charges against her were baseless and also denied that her release was in exchange for a French court’s decision on May 5 to deny an American extradition request for an Iranian businessman accused of violating the trade embargo against Iran.”
  2. ”Justice Department officials in Washington said they suspected that the release of the businessman, Majid Kakavand, 37, was a quid pro quo for the release of Ms. Reiss.”
  3. ”Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner denied any deal again on Sunday. “There is no connection between these two Iranian cases, which were dealt with by the French justice system, and the freedom of our hostage,” he told a radio station. An Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman also told the Iranian news agency, Fars, that there had been no deal.”

Export Control, Extradition, France, Iran


Mac CORMAIC, RUADHÁN, ”Teacher charged with spying in Iran returns to France”, Irish Times, May 17, 2010. http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2010/0517/1224270548900.html

  1. ”Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said last September that France should consider a prisoner swap if it wanted Ms Reiss to be freed, and her release coincided with two high-profile legal cases in Paris involving Iranians.”
  2. ”Just two weeks ago France infuriated Washington by refusing to extradite an Iranian engineer who was accused of illegally buying electronic equipment from US firms for military use.”

Export Control, Extradition, France, Iran


Wolf, Kevin. “Addition of New Export Control Classification Number 6A981 Passive Infrasound Sensors to the Commerce Control List of the Export Administration Regulations, and Related AmendmentsFederal Register Volume 75, Issue 125. 37,742. June 25, 2010.

  1. ”The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) proposes to amend the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 6A981 to the Commerce Control List (CCL) to control passive infrasound sensors because of their military and commercial utility.” –page 37742
  2. ”Items under this new ECCN will be controlled for regional stability (RS) and Anti-Terrorism (AT) reasons.” – page 37742
  3. ”Passive infrasound sensors, which possess civil and military utility, are not currently specified in the CCL, but similar sensors are subject to the EAR.” – page 37742
  4. ”BIS proposes to require a license for the export and reexport of these sensors to countries with an X in the box under RS Column 2 and AT column 1 on the Commerce Control Chart.” – page 37743
  5. ”BIS is requesting public comments on the possible impact of this proposed rule. As these sensors are not currently on the CCL, it is difficult for BIS to determine how many U.S. companies manufacture these sensors and would be impacted by the new control.” – page 37743
  6. ”RS Column 2 license requirements – A license is required to any destination except Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).” – page 37743

Export Control, U.S. Foreign Policy


Lieggi, Stephanie; Shaw, Robert; and Toki, Masako. “Taking Control: Stopping North Korean WMD-Related ProcurementBulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 66, issue 5. Pages 21-34. September 2010

  1. “Last year, when two Japan-based traders were convicted for attempting to illegally transport sensitive materials, a larger story unraveled – one that illuminated North Korea’s efforts to obtain technology related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).” – page 21
  2. “Historically, the country acquired much of its WMD-related technology and training from abroad, particularly China and the Soviet Union. Today, North Korea’s procurement network employ a sophisticated mix of front companies, brokers, and transshipment strategies.” –page 21
  3. “Since the early 1950’s, North Korea has both legally and illegally sought to acquire advanced technology and commodities from Japanese entities to improve its military capability.” – page 22
  4. “Pyongyang’s (capitol of North Korea) missile business has developed into an important source of revenue – ranging from #300 million to $1.5 billion annually, according to some estimates – and North Korea has traded missile technology with many countries, including Pakistan, Iran, Syria, and Yemen.” – page 23
  5. “The export violations incidents in Japan involving Toko Boeki and Tadao Morita occurred after the U.N. Security Council passed resolutions in July and October 2006 sanctioning North Korea, and after Tokyo consequently expanded its list of items under embargo to Pyongyang.’ – page 23
  6. “…Japans ‘catch-all’ controls, which mandate a license requirement for certain destination countries if an export is likely to support development of WMD, even if the item is not specifically mentioned on domestic controls list” – page 23
  7. “In early 2009, police in Kanagawa, a suburb of Tokyo, raided the offices of trading company Toko Boeki after the firm attempted to export a magnetometer (a device used to measure magnetic fields) to Myanmar in September 2008 and again in January 2009.” – page 23
  8. “Japanese authorities determined a magnetometer to be a useful tool in the development of magnets critical to the operation of some missile guidance systems, and police suspected a link to North Korea’s missile development programs” – page 23
  9. “The investigation led to the June 2009 arrest – and eventual indictment – of Toko Boeki’s founder and president, Li Gyeong Ho, for his attempts to dodge Japan’s catch-all controls.” – page 23
  10. “Li pleaded guilty and received a prison sentence of two years, matching the request of the prosecutors. However, the sentence was suspended for four years, highlighting Japan’s problem with lenient sentences for proliferation-related offenses. Additionally, Li’s company, Toko Boeki, was fined about $68,000 (6 million yen)” page 25
  11. “In addition to the criminal penalties, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) imposed a complete seven month export ban on both Li and his company.” – page 25
  12. “In May 2009, police in Hyogo, a suburb outside Kyoto, arrested Chong Rin Chae (Tadao Morita), a South Korean resident, for attempting to illegally export two tanker trucks from Japan to North Korea via South Korea.” – page 25
  13. “In July 2009, Morita pleaded guilty to export control violations involving the tanker trucks and the luxury goods and was sentenced to a suspended three-year prison term. His company was also assessed a fine of approximately $55,000 (5 million yen).”- page 26
  14. “In January 2010, six months after Morita’s criminal conviction, METI also imposed a 16-month export ban on Morita and his company” – page 27
  15. “Since METI’s 2002 implementation of catch-all controls, the Japanese government has strengthened legal and administrative provisions specific to curbing the spread of WMD – a process accelerated by North Korea’s recent nuclear and missile tests.” – page 27
  16. “Last year, Japan amended its Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade law, which increased the maximum penalty for export control violations from five to seven years. If a violation involves WMD-related items, however, then the maximum penalty is 10 years” – page 27
  17. “The use of front companies and transshipment destinations reveals a network continuously evolving in response to U.N. sanctions and increased nonproliferation-focused export controls of supplier countries like Japan” – page 30

Export Control, Japan, North Korea, WMD, Military, Nonproliferation, UN


Editors, “U.S. and Spain Equip Second Megaport With Radiation Detectors“, 27 September 2010, Global Security Newswire, http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/valenciamegaport092710 Last Checked 1 October 2010.

  1. “The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced today the successful commencing of operations of radiation detection equipment at the Port of Valencia in Spain.”
  2. “With this equipment the Port of Valencia will now be able to scan all import and export containers passing through the port for the presence of dangerous nuclear and radioactive materials.”
  3. “‘The commissioning of the Port of Valencia underscores the continued shared commitment of the U.S. and Spain to enhance global maritime security,’ said Ken Baker, NNSA Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. ‘This successful milestone marks continued progress in implementing President Obama’s nuclear security agenda and supports the U.S. global effort to secure vulnerable nuclear material and prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism.’”
  4. “This effort is part of the NNSA’s Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program, which works collaboratively with foreign governments at border crossings, airports, seaports and other points of entry to install specialized radiation detection equipment and associated communications equipment.”
  5. “NNSA has installed similar equipment at more than 230 sites and at 31 Megaports around the world.”

