U.S. Foreign Policy

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Borman, MatthewImplementation in the Export Administration Regulations of the United States’ Rescission of Libya’s Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism and Revisions Applicable to IraqFederal Register, Volume 71, Issue 169. 51,714. August 25, 2006

  1. ”The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the June 30, 2006 rescission of Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.” – page 51714
  2. ”This action is the latest in a series of steps taken by the U.S. Government to reflect the improvement in the bilateral relationship since Libya’s announcement in December 2003 that it was renouncing terrorism and giving up its weapons of mass destruction programs.” – page 51714
  3. ”On April 29, 2004, BIS published an amendment to the EAR that allowed for the licensing and authorization of the export or reexport of dual-use items to Libya.” – page 51714
  4. ”On May 15, 2006, the President submitted a report to Congress certifying that Libya had not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding 6 months and that Libya had provided assurances that it would not support future acts of international terrorism.” – page 51715
  5. ”Items controlled only for anti-terrorism (AT) reasons on the commerce control list (CCL) will no longer be subject to a licensing requirement for export or reexport to Libya, except for the end-use and end- user requirements.” – page 51715 *”Under the terms of the revisions in regards to Iraq, items covered by eight ECCNs which previously required a license for export or reexport to Iraq, or transfer within Iraq, for AT reasons now require a license for export or reexport to Iraq, or transfer within Iraq, for Regional Stability (RS) reasons.” – page 51716

Export Control, U.S. Foreign Policy, WMD, Libya, Iraq


Ostfield, Marc, L. , “STRENGTHENING BIODEFENSE INTERNATIONALLY: ILLUSION AND REALITY”, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, Volume 6, Number 3, 2008.

State Department, U.S. Foreign Policy


Wald, Matthew, “Hiring of Soviet Scientists Has Strayed From Aim, Audit Says,” NYT, Jan. 24, 2008, pg. A4.

  1. –biosecurity program- /program to hire former weapons scientists in Russia/some weren’t weapons scientists/unintended effect of indirectly supplying Iran with nuclear technology/help Russia surpass us in science

Department of Energy, State Department, WMD, Nuclear, Russia, U.S. Foreign Policy


Afrasiabi, Kaveh, L., “Iran Sanctions Hit the Wrong Target,” Asia Times, Jan. 25, 2008. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JA25Ak03.html Last checked Oct. 18, 2009.

  1. “Indeed, this much is clear by examining the poor logic of renewed attempts to toughen Iran sanctions on the part of the UN Security Council’s five permanent members (the US, Britain, France, Russia and China) plus Germany – the Five plus One – reportedly agreeing in their last meeting in Berlin on Tuesday to draft a new resolution. … [Which will] impose new travel bans, certain ‘asset freezes’ as well as calls for ‘vigilance’ with respect to the transfer of ‘banned material’ for sensitive nuclear activities, and ‘monitoring’ of the sanctions regime.”
  2. “The latest draft UN resolution’s provisions for ‘travel bans’ simply lack a sound strategic design, rigorous monitoring and enforcement mechanism and will likely fail to generate international cooperation and compliance.”
  3. “such UN initiatives will likely backfire on the UN and diminish its standing, particularly among the majority of the world’s population who belong to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), given NAM’s solid support of Iran’s nuclear rights.”
  4. “Resolution 1747, while providing a short list of several scientists and heads of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps as intended targets for a travel ban, [cite omitted] nonetheless opens a loophole by stating ‘except when such travel is for activities directly related to items in certain sub-paragraphs. One such exception deals with religious pilgrimage, another deals with Iran’s non-proliferation sensitive nuclear activities.”
  5. “There is always the availability of false passports and travel documents and the challenges of effective customs and border monitoring, particularly by Iran’s neighbors. [cite omitted] Then there is a lack of incentives for cooperation by other states, especially those which are critical of the US-led sanctions on Iran and which agree with Iran that these measures have the character of ‘psychological warfare.'”
  6. “the question arises as to the grounds on which poor scientists who simply follow orders should be penalized, and their freedom to travel curtailed.”

Academia, Misconduct, Iran, U.S. Foreign Policy, Nonproliferation, Non-Aligned Movement


Moore, John, “UNCLOS Key to Increasing Navigational Freedom”, Texas Review of Law & Politics, Spring 2008, Vol. 12, Issue 2 PG. 459-467.