Nonproliferation, Nuclear, Export Control, Container Security


EditorsPresident Obama Announces First Steps Toward Implementation of New U.S. Export Control System.The White House. December 9,2012 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/09/president-obama-announces-first-steps-toward-implementation-new-us-expor

  1. “At the meeting, the President announced that the Administration released a series of regulations and requests for comment as part of the implementation of the new U.S. export control system announced by the President in August…It includes a new tool to facilitate compliance with U.S. export control requirements by bringing together, for the first time, the various screening lists maintained by multiple Departments.”
  2. “In publishing these documents, the Administration is seeking public comment before the rules are finalized and the control lists are completed.”
  3. “The export control reform initiative was announced in August 2009, when the President directed a broad-based interagency review of our current export control system to ensure that the system, designed for a bipolar world of the Cold War era, is updated to address the threats we face today and the changing economic and technological landscape. At the end of the review, in August 2010, the President announced, “we need fundamental reform in all four areas of our current system – in what we control, how we control it, how we enforce those controls, and how we manage our controls.”
  4. “…the PEC made several recommendations to the President, including formalizing the involvement of industry in the reform effort and devoting more resources to help small businesses comply with the export control laws.”
  5. “Rebuilding the two U.S. export control lists – which currently have completely different structures, take different approaches to defining controlled products, and are administered by two different departments…”
  6. “… agencies have developed new criteria for determining what items need to be controlled and are developing a complementary set of policies for determining when an export license is required. The control list criteria are based on transparent rules…”
  7. “Eighteen interagency technical teams, under the leadership of the Department of Defense, are applying the criteria and revising the lists of munitions and, to the extent necessary, dual-use items that are controlled for export…”
  8. “A “positive list” describes controlled items using objective criteria (e.g., technical parameters such as horsepower or microns) rather than broad, open-ended, subjective, generic, or design intent-based criteria.”
  9. “This flexible construct will improve the nation’s national security and permit the government to adjust controls in a timely manner over a product’s life cycle in order to keep lists targeted and current based on the maturity and sensitivity of an item.”
  10. “Once a controlled item is placed into a tier, a corresponding licensing policy will be assigned to it to focus agency reviews on the most sensitive items.”
  11. “The items subject to control in the revised Category account for only about 26 percent of what the Department of State licensed for Category VII last year…The new Category more precisely focuses on those key items and technologies that should be controlled because they provide, at least, a significant military or intelligence advantage.”
  12. “The proposed regulation would create a new license exception that would allow exports of controlled items (consistent with statutory and treaty requirements) to countries that are members of all four multilateral export control regimes or other regime members that also are members of NATO. It would also allow exports of items controlled on the Wassenaar Arrangement’s Basic List to countries that are members of or adherents to all four multilateral export control regimes, members of NATO, or for civil end-uses in destinations that have not historically represented a significant diversion or proliferation risk for U.S.-origin items.
  13. “For the first time, exporters can download a single electronic list of the literally thousands of names maintained across the U.S. Government for whom there is an export control restriction or special requirement.”
  14. “…more clearly identifying what is controlled, how it is controlled, and how to screen to ensure that items do not end up where they shouldn’t – are tangible results in implementing the Administration’s common sense approach to export controls.”

Dual Use, Export Control


Editors. “24-year-old accused of trying to smuggle night vision scopes to Russia.CNN News. July 27. 2010 http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/07/27/us.latvian.arms.control/index.html?iref=allsearch

  1. “A 24-year-old native of Latvia is charged with violating the Arms Export Control Act after allegedly trying to smuggle $15,000 worth of night-vision equipment from the U.S. to Russia…”
  2. “…Customs and Border Protection officers intercepted her luggage and found three night-vision devices that are on the United States munitions list.”
  3. “When Immigrations and Customs Enforcement agents asked Fermanova if she was aware of federal regulations pertaining to the night-vision equipment, “Fermanova stated that she ‘signed something about that’ but was ‘not really sure what she was signing,'” the affidavit states.”
  4. “…some identification numbers on the night vision devices had been covered with a black marker pen….When agents asked if this was done so that she could get them out of the United States without a license, Fermanova replied, ‘yes.'”

Export Control, Russia


Pomfret, JohnU.S. Asked China to Stop Missile Parts Shipment to Iran”, 29 November 2010, Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/28/AR2010112804391.html Last Checked 1 December 2010.

  1. “U.S. officials have long accused China of failing to crack down on proliferation activities that occur on its territory.”
  2. “For decades, China was a major proliferator of missiles itself, but that activity seemed to slow in the 1990s under U.S. pressure.”
  3. “The United States asked China in 2007 to stop a shipment of ballistic missile parts going from North Korea to Iran through Beijing and indicated that the U.S. government was fed up with China’s unwillingness to crack down on such trade, according to reports Sunday based on U.S. diplomatic cables.”
  4. “Another cable highlighted U.S. concern this year that Chinese firms were supplying North Korea with precursors for chemical weapons – in what would be a violation of U.N. sanctions.”
  5. “In May, Clinton said the United States was concerned that exports by named Chinese firms ‘could be used for or diverted to a CW [chemical weapons] program.’”
  6. “Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton continued to pressure China on proliferation issues, this time because it was apparently turning a blind eye to its own companies.”
  7. “China passed export control laws, but Beijing has rarely, according to U.S. officials and the cables revealed Sunday, actively worked to stop proliferation from occurring on its territory.”

NonproliferationPSI, Nuclear, North Korea, Iran, Chemical, Export Control


Patrick, Micheal, “The New Form I-129- Enhanced Enforcement,” NYLJ, January 20, 2011, P. 3, Col.1.

  1. “Form I-129 is used by employers to petition U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services for prospective non-immigrant foreign workers, including H-1B professionals, L-1 intracompany transferees, and O-1 individuals of extraordinary ability.”
  2. “The form is used primarily to determine whether the foreign national and the job he or she will perform are eligible for the non-immigrant classification. But recent revisions to the form have increased its role as a compliance and enforcement document.”
  3. “First, the petitioner must certify that it has reviewed the list of controlled technologies and technical data from the EAR and ITAR. Second, with respect to technology or technical data the petitioner intends to release to the foreign worker, the petitioner must check one of two boxes, stating either that an export license is not required or that a license is required and will be obtained before the employer releases the controlled technology to the foreign worker.”
  4. “This is the first time that employers filing visa petitions for non-immigrant workers have been required to make this certification directly on the I-129 form.”
  5. “The export control regulations apply primarily to ‘dual use’ technologies with both commercial and military applications
  6. “[B]ecause of widespread objections to and confusion about this new requirement, its implementation has been delayed two months, and it will not become mandatory until Feb. 20, 2011.”

Export Control, Dual Use, Military


”’Peckler, Nedra”’, “Iranian Man Accused of Illegal Metal Exports”, 1 February 2011, Washington Times [http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/1/iranian-man-accused-illegal-metal-exports/] Last Checked 1 February 2011.
*“U.S. authorities announced Tuesday that they have charged an Iranian businessman who they say acted as a ‘lifeline’ to his country’s missile program by smuggling metals and other vital materials from the United States in violation of a trade embargo.”
*“Federal officials said Mr. Jafari ran businesses in Istanbul and Tehran that would buy metals like steel and aluminum alloy from U.S. companies and export them through Turkey to hide their true destination, since exports to Iran are prohibited without authorization from the Treasury Department.”
*“The Treasury Department on Tuesday designated the six individuals and five companies in the Jafari network as proliferators of weapons of mass destruction which freezes their assets in the United States in an attempt to isolate them from doing further business in this country.”
*“‘The Jafari network has established itself as a lifeline for Iran’s missile program by providing essential materials and support for AIO,’ said Stuart Levey, Treasury’s undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence.”
*[[Export Control]], [[PSI]], [[Iran]], [[Nuclear]]
”’Editors”’, “U.S. Fears Chinese Firms Selling WMD Materials to Iran, North Korea” 3 February 2011, Global Security Newswire [http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110203_8986.php] Last Checked 5 February 2011.
* “Recently leaked U.S. cables detail Washington’s worries that Chinese firms in recent years had exported goods to Iran that could be used to produce weapons of mass destruction.”
* “U.S. intelligence believed a Chinese branch of a German company had provided Iran with a test chamber usable in missile development.”
* “The United States also urged China to look into a possible shipment to North Korea of material usable in chemical warfare materials.”
* “Israeli intelligence officials were also worried that French car companies could unknowingly assist Iran’s WMD production program.”
* “China insisted that a shipment of weapon-sensitive sodium sulfide was bound for Armenia, despite open-source indications that the material was being delivered to Iran.”
* “The Bush administration was sufficiently worried that Chinese weapons and equipment were reaching Iran that the State Department in September 2008 launched a concerted diplomatic campaign to press Beijing to better administer controls on weapon sales to Tehran.”
* “The United States provided information to Italy, Spain and six other ‘key allies’ in order to ‘persuade China to enforce its export control laws more effectively’ and to ‘aggressively implement’ U.N. Security Council resolutions on trade in weapons and related goods.”
* [[PSI]], [[Export Control]], [[China]], [[Iran]], [[North Korea]], [[WMD]]
”’Dasgupta, Sunil”’ and ”’Cohen, Stephen”’, “Arms Sales for India Subtitle: How Military Trade Could Energize U.S.-Indian Relations,” March 2011-April 2011, Council on Foreign Relations Inc., Vol. 90, No. 2.
*“Obama announced that the United States would sell $5 billion worth of U.S. military equipment to India, including ten Boeing C-17 military transport aircraft and 100 General Electric F-414 fighter aircraft.”
*“Although the details are still being worked out, these and other contracts already in the works will propel the United States into the ranks of India’s top three military suppliers, alongside Russia and Israel.”
*“With India planning to buy $100 billion worth of new weapons over the next ten years, arms sales may be the best way for the United States to revive stagnating U.S.-Indian relations.”
*“Since coming to power, the Obama administration has shifted course, partly on the grounds that Bush gave India too much, especially in regard to the nuclear deal. The Obama administration wants greater reciprocity — including Indian support for U.S. policies on global energy and trade, India’s granting of more freedom of action in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and weapons contracts for U.S. firms. Obama also wants to develop ties more incrementally. One reason is that his administration’s primary interest in the region is stabilizing Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
*“Obama’s two years of trying to bring Pakistan on board with Washington’s plans has led only to frustration and has highlighted the importance of renewing cooperation with India in order to make progress on Afghanistan.”
*“Russian military suppliers enjoy strong relationships with the Indian military establishment and its research agency, the Defense Research and Development Organization, relationships that were developed during the Cold War.”
*“But now, after a decade of rapid economic growth that fattened India’s military budgets, the Indian armed forces have set their sights on buying a range of new weapons, from traditional machinery, such as tanks, ships, and aircraft, to the most advanced innovations, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and the technology for electronic warfare. And India is increasingly turning to Israeli and Western suppliers, especially since its ties with Russian sellers started souring in early 2010, when the Russians forced a repricing of the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov from $1 billion to $2.3 billion.”
*“The Indian-Israeli arms trade amounts to more than $2 billion annually, and Israel has become India’s number two military supplier. Like Russia, it offers India access to military equipment without imposing political conditions, and Israeli firms have also been able to woo the DRDO with offers of joint development of high-tech weaponry.”
*“The United States clearly has the technological edge to win Indian military contracts, but the U.S. law banning the transfer of technologies that have military uses is a major stumbling block. India’s leaders have made it clear that if they purchase machinery from the United States or U.S.-based firms, they expect to be granted access to the manufacturing processes and technology behind it. On the other side, the U.S. government would have to overcome significant legal hurdles to allow technology transfers to India.”
*“There are questions about whether technology transfers would actually motivate India to make the political concessions the United States seeks and worries that Washington would have to keep offering more and more to secure Indian friendship in the future.”
*“The Obama administration is apprehensive that getting too close to India would jeopardize U.S. objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially if the Indian military were to use equipment it received from the United States against Pakistan. Even U.S. companies, which hope to profit from India’s military market, are reticent about sharing their prize technologies.”
*“In 2009, India’s leaders signed an end-use monitoring agreement that would allow U.S. representatives to periodically inspect and inventory items transferred to India — and they did so despite criticism that the agreement’s terms eroded India’s sovereignty.”
*“During his visit to India in November, Obama promised to lift some export-control restrictions on India and to remove some restrictions on trade with India’s space and military research agencies.”
*“But some major obstacles remain. For one, India needs to fix its broken procurement system. Although the Indian Ministry of Defense has issued a series of new military procurement guidelines in the last few years, transparency, legitimacy, and corruption problems continue to plague the process. Indian law also requires foreign suppliers to source components and invest in research and development in India, while prohibiting them from creating wholly owned or majority-owned subsidiaries in the country. These two provisions are intended to ensure that the technology used by foreign suppliers will eventually be transferred to Indian companies. But the U.S. government and U.S. companies would not agree to this unless the U.S. law governing technology transfers were relaxed and India began to guarantee the protection of intellectual property rights.”
*“The new nuclear liability bill that India passed in August will also have a chilling effect on U.S.-Indian military trade. It holds foreign suppliers responsible for accidents at nuclear power plants for up to 100 years after the plants’ construction. The law applies to companies that supply equipment to the contractors building the reactors, even if these companies do not have a physical presence in India. Progress on the construction of any new reactors under the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal will almost certainly be slowed by this law, as U.S. companies seek to protect themselves from liability.”
*“The United States can get around its own legal restrictions on technology transfers by pursuing such ambitious long-term projects, because if a technology does not currently exist, U.S. law does not protect it.”
*“Not only would the United States gain a huge foothold in the Indian military market; it could also channel any offset money it is required to invest in India into joint development projects.”
*“So far, however, the Obama administration has not wanted to think big and seriously consider joint technology development. This is a mistake. Short-term differences between India and the United States caused their estrangement during the Cold War. A similar rift now would not be in the long-term interest of either country.”
*[[Export Control]], [[U.S. Foreign Policy]], [[India]], [[Military]]
”’Editors”’, “Export Control Reform Followup,” 11 May 2011, Space Politics [http://www.spacepolitics.com/2011/05/11/export-control-reform-followup/] Last Visited 2 August 2011.
* “[N]ew legislation introduced last week to reform satellite export controls by giving the president the ability to remove satellite and related components from the US Munitions List (USML), although still prohibiting their export to China. However, some caution that the introduction of that legislation doesn’t mean reform is right around the corner.”
* “During a meeting of the Export Controls Working Group of the FAA’s Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC), congressional staffers . . . warned that a couple of obstacles will hinder any near-term progress.”
* “One is the so-called ‘Section 1248 report.’” . . .  “[T]he FY2010 defense authorization act that required the Defense Department to prepare ‘an assessment of the national security risks of removing satellites and related components from the United States Munitions List.’”
* “That report was due in April 2010, but only in the last few days has Congress received an ‘interim’ report.”
* “That interim report, according to one staffer, concluded that there are “no unacceptable security risks” of moving commercial satellites and related components off the list.”
* “Until the administration releases a final report, not expected until late this year, though, that staffer expected Congress not to act on any reform effort.”
* “The second factor is the administration’s ongoing export control reform efforts, which seek to unify various export control lists and systems. (That work is one reason why the Section 1248 report is so late.) Such an effort is a major, and slow, process. “This is a momentous undertaking,” said a panelist.”
* “The thinking on Capitol Hill . . . is that Congress prefers to wait to see how that reform effort works out before moving to make changes of its own.”
* “There’s also skepticism that the reform effort will work out as the administration has proposed: while there’s support for a unified IT system and even a single, tiered export control list, there’s less support for two other major aspects of the reform effort, creation of a single licensing agency and single enforcement agency.”
* “Panelists also noted one of the challenges for proponents for export control reform has been the difficulty in identifying specific negative impacts on US industry caused by moving satellites and related components to the USML n the late 1990s.”
* “[V]arious reports on export control policy have not been able to quantify the [sic] effect on American industry.”
* [[Export Control]], [[Executive Order]]
”’Hansson, Leigh; Lowell, Micheal”’, “Top Ten Things to Know About Export Control Reform,” 1 June 2011, Association of Corporate Counsel [http://www.acc.com/legalresources/publications/topten/Export-Control-Reform.cfm] Last Checked 2 August 2011.
* “ The current export control system operates under two different control systems: the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) and the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”).”
* “In addition to the EAR and ITAR, exporters must consider a third agency with jurisdiction over transactions. The U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) administers a number of sanctions programs based on the destination, end-user, or end-use for the proposed export.”