  1. “Nonadherence has reduced the voice of the United States of America, a terribly important voice in the world, and continued nonadherence will further reduce that voice on issues that are critical for us.” (pg. 462)
  2. “The issue is the entire Convention and our effort to protect the navigational freedom that we have been struggling for, over the past hundred years, and will continue to struggle for, in the next fifty years.” (pg. 464)
  3. “At stake in that debate was whether the United States was going to insist on all of our navigational rights, transit passage through, over, and under straits used for international navigation, or whether we would accept the advice of some that this was simply a nonnegotiable issue, and we should damp it down.” (pg.459)
  4. “The United States prevailed on all of the security provisions of the Convention— security provisions which were very much at stake in the negotiations.” (pg.460)
  5. “We fully preserved navigational freedom, including transit passage through, over, and under international straits.” (pg.460)
  6. “We extended United States’ resource jurisdiction into the oceans in an area larger than the entire land mass of the United States, and we insisted on assured access to seabed minerals for United States’ firms.” (pg.460)
  7. “This treaty was a great victory for the United States Navy and for navigational freedom and our security interests on the world’s oceans.” (pg. 461)
  8. “The United States was overwhelmingly the leader in this negotiation.” (pg. 460)
  9. “The Law of the Sea Convention and its negotiation remains one of the seminal negotiating successes of the United States throughout its history.” (pg. 460)

PSI, U.S. Foreign Policy, Jurisdiction


Wall, Christopher. “Effects of Foreign-Policy Based Export ControlsFederal Register Volume 73 Issue 174. 52,006. August 29, 2008.

  1. ”The current foreign policy- based export controls maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) are set forth in the EAR, including in parts 742 (CCL Based Controls), 744 (End-User and End-Use Based Controls) and 746 (Embargoes and Special Country Controls).” – page 52006
  2. ”Under the provisions of section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), as amended, export controls maintained for foreign policy purposes require annual extension. Section 6 of the EAA requires a report to Congress when foreign policy-based export controls are extended.” – page 52006
  3. ”The Department of Commerce, insofar as appropriate, is following the provisions of section 6 by reviewing its foreign policy-based export controls, requesting public comments on such controls, and preparing a report to be submitted to Congress. In January 2008, the Secretary of Commerce, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, extended for one year all foreign policy-based export controls then in effect.” – page 52006
  4. ”Among the criteria considered in determining whether to continue or revise U.S. foreign policy-based export controls are the following: the likelihood that such controls will achieve the intended foreign policy purpose; whether the foreign policy objective of such controls can be achieved through negotiations or other alternative means; the compatibility of the controls with the foreign policy objectives of the United States; whether the reaction of other countries to the extension of such controls is not likely to render the controls ineffective in achieving the intended foreign policy objective; the comparative benefits to U.S. foreign policy objectives versus the effect of the controls on the export performance of the United States; and the ability of the United States to enforce the controls effectively.” – page 52007
  5. ”BIS is particularly interested in receiving comments on the economic impact of proliferation controls.” – page 52007
  6. ”The Entity List provides notice to the public that certain exports and reexports to parties identified on the Entity List require a license from BIS and that availability of License Exceptions in such transactions is limited” – page 52007

Export Control, U.S. Foreign Policy


Delury, JohnNorth Korea: 20 Years of SolitudeWorld Policy Journal Volume 25, Issue 4. Pages 75-82. Winter 2008

  1. “The current framework for dealing with North Korea evolved back in the late 1980s in the wake of two game-changing developments: the end of the Cold War and the birth of the North Korean nuclear weapons program” – page 75
  2. “The last two decades have shown that neither isolating North Korea nor halfheartedly negotiating with Pyongyang works. Instead, North Korea stands as one of the most striking failures of post–Cold War U.S. foreign policy” – page 76
  3. “…my suggestion would be for the Obama administration to dispatch a peace mission to Pyongyang. Vice President Joe Biden has a long record of working on the Korean issue, and might be a good candidate to act as the senior American emissary” – page 77
  4. “Biden would initiate substantive peace talks, including the establishment of a U.S. Liaison Office in Pyongyang. Biden could also pave the way for Pyongyang to do the same in Washington.”- page 77
  5. “The liaison offices would be initial steps in a broader initiative to peel away legal restrictions on travel and commerce between the two countries, with requisite care to restrict drug, counterfeit, and arms trade” – page 77
  6. “We are likely to see Beijing playing a steady, supportive role in the Korean peace initiative” – page 78
  7. “President Obama’s immediate task is to keep that positive momentum going, and enlist Beijing’s leadership in transforming the Six Party Talks into the Korean Peace Process.” – page 79
  8. “The conservative government in Seoul leans toward a “tough” line on the North, and Pyongyang has reciprocated with relentless invective against President Lee Myung-bak since his inauguration in February. This poses an obvious and immediate problem for the United States, as it is crucial to align our peace initiative with the democratically elected government in Seoul” – page 80
  9. “In brokering a peace, we should look for opportunities to nurture the economic synergy between the North, which is rich in mineral resources and cheap labor, with South Korea’s strengths in agriculture, exports, and services.” – page 80
  10. “Involving Japan in the endeavor to alter North Korean relations may prove trickiest of all. Prime Minister Taro Aso is a long standing hawk on North Korea. Japanese public opinion also continues to harden, centering on two concerns—the abduction issue and the security threat.” – page 81
  11. “The solution to the myriad problems created by North Korea’s long isolation is, quite simply, to end the isolation” – page 82
  12. “…a middle course of robust, determined engagement, embracing the bilateral relationship while coordinating the multilateral diplomacy, has the potential to reverse 20 years of failed foreign policy.” – page 82

Nuclear, North Korea, U.S. Foreign Policy, Export Control


MacFarquhar, Neil, “U.S. Circulates new Iran Sanctions Draft,NYT, A9, March 4, 2010.