* “The Obama Administration has decided to reform the system largely through harmonization, consolidation, and lessening of export controls to encourage U.S. exports and narrow the focus of U.S. Government control efforts to the most critical goods and technologies.”
* “[T]he Export Control Reform Initiative, was launched following an interagency review of the current export control system. The interagency review determined that the current export control system was “overly complicated,” redundant, and “in trying to protect too much, diminishes our ability to focus our efforts on the most critical national security priorities.”
* “The [initiative] includes three phases of reform resulting in a consolidation of four key aspects of export controls: (1) a single control list; (2) a single licensing agency; (3) a single information technology system; and (4) a single primary enforcement agency.”
* “If successful, it appears that the reform would result in an end of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR Parts 120-130 (‘ITAR’).”
* “The reform would also likely lead to a significant loosening of controls on a large number of items that currently require authorization from the U.S. Government prior to export.”
* “The reform will be rolled out in three phases. Phases I and II will involves reconciliation of definitions, regulations, and policies primarily relating to the ITAR and EAR. Phase III will be implementation of the single control list, licensing agency, enforcement coordination, and a single IT system.”
Moving to a Single Control List
* “Currently, there are two primary lists of export-controlled items: the EAR’s Commerce Control List (“CCL”) and the ITAR’s U.S. Munitions List (“USML“).”
* “The new export control system will include the development of ‘new criteria for determining what items need to be controlled and corresponding policies for determining when a license is required.’”
*  “The new list will be ‘positive’ — that is, the list will describe items ‘using objective criteria (e.g., technical parameters such as horsepower or microns) rather than broad, open-ended, subjective, catch-all, or design intent-based criteria.’”
* “The list will also be tiered such that the most critical or sensitive items will be subject to the highest controls (Tier One) with a sliding scale of controls for items that might be more broadly available overseas and therefore less sensitive (Tier Three).”
* “It is not clear whether the export controls administered by other federal agencies, including controls affecting the nuclear industry, food and drugs, and controlled substances, will be included in the proposed consolidated list.”
Single Restricted Party List
* “The current system includes a number of different restricted party lists — those lists of persons with whom U.S. persons may be prohibited from doing business or have other restrictions on transactions.”
* “These lists are maintained by the Commerce Department, the State Department, and OFAC. Despite some overlaps, the lists are unique and none is a comprehensive resource for exporters.”
* “As part of the Export Control Reform Initiative, the U.S. Government has consolidated the restricted party screening lists into a consolidated list”
*Single Information Technology System
* “All three of the primary agencies involved in U.S. export controls maintain separate internal information technology (“IT”) systems for managing export license applications and a separate external portal through which exporters can apply for licenses.”
* “For the internal systems, the U.S. Government has decided to migrate licensing to the U.S. Department of Defense’s USXPorts system. Work has already begun to migrate DDTC to USXPorts and completion of the migration is expected in 2012.”
* “A consolidated IT system is expected to result in increased efficiency, cooperation, and transparency in the export licensing process.”
Single Primary Enforcement Agency
* “On November 9, 2010, Executive Order 13558 established theExport Enforcement Coordination Center. The Center is expected to coordinate and strengthen export enforcement by the U.S. Government by minimizing duplication of efforts and increasing inter-agency cooperation on enforcement.”
* “At this point, there is no indication that DDTC, BIS, or other agencies will lose enforcement responsibilities, although that would seem likely if a single licensing agency is actually created.”
Single Licensing Agency
* “Currently, DDTC, BIS, and OFAC each have their own responsibility for export licensing and, although rare, some transactions require licenses to be approved by more than one agency depending on the mix of items included in the transaction (ITAR-EAR) or the destination, end-use, or end-user (EAR-OFAC). To increase transparency, cooperation, and to minimize bureaucratic waste, the Initiative proposes to consolidate the licensing jurisdiction of these agencies, which would have the added benefit of a single license application form, rather than the multiple forms that exist under the current system.”
The Export Control Reform Initiative Might Not be Successful
* “Until recently, there was very little indication that the U.S. Congress would oppose the Initiative. However, in May 2011, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.) remarked that ‘[t]o date, a compelling case has not been made for the wholesale restructuring of our current system, especially one that would include the creation of a costly and perhaps unaccountable new federal bureaucracy.’”
* [[Export Control]], [[Executive Order]]
”’Editors”’, “China Ignoring Pleas to Halt Missile Tech Exports, U.S. Cable Says” 2 June 2011, Global Security Newswire [http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110602_7075.php], Last Checked 15 June 2011.
*“A recently leaked U.S. diplomatic memo highlights China’s longstanding history of shrugging off U.S. requests to block export of missile-related parts and technology by domestic entities”
*“Since March 2008, the U.S. has provided Chinese officials with information regarding a number of cases of missile-related proliferation concern.”
*“The memo, released by the transparency organization WikiLeaks, seemed aimed at tactfully extracting a reason from Beijing regarding its unresponsiveness on nine incidents cited by Washington of Chinese state-managed firms providing U.S. antagonists and other states with materials that could be used in missile or nuclear-weapon programs.”
*“A U.N. report sent last month to the Security Council committee monitoring the implementation of sanctions against North Korea stated that illegal North Korean-Iranian missile parts trade was taking place through an unidentified third nation that borders the North.”
*“Multiple anonymous diplomats identified that country as China.”
*[[PSI]], [[Export Control]], [[China]]
”’Editors”’, “Export Control Reform Initiative: Strategic Trade Authorization License Exception,” 16 June 2011, Bureau of Industry and Security U.S. Department of Commerce [http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2011/bis_press06162011.htm] Last Checked 2 August 2011.
*“U.S. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke today announced the next step in President Obama’s export control reform (ECR) initiative aimed at strengthening U.S. national security and ensuring the competitiveness of American companies abroad.”
*“The Department will implement today a new license exception, Strategic Trade Authorization (STA), that will facilitate exports between the United States and partner countries while enhancing the competitiveness of key industrial base sectors.”
*“The Export Control Reform Initiative aims to build higher fences around a core set of items whose misuse can pose a national security threat to the United States. By facilitating trade to close partners and allies, the Commerce Department can better focus its resources ensuring the most sensitive items do no end up where they should not.”
*”This new license exception will eliminate the need for U.S. exporters to seek licenses in nearly 3,000 types of transactions annually, affecting an estimated $1.4 billion in goods and technology”
*”The new license exception will . . . focus . . . resources on items that pose a significant national security risk and help facilitate U.S. exports.”
*“Items such as electronic components for use on the International Space Station, cameras for search and rescue efforts for fire departments, components for civil aviation navigation systems for commercial aircraft, airport scanners, and toxins for vaccine research will be eligible for the new license exception.”
*“At the same time, the license exception establishes new safeguards designed to ensure Department of Commerce approval is obtained before controlled items exported under the exception are re-exported outside of authorized destinations.”
*[[Export Control]], [[Nonproliferation]], [[Homeland Security]]
”’Matishak, Martin”’, “Homeland Security Cancels Troubled Radiation Detector Effort,” 26 July 2011, Global Security Newswire [http://gsn.nti.org/siteservices/print_friendly.php?ID=nw_20110726_7635] Last Checked 27 July 2011.
*“The U.S. Homeland Security Department has terminated the program to develop the next generation of radiation detection monitors.”
*”‘The [Advanced Spectroscopic Portal] will not proceed as originally envisioned. We will not seek certification or large-scale deployment of the ASP.’”
*“The agency spent roughly $230 million over five years attempting to develop and field the monitor system.”
*“The machines were designed to not only detect radiation but identify the nature of its source. Proponents claimed the devices, each with a price tag of around $822,000, would eliminate time-consuming secondary inspections to determine whether a material was dangerous.”
*“Homeland Security officials had expected to spend $1.2 billion to deploy 1,400 of the machines to scan cargo containers for potential nuclear or radiological weapons materials at U.S. points of entry.”
*“In the rush to field the technology, the department conducted poorly designed performance tests that undermined officials’ ability to ‘draw reliable conclusions’ about whether the costly new equipment would work as envisioned.”
*“The system was found to be susceptible to false alarms and other significant technical troubles.”
*“Despite that conclusion, the detection office and the department do not plan on abandoning the concept of such a system altogether.”
*“The department will deploy the 13 monitors that have been built and purchased to glean data that would help define requirements for a commercial competition to design and build a future spectroscopic portal.”
*“Four of the devices are already deployed.”
*“The agency will compensate for the absence of the new monitors in part with the deployment of new hand-held radiation detection devices called the RadSeeker.”
*“Dan Lungren (R-Calif.) repeatedly expressed concern that hand-held radiation detection devices and the department’s existing polyvinyl toluene portal monitors would not be enough to spot smuggled nuclear material at the nation’s ports.”
*“The decision also allows the department to focus more broadly on its global nuclear detection architecture, rather than ‘fixate’ on the ASP system.”
*“The detection architecture is the worldwide network of sensors, telecommunications, personnel and measures used to detect, identify and report the potential movement of illicit nuclear and radioactive materials or weapons.”
*[[Homeland Security]], [[Biodetection]], [[Export Control]], [[Container Security]]
”’Editors”’, “Radiation Detectors Deployed at Bangladeshi Port,” 5 August 2011, Global Security Newswire [http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110805_6442.php] Last Checked 8 August 2011.
*”New radiation sensor technology has formally entered service at the Bangladeshi Port of Chittagong, enabling the South Asian state to scrutinize four-fifths of all incoming and outgoing cargo containers for potential nuclear and radiological weapons materials.”
*”The effort is part of the U.S. Second Line of Defense program, which helps improve detection capabilities for nuclear and radiological materials at foreign seaports, airports and border checkpoints .”
*”The NNSA Megaports Initiative has deployed radiation detection technology at 38 sites around the world.”
*”‘Our success in equipping the Port of Chittagong, one of the major shipping points in South Asia, highlights our shared commitment to keeping dangerous materials out of the hands of terrorists, smugglers and proliferators,’ NNSA Deputy Administrator Anne Harrington said.”
*[[Export Control]], [[Container Security]]
”’Wolf, Kevin, J.,”’ “Retrospective Regulatory Review Under E.O. 13563,” Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce, p. 47527, August 5, 2011.[http://www.bis.doc.gov/federal_register/rules/2011/76fr47527.pdf] Last checked 2/7/2012.
*” The Administration is implementing the reform in three phases. The first two phases involve short- and medium-term adjustments to the current export control system, with a focus on establishing harmonized control lists and processes among the Departments of Commerce, State, and the Treasury, to the extent practicable, in order to build toward the third phase of the single control list, licensing agency, information technology system, and enforcement coordination agency.”
*”A core proposal intended to bring about the initiative’s national security objectives is to transfer jurisdiction over less significant defense articles, principally generic parts and components, that are controlled by the regulations administered by the State Department to the export control regulations administered by the Commerce Department, which are more capable of having controls tailored to the significance of the item and the degree of risk associated with its export to different groups of countries.”
*”This plan will also significantly reduce the licensing and other collateral burdens on exporters and the government while at the same time harmonizing the system to allow for the eventual creation of a single list of controlled items administered by a single licensing agency.”
*[[Export Control]], [[State Department]], [[Homeland Security]]
”’Editors”’, “DUTCH CITIZEN ARRESTED, CHARGED WITH CONSPIRACY TO EXPORT GOODS TO IRAN,” 8 August 2011, Bureau of Industry and Security U.S. Department of Commerce, [http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2011/doj08092011.htm] Last Visited 11 August 2011.
*“Federal agents arrested a former manager of a Netherlands-based freight forwarding company Saturday evening, August 6, 2011, for allegedly conspiring with others to export goods – including aircraft parts, peroxide, and other materials – to Iran.”
*“[Urlich] Davis was arrested at Newark Liberty International Airport as he was attempting to depart for The Netherlands by special agents of the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations.”
*“According to the Complaint, Ulrich Davis sent prohibited shipments to Iran, intentionally hiding the nature of sensitive materials to be provided to the Iranian military,” said U.S. Attorney Fishman. “The violation of export laws designed to keep American munitions out of the wrong hands is more than shady business practice; it is a threat to national security.””
*“This investigation demonstrates our ongoing commitment to pursue individuals, including those in the freight forwarder community, who knowingly violate U.S. export control laws no matter where in the world they set up their illicit operations,” said Eric Hirschhorn, Under Secretary for Industry and Security.”
*“Davis and the Netherlands company caused several shipments to be made to Iran without the necessary authorization from the United States government and in violation of the law.”
*“In May 2007, the Netherlands freight-forwarding company caused attitude direction indicators for aircraft to be sent from the United States to Iran. Davis directed the transport company to disguise the nature of the shipment by removing the invoices and list of items from the box.”
*“Also in May 2007, Davis’ company forwarded a fuel control unit for use on a Boeing 747 aircraft to Iran.”
*“In September 2007, the Netherlands freight forwarder shipped C-130 aircraft parts to Iran; Davis was listed as the employee responsible for the shipment.”
*“In 2007 and 2008, Davis also procured various materials from a New Jersey company – including adhesive primer, peroxide, and aerosols – that were sent to Iran in multiple shipments between August 2007 and January 2008. The shipments were made by the New York-based freight forwarding company, via another country. At least one of the shipper’s export declarations filed by the New York freight forwarder falsely identified The Netherlands as the ultimate destination. Davis had instructed an employee of the New York freight forwarder to falsely list The Netherlands as the country of ultimate destination for the exports. The address in The Netherlands was a post office box.”
*[[Export Control]], [[Nonproliferation]]
”’Fallon, Jim”’, “U.S. Export Control Reform: Getting It Right This Time,” 10 August 2011, Microwave Journal, [http://www.mwjournal.com/Article/Export_Control_Reform_Getting_Right_Time/AR_11232/] Last Visited 11 August 2011.
*“The [Obama] [A]dministration’s plan for Export Control Reform (ECR) — to make the system work for us as part of our national security strategy, not against us – is indeed a visionary approach for those of us who have been involved in this bureaucratic nightmare for many years.”
*“The goal is also to be better able to monitor and enforce controls on technology transfers with real security implications while helping to speed the provision of equipment to allies and partners who fight alongside us in coalition operations.”
*“The Cold War is over and so are most of the assumptions that led us to this point in the evolution of Export Control Laws and Regulations.”
*“Today, we fight in ‘cyberspace domains at the speed of light.’ And our Export Control Systems must be brought up to new standards and be re-evaluated in that context.”
*“[Export Control laws] should reflect how we deal with our closest allies internationally, both as close friends and as military coalition partners.”
*“We must protect the critical technology in the U.S. in the proper fashion from all the ‘bad guys.’ But our Export Control laws must reflect the world we live in today.”
*“The context for this discussion is clear – our laws need to keep pace with advancing technology in a globally connected world economy. U.S. military supremacy depends on our warfighters having a clear technological advantage.”
*“Technology is the critical factor that determines support for our national military strategy, and most importantly, is the key underpinning used to protect and support our warfighters on the battlefield.”
*“This whole discussion is really all about one thing – ‘a big reset’ that is coming – on how we will come together and implement Export Control Reform.”
*[[Export Control]], [[Nonproliferation]], [[Cybersecurity]]
”’Broad, William, J”’., “Laser Advances in Nuclear Fuel Stir Terror Fear,” New York Times, August 20, 2011,  [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/science/earth/21laser.html?_r=1&hp] Last Checked 8/21/11.
*”In a little-known effort, General Electric has successfully tested laser enrichment for two years and is seeking federal permission to build a $1 billion plant that would make reactor fuel by the ton.  That might be good news for the nuclear industry. But critics fear that if the work succeeds and the secret gets out, rogue states and terrorists could make bomb fuel in much smaller plants that are difficult to detect.”
*”Iran has already succeeded with laser enrichment in the lab, and nuclear experts worry that G.E.’s accomplishment might inspire Tehran to build a plant easily hidden from the world’s eyes.”
*”But critics want a detailed risk assessment. Recently, they petitioned Washington for a formal evaluation of whether the laser initiative could backfire and speed the global spread of nuclear arms. … New varieties of enrichment are considered potentially dangerous because they can simplify the hardest part of building a bomb — obtaining the fuel.”
*”’We’re on the verge of a new route to the bomb,’ said Frank N. von Hippel, a nuclear physicist who advised President Bill Clinton and now teaches at Princeton.’“We should have learned enough by now to do an assessment before we let this kind of thing out.’”
*” General Electric, an atomic pioneer and one of the world’s largest companies, says its initial success began in July 2009 at a facility just north of Wilmington, N.C., that is jointly owned with Hitachi. It is impossible to independently verify that claim because the federal government has classified the laser technology as top secret. But G.E. officials say that the achievement is genuine and that they are accelerating plans for a larger complex at the Wilmington site.”
*”For now, the big uncertainty centers on whether federal regulators will grant the planned complex a commercial license. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is weighing that issue and has promised G.E. to make a decision by next year.  The Obama administration has taken no public stance on plans for the Wilmington plant. But President Obama has a record of supporting nuclear power as well as aggressive efforts to curtail the bomb’s spread. The question is whether those goals now conflict.”
*”The aim of enrichment is to extract the rare form of uranium from the ore that miners routinely dig out of the ground. The process is a little like picking through multicolored candies to find the blue ones. The scarce isotope, known as uranium 235, amounts to just 0.7 percent of mined uranium. Yet it is treasured because it splits easily in two in bursts of atomic energy. If concentrations are raised (or enriched) to about 4 percent, the material can fuel nuclear reactors; to 90 percent, atom bombs. “
*”Twenty miles southwest of Sydney, in a wooded region, Horst Struve and Michael Goldsworthy kept tinkering with the idea at a government institute. Finally, around 1994, the two men judged that they had a major advance. The inventors called their idea Silex, for separation of isotopes by laser excitation. ‘Our approach is completely different,’ Dr. Goldsworthy, a physicist, told a Parliamentary hearing.  … In May 2006, G.E. bought the rights to Silex. Andrew C. White, the president of the company’s nuclear business, hailed the technology as ‘game-changing.’”
*”In late 2009, as G.E. experimented with its trial laser, supporters of arms control wrote Congress and the regulatory commission. The technology, they warned, posed a danger of quickening the spread of nuclear weapons because of the likely difficulty of detecting clandestine plants. Experts called for a federal review of the risks. In early 2010, the commission resisted. Late last year, the American Physical Society — the nation’s largest group of physicists, with headquarters in Washington — submitted a formal petition to the commission for a rule change that would compel such risk assessments as a condition of licensing.”
*”But critics say a clandestine bomb maker would need only a tiny fraction of that vast industrial ability — and thus could build a much smaller laser … Each year, they note, the enrichment powers of the Wilmington plant would be great enough to produce fuel for more than 1,000 nuclear weapons.”
*”This year, thousands of citizens, supporters of arms control, nuclear experts and members of Congress wrote the commission to back the society’s effort. Many of them cited well-known failures in safeguarding secrets and detecting atomic plants. But the Nuclear Energy Institute, an industry group in Washington, objected. It said new precautions were unnecessary because of voluntary plans for “additional measures” to safeguard secrets.”
*[[Nuclear]], [[Open Science]], [[Classified]], [[Iran]], [[Export Control]]
”’Siegel, Aaron”’, “36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Defense Department Documents and Publications, 31 October 2011.
*”The Government of Turkey has requested a possible sale of three (3) AH-1W SUPER COBRA Attack Helicopters, seven (7) T700-GE-401 engines (6 installed and 1 spare), inspections and modifications, spare and repair parts, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical documentation, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics personnel support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $111 million.”
*”Turkey is a partner of the United States in ensuring peace and stability in the region.”
*”It is vital to the U.S. national interest to assist our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally in developing and maintaining a strong and ready self-defense capability that will contribute to an acceptable military balance in the area.”
*”This proposed sale is consistent with those objectives.”
*”The proposed sale will improve Turkey’s capability for self defense, modernization, regional security, and interoperability with U.S. and other NATO members.”
*”The proposed sale of these helicopters will not alter the basic military balance in the region or U.S. efforts to encourage a negotiated settlement in Cyprus.”
*”There will be no prime contractor associated with this proposed sale. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.”
*[[Export Control]]
”’Editors”’, “Chinese Woman Admits to Violating U.S. Export Controls on Pakistan,” 16 November 2011, Global Security Newswire [http://gsn.nti.rsvp1.com/gsn/nw_20111116_6133.php?mgh=http%3A%2F%2Fgsn.nti.org&mgf=1] Last Checked 16 November 2011.
*“A Chinese woman residing in the United States on Tuesday entered a guilty plea to federal charges of illegally exporting high-tech paint coatings that could support Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.”
*“As the onetime managing director of a Chinese branch of PPG Industries, Xun Wang over a period of years used an intermediary in China to export shipments of a sophisticated epoxy coating to Pakistan where it was used to coat the inside of the nation’s second atomic energy reactor at the Chashma complex.”
*“Wang could potentially be imprisoned for five years and fined $250,000 for violating U.S. Commerce Department nonproliferation guidelines.”
*“She previously paid a $200,000 fine for her role in the crime.”
*[[Export Control]]