  1. “The proposed sanctions would both broaden the scope and intensify three previous rounds of sanctions enacted since 2006 in an effort to persuade Iran to halt uranium enrichment and negotiate the future of its nuclear development program.”
  2. “The focus is on the Islamic Revolutionary Corps, which runs a vast array of Iranian businesses, while the oil industry is not included diplomats said.”
  3. “The new sanctions would also expand the list of individuals facing a travel ban and assets freeze for their work in the nuclear program. Sanctions to date, which run to about six pages, have singled out companies and individuals involved in the nuclear and missile development programs or in efforts to help to finance them. They include a ban on arms exports.”
  4. “One diplomat, expressing frustration with the level of proof demanded by China and Russia, said their negotiators went down the list as if they were expecting to get ‘a picture of each guy building the bomb.'”

Nuclear, Nonproliferation, Scientific Restrictions, Iran, China, Russia, U.S. Foreign Policy


Wolf, KevinAddition of New Export Control Classification Number 6A981 Passive Infrasound Sensors to the Commerce Control List of the Export Administration Regulations, and Related AmendmentsFederal Register Volume 75, Issue 125. 37,742. June 25, 2010.

  1. ”The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) proposes to amend the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 6A981 to the Commerce Control List (CCL) to control passive infrasound sensors because of their military and commercial utility.” –page 37742
  2. ”Items under this new ECCN will be controlled for regional stability (RS) and Anti-Terrorism (AT) reasons.” – page 37742
  3. ”Passive infrasound sensors, which possess civil and military utility, are not currently specified in the CCL, but similar sensors are subject to the EAR.” – page 37742
  4. ”BIS proposes to require a license for the export and reexport of these sensors to countries with an X in the box under RS Column 2 and AT column 1 on the Commerce Control Chart.” – page 37743
  5. ”BIS is requesting public comments on the possible impact of this proposed rule. As these sensors are not currently on the CCL, it is difficult for BIS to determine how many U.S. companies manufacture these sensors and would be impacted by the new control.” – page 37743
  6. ”RS Column 2 license requirements – A license is required to any destination except Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).” – page 37743

Export Control, U.S. Foreign Policy


Gordon, Michael and Lehren, Andrew, “U.S. Strains to Stop Arms Flow”, 6 December 2010, NYT http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/world/07wikileaks-weapons.html?_r=2&emc=na Last Checked 12 December 2010.

  1. “Just a week after President Bashar al-Assad of Syria assured a top State Department official that his government was not sending sophisticated weapons to Hezbollah, the Obama administration lodged a confidential protest accusing Syria of doing precisely what it had denied doing.”
  2. “Wielding surveillance photos and sales contracts, American diplomats have confronted foreign governments about shadowy front companies, secretive banks and shippers around the globe.”
  3. “American officials have tried to block a Serbian black marketer from selling sniper rifles to Yemen. They have sought to disrupt the sale of Chinese missile technology to Pakistan, the cables show, and questioned Indian officials about chemical industry exports that could be used to make poison gas.”
  4. “American diplomats have repeatedly expressed concern that huge cargo planes operated by Badr Airlines of Sudan were flying weapons from Tehran to Khartoum, Sudan, where they were shipped to Hamas, the militant group in Gaza.”
  5. “Sudan insisted that the cargo was farm equipment, but the United States asked countries in the region to deny overflight rights to the airlines. Jordan and several other countries agreed, but Yemen declined.”
  6. “Iran not only was providing $25 million a month to support Hamas but also was linked to a Hezbollah cell trying to smuggle arms from Gaza into Egypt.”
  7. “North Korea has abetted the arms race in the Middle East by providing missile technology to Iran and Syria, which then backed Hamas and Hezbollah.”
  8. “North Korea’s arms industry has conducted many of its transactions through the Korea Mining and Development Corporation, relied on suppliers of machinery and steel from countries including Switzerland, Japan, China and Taiwan, passed money through Chinese and Hong Kong banks and sold weapons to other countries.”
  9. “The newly fortified Hezbollah has raised fears that any future conflict with Israel could erupt into a full-scale regional war.”
  10. “To disrupt the transactions, American officials have prodded and protested. Diplomats raised questions in the spring of 2009, for example, about planned purchases from North Korea