”’Sanger, David, E., & Broard, William, J.”’, “Explosion Seen as Big Setback to Iran’s Missile Program,” New York Times, December 4, 2011, [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/world/middleeast/blast-leveling-base-seen-as-big-setback-to-iran-missiles.html?hp], last checked 12/4/11.
*” The huge explosion that destroyed a major missile-testing site near Tehran three weeks ago was a major setback for Iran’s most advanced long-range missile program, according to American and Israeli intelligence officials and missile technology experts.”
*” It is still unclear what caused the explosion, with American officials saying they believe it was probably an accident, perhaps because of Iran’s inexperience with a volatile, dangerous technology.”
*”If a drone was used for intelligence gathering in Iran, it presumably would not belong to the military — since there are no open hostilities with Iran — but rather to the C.I.A. or another intelligence agency, acting under a presidential finding about the Iranian nuclear program.”
*”Moreover, at a time Iran is being squeezed by sanctions, the country has succeeded in making the solid-fuel engines with indigenous technology. For liquid-fueled engines, many key components come from abroad.”
*”Iran declared it an accident, but subsequent discussions of the episode in the Iranian news media have referred to the chief of Iran’s missile program as one of the “martyrs” killed in the huge explosion.”
*” In its report three weeks ago, the International Atomic Energy Agency laid out, for the first time in public, detailed evidence it says suggests that Iran worked at some point in the past decade on designing a nuclear warhead that would fit atop its missile fleet.”
*” Government and private analysts described the blast at the military base, which occurred Nov. 12 and killed Gen. Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, the head of Iran’s missile program, as a major setback — not just because of the extensive damage to the site but also because of the loss of expertise from the specialists working there.”
*” Partly for that reason, Western officials said, many of the sanctions imposed on Iran by the United Nations Security Council seek to block its import of rocket parts.”
*[[Iran]], [[Sabotage]], [[Export Control]], [[Scientist]], [[Nuclear]]
”’Jordans, Frank”’, “Swiss charge 3 men in nuclear smuggling case,” Associated Press, 12/13/2011 [http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jf6wSjVK_6bzo44cg5hga90cdqtA?docId=ae93c8602aa144d7bc230184edde0a69 last] checked 12/14/11.
*”Three Swiss engineers — a father and his two sons — have been charged with breaking arms export laws by aiding a Pakistani-led nuclear smuggling ring that supplied Libya’s atomic weapons program, prosecutors said Tuesday.”
*”Urs Tinner, 46, his brother Marco, 43, and their father Friedrich, 74, are accused of providing technology and know-how to the nuclear smuggling network of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the architect of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, the federal prosecutors office in Bern said in a statement.”
*” Prosecutors said the Tinners have agreed to ask for a shortened legal procedure, under which defendants admit the basic charges against them but face no more than five years in prison.”
*”If judges at the Federal Criminal Tribunal agree, politically sensitive aspects of the investigation likely won’t be publicly aired as further evidence gathering — and therefore cross-examination — would be excluded in court.”
*” An unidentified fourth defendant who prosecutors said played a subordinate role will be charged in a separate legal proceeding with breaking Swiss arms exports laws.”
*” Urs Tinner, who was released on bail in December 2008 after almost five years in investigative detention, claimed in a 2009 interview with Swiss TV station SF1 that he had tipped off U.S. intelligence about a delivery of centrifuge parts meant for Libya’s nuclear weapons program. The shipment was seized at the Italian port of Taranto in 2003, forcing Libya to admit and eventually renounce its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.”
*” In 2007, the Swiss government ordered evidence in the case destroyed, citing national security concerns. The decision prompted outrage in Switzerland and accusations that the government had acted under pressure from Washington.”
*[[Law Enforcement]], [[Nuclear]], [[WMD]], [[Export Control]], [[Switzerland]]
”’Staff Writers”’, AFP, Space War.com, “Swiss charge three in nuclear weapons case,” 12/13/2011, AFP,
[http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Swiss_charge_three_in_nuclear_weapons_case_999.html] last checked 12/14/2011.
*”’Based on the admissions made by the Tinner brothers and their father and at their request, the Office of the Attorney-General (OAG) in November 2011 ruled that accelerated proceedings should be conducted,’ said the prosecutors office.”
*”’In the indictment, the accused and the OAG request that the court return verdicts of guilty in relation to offences under the War Material Act and against one of the sons for forgery of documents.’”
*” The brothers spent three-and-a-half years in pre-trial custody before being released in December 2008 and January 2009. Their father had been earlier released in 2006, according to prosecutors.”
*” The men were suspected of helping Tripoli develop centrifuges to enrich uranium from 2001 to 2003 and collaborating with Khan, but in Tuesday’s statement, Swiss prosecutors did not name Libya in its charges but referred only to an ‘unknown state.””
*”Newspaper reports claimed the family were later recruited by the CIA to help halt Libya from gaining nuclear capability.”
*” Libya agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons plans in 2003 under pressure from the West.”
*”[[Law]], [[Export Control]], [[Law Enforcement]], [[Libya]], [[Nuclear]], [[Switzerland]]
”’Heilprin, John”’, “3 Swiss to avoid trial in nuclear case,” AP, 12/13/2011 [http://www.wboc.com/story/16027674/report-3-swiss-to-avoid-trial-in-nuclear-case?clienttype=printable] last checked 12/14/2011.
*” A spokeswoman for the federal prosecutors, Walburga Bur, has previously told AP that a shortened procedure was possible under which the Swiss engineers admit the basic charges against them but face no more than five years imprisonment. Normally, anyone who breaks Swiss laws banning the export of nuclear material faces up to 10 years imprisonment.”
*”Urs Tinner, who like his brother and father has been released on bail pending charges, claimed in an 2009 interview with Swiss TV station SF1 that he had worked with U.S. intelligence. He said he had tipped off the CIA about a delivery of centrifuge parts meant for Libya’s nuclear weapons program.”
*” The shipment was seized at the Italian port of Taranto in 2003, which forced Libya to admit and eventually renounce its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, and helped expose Khan’s smuggling ring.”
*[[Export Control]], [[Law Enforcement]], [[Switzerland]], [[Italy]], [[Libya]]

== 2012 ==
”’Editors”’ “Infrared Military Technology to South Korea,” Department of Justice, p. 2, January, 2012.   [http://www.justice.gov/nsd/docs/export-case-fact-sheet.pdf] Last Checked 2/15/2012.

*”On Dec. 20, 2011, EO System Company, Ltd, located in Inchon, South Korea, and defendants Seok Hwan Lee, Tae Young Kim and Won Seung Lee, all citizens and residents of South Korea, were indicted in the Northern District of Ohio on five counts of illegally exporting defense articles to South Korea.”

*”The defendants caused to be exported five infrared focal plan array detectors and infrared camera engines, which are classified as defense articles on the U.S. munitions list, from the United States to South Korea without the required State Department license.”

*”As part of the same investigation, on Jan. 20, 2011, Kue Sang Chun, a former longtime employee at the NASA Glenn Research Center in Ohio and resident of Avon Lake, Ohio, pleaded guilty in the Northern District of Ohio to one count of violating the Arms Export Control Act.”

*”Chun illegally exported several infrared focal plane array detectors and infrared camera engines to South Korea for use in Korean government projects between March 2000 and November 2005. Chun entered into a contract with a Korean company to design, build and text electronics to support the items he was exporting.”

*[[Export Control]], [[Law Enforcement]], [[State Department]]. [[Homeland Security]]

”’Benzing, Jeffrey”’, “Export Control Bureau Would Be Part of Obama Reorganization Plan,” Main Justice, January 16, 2012, [http://www.mainjustice.com/2012/01/16/export-control-bureau-would-be-part-of-obama-reorganization-plan/] Last Checked 20 January 2012.
* “Among the federal agencies that would be consolidated under President Barack Obama’s proposed government reorganization plan is the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security”
* “The bureau, known as BIS, regulates the export of so-called “dual use” items”
* “Obama’s new plan, if approved by Congress, would replace the Department of Commerce with a new department that would include the consolidation of the Small Business Administration, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.”
* “BIS would find a home in the new department, which would oversee issues related to small businesses, trade and competitiveness, technology and innovation and statistics.”
[[Export Control]], [[Dual Use]]
”’Editors”’, “Qatar organises course for GCC customs officials”, 19 February 2012, GulfTimes.com, [http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=487626&version=1&template_id=36&parent_id=16] Last Checked 19 February 2012.
*”The fourth sub-regional training course for customs authorities in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries on the technical aspects of the “Transfer Regime of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)” opened yesterday at Doha La Cigale Hotel. ”
*”The course, which is organised by the National Committee for the Prohibition of Weapons (NCPW) in co-operation with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), is being held under the auspices of HE the Chief of Staff of the Qatari Armed Forces Major General Hamad bin Ali al-Attiyah. The course will discuss several issues, including an introduction on OPCW, principles and procedures governing the transportation of chemicals and means of identification of chemical and biological warfare agents.”
*”In his opening speech, Brig. Gen. (Pilot) Nasser Mohamed al-Ali, chairman of the Qatar National Committee for the Prohibition of Weapons, stressed Qatar’s keenness to organise such courses for the representatives of GCC Customs as they are geographically contiguous, and that the leakage of any of the materials used in chemical weapons to any of the GCC territory will affect the security of the rest of the GCC states. ”
*”Al-Ali said the customs sector is a manifestation of the state’s sovereignty over its territory and its invincible fortress to protect it from smuggling of chemical weapons, banned substances and the illicit trade. He also warned that while protecting the country is the responsibility of everyone, the customs inspectors are considered the first line of defence.”
*”Brig. Gen. (Pilot) Nasser Mohamed al-Ali pointed out that the themes and topics which will be covered during the course will contribute to building human capacity in the GCC countries, stressing at the same time the Organisation’s continuing co-operation with the OPCW. Meanwhile, al-Ali thanked those in charge of the organisation on easing the task of states’ parties to fulfil their national obligations towards the implementation of the convention.”
*”For his part, head of Implementation Support Branch of OPCW Mark Albon thanked Qatar for hosting the course for the fourth year, stressing that the convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is one of the most important international legal tool to remove weapons of mass destruction. ”
*”He stressed the need of focusing during the next phase to prevent countries that their chemical weapons were destroyed to obtain them again, and this is the role of customs. This course is based on the important role played by customs authorities in GCC countries with regard to the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, where those authorities work as strong barriers to protect the concerned territory of the GCC countries from the risk of chemicals.”
*[[Chemical]], [[CWC]], [[Export Control]]
”’Schoorl, Joseph.”’ “Clicking the ‘Export’ Button: Cloud Data Storage and U.S. Dual-Use Export Controls” The George Washington Law Review, Volume 80, Issue 2. February 2012.
*”Use of online data storage services known generally as ‘cloud computing’ could lead to unintentional violations of the United States’ dual-use export control regime, the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).”
*”Depending on the nature of the data transmitted and the location of the foreign server, the users of these cloud services could be liable for violations of the EAR.”
*”This Note argues that the EAR’s fundamental reliance on the geographic destination of exports should not apply to the regulation of cloud computing. This regime threatens to undermine the development of an important technology without addressing the real threats that arise when U.S. companies store sensitive technical data on cloud servers.”
*”The cloud is essentially a vast network of large computers called servers, which can be located anywhere an Internet connection is available.”
*”Failure to obtain a license could result in a violation of the EAR and fines of up to twice the value of the transaction or $ 250,000 per transmission.”
*”BIS has failed to address questions of how a cloud user’s exports will be regulated. Since 2009, BIS has released two advisory opinions regarding the liability of cloud providers. Neither opinion formulates a clear policy on what cloud computing users must do to comply with the EAR”
*”After determining that a transaction involves items subject to the EAR and that an export will occur, exporters must identify whether the commodity, technology, or software is listed on the Commerce Control List (CCL). This is a list of specifications for dual-use items, and each entry is assigned an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN). If an item does not appear on this list, it is EAR99, a catch-all classification. EAR99 items require a license from BIS only in a small number of situations, such as when the destination is an embargoed nation or the item will be used for prohibited end-uses or by prohibited end-users.”
*”This Note proposes a modest step toward realigning the application of export controls with the diminished and distinguishable national security threats that accompany storing controlled data on the cloud. This step would take the form of a license exception to the EAR for American cloud users storing information to be used domestically.” There are 4 parts.
“Part I considers five basic concepts: (A) the scope of the EAR, (B) the definition of exports, (C) the concept of deemed exports, (D) licensing requirements and licensing exceptions, and (E) enforcement.”
*”Part II identifies the technological characteristics of the cloud computing model under the EAR. It then shows that one of the most basic uses of the cloud, data storage, involves users in activities subject to the EAR that could require a practically unobtainable license. Finally, it considers the inherent problems in regulating cloud transmissions under the EAR.”
*”Part III introduces License Exception CLC, which would provide greater clarity and flexibility than the current regulatory approach. It presents and explains the language to be added to the EAR. It then provides the rationale behind the exception and examples of how this exception would apply to real export situations.”
*”Part IV considers several counterarguments that could be leveled against the establishment of License Exception CLC. Because the U.S. export control regime faces simultaneous criticism from different interest groups for being both too lax and too rigid, this Section considers the problem from the perspective of the national security community and the business community.”
*[[Export Control]]
”’Russell, George”’, “UN computer shipment to North Korean regime violates US manufacturer’s ban,” FoxNews.com, April 17, 2012. [http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/17/un-computer-shipment-to-north-korean-regime-violates-us-manufacturers-ban/] Last Checked 5/2/12.

*“A United Nations agency that quietly shipped computers and computer servers to North Korea several months ago apparently was violating restrictions on the equipment’s use imposed by Hewlett-Packard, the U.S.-based maker of the computers and computer servers, which bars any HP equipment from being sent to the communist dictatorship as part of its supplier agreements.”
*”News of the under-the-radar computer shipment — and now, the revelation that it was delivered in violation of the manufacturer’s rules — comes on the crest of heightened tensions between the UN Security Council and the nuclear-ambitious, rogue North Korean regime.”
*“The WIPO legal memo made no mention of contact with or notification of UN sanctions committees that monitor the restrictions on North Korea before the shipment was delivered.”
*“The most recent Security Council resolution, passed in June 2009, specifically calls on “all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully” with the sanctions committee and its panel of experts, “in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures imposed by resolution 1718 (2006) [the previous sanctions measure] and this resolution.”
*“The Security Council — currently headed by U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice – is to announce additional sanctions covering new “entities and items” within the next two weeks.”
*[[Export Control]], [[Law Enforcement]], [[U.S. Foreign Policy]]
”’Eric McClafferty & Michael Dobson”’, “Export Controls Complicate Risk for Chemical Companies,” ICIS.com, May 7, 2012. [http://www.icis.com/Articles/2012/05/07/9556554/export-controls-complicate-risk-for-chemical-companies.html] Last Checked 6/2/12

*”On December 19, 2011, the US Commerce Department issued an order requiring payment of a $275,000 civil penalty to settle export violations that occurred between 2007 and 2010. The violations involved 16 unlicensed shipments of triethanolamine (TEA), a relatively common chemical compound used in cosmetics, photograph processing, and many other applications. The shipments went to an affiliate entity in Brazil, and were valued at less than a quarter of the penalty amount.”
*”This wasn’t an unusual case: in recent years, well over 70 companies in the chemical and allied industries have been penalized for export control violations. The number of criminal cases is exploding, enforcement agents pay announced and unannounced visits to companies, hundreds of new ICE and FBI agents are now enforcing export control regulations, and two new enforcement coordination centers were created in recent months.”
*”It turns out that in addition to its use as an ingredient in lotions, TEA can also be used to make nitrogen-based vesicants similar to mustard gas, which is regulated under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.”
*”Because it is a chemical weapon precursor, TEA, along with roughly 90 other chemicals, is controlled for export under the US Export Administration Regulations (EAR) . . . . The US regulations, which are administered by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), apply to “dual-use” items that have both commercial and military or weapons proliferation applications. While most items in the marketplace are subject to the EAR in one way or another, only certain listed chemicals, fertilizers, and petrochemical items are controlled for export – meaning a license is required for export to listed destinations.”
*”Near-identical controls (and similar headaches) apply to re-exports, or shipments from the initial destination country to a second country. These have proven particularly vexing for chemical companies, which too often operate under the misguided assumption that export responsibilities end at the US border.”
*”Think of the US export rules as a string that attaches to products exported from the US, following the product from location to location. The first shipment from the US may not need a license because it is made to a close ally, but shipment to the next country may well require a license from the US Commerce Department.”
*”Serious enforcement efforts have recently targeted the equipment side of the chemical business, and over 50 companies have been penalized for exports and re-exports of controlled equipment. . . . [O]ne company . . . received a $2.9m penalty associated with equipment shipments.”
*”None of these controls is [”sic”] static. The equipment rules have been amended several times in recent years in important ways – for example, over 100 countries were added to the control category – and there are more changes coming that have not been published yet.”
*”If your company does not have an explicit, regularly updated process to classify products and technology that are exported, you are likely not handling export compliance risks appropriately.”
*”[B]ecause the penalties are assessed on a “strict liability” basis, the government has little sympathy for companies unfamiliar with the regulations.”
*”Getting to full compliance with export control regulations can be complicated, but it is well worth the effort, given what is at stake for both companies and individuals. In addition to the penalties already mentioned, companies can lose eligibility to do business with the US government, and they can have export privileges revoked altogether.”
*[[Export Control]], [[Chemical]], [[Dual Use]]

”’Golden, Daniel”’. “Military secrets leak from U.S. universities with rules flouted” Bloomberg News. April 30, 2012 [http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-04-30/military-secrets-leak-from-u-dot-s-dot-universities-with-rules-flouted#p4]
*”The lapse by Atlanta-based Georgia Tech illustrates how colleges and federal arms-control regulators are often lax in enforcing Americans-only limits intended to prevent theft of military technology from U.S. campuses.”
*”Foreign governments are targeting universities to “obtain restricted information or products,” the FBI said in a 2011 report.”
*”Eager to preserve their culture of openness and global collaboration, campuses are skirting — and even flouting –export-control laws that require foreigners to hold government licenses to work on sensitive projects.”
*”Using unlicensed foreign students on export-controlled projects “happens all the time,” said Michael Deal…The academic world is completely undisciplined about it.”
*”Export controls — over, for example, developing trucks with extra protection against mines and explosives –occupy a middle ground. They exempt fundamental research that is ordinarily publishable or already in the public domain, as well as courses that are widely taught and in the academic catalog.”
*”Universities, which blocked a 2004 proposal to expand export controls, are now backing an Obama administration initiative to streamline them.”
*”While export-control violators are subject to imprisonment or fines, the federal government rarely goes after universities.”
*”Enforcement “is grounded in voluntary compliance, in essence an honor system, on the part of the academic community,” according to a 2009 court filing by the U.S.Justice Department.”
*”The number of voluntary disclosures by industry and academia is increasing 10 percent a year…”
*”Before a foreign national can participate in export-controlled research, the university must first obtain a license from the government. If the student comes from any of about 20 countries, the State Department normally denies the license application.”
*”Commerce approved 93 percent of applications in fiscal 2010 for “deemed export” licenses, of which almost 60 percent came from companies or universities wanting to release controlled technology to Chinese nationals.”
*”Tensions between law enforcement and academia over balancing national security with the global pursuit of knowledge came into focus in the case of University of Tennessee professor J. Reece Roth,… who began serving a four-year prison sentence in January for conspiracy and violating the Arms Export Control Act.”
*”Working with Knoxville-based Atmospheric Glow Technologies Inc., Roth used a Chinese and an Iranian graduate student –both unlicensed — on an export-controlled Air Force contract to develop plasma actuators to guide the flight of unmanned aircraft…Atmospheric Glow Technologies pleaded guilty to 10 counts of export control violations…”
*”This contention that any export-controlled information must not go out of the country is going to make it virtuallyimpossible for scholars to take their laptops out of the United States,” Roth said.”
*”In 2010, 54 percent of U.S. doctoral degrees in engineering were awarded to non-resident aliens, according to the Washington-based American Society for Engineering Education.”
*”Even as their laboratories depend on foreign graduate students, universities are escalating U.S.-only research.”
*”We’ve had an explosion in the number of programs” requiring foreigners to be licensed, partly because the government is funding more ITAR-controlled projects, he said.”
*”Seeking export-controlled revenue is shortsighted…Organizations that do engage in these projects are giving up opportunities to work with some of the best and brightest students…”
*”Most universities that take on export-controlled research construe the restrictions narrowly. Because rules can be ambiguous, acting as if a project is fundamental research often makes it so…”
*”Academia’s failure to police export controls shows that it puts tuition revenue from foreign students ahead of national security, said U.S. Representative Dana Rohrabacher, a California Republican.”
*”Universities have been waging a political battle against U.S.-only rules since 2004, when a series of reports by federal inspectors general criticized academia.”
*”When the Commerce Department’s inspector general called for more controls, universities stymied the proposal.”
*”In December 2007, an advisory committee of industry and university leaders suggested pruning Commerce’s restricted list.”
*”The National Research Council, a nonprofit organization of prominent scientists, joined the chorus in 2009, attacking export controls as “unwieldy, slow” and “difficult to administer rationally.”
*”,… the Obama administration is overhauling the controls, in the face of opposition from some Republican members of Congress and hardliners within the State and Defense departments. It’s working to move some items from the State Department’s list of controlled military and satellite technology to Commerce’s dual-use roster, which has fewer prohibited countries and a lower bar.”
[[Academia]], [[Export Control]]
[[Information Policy]]

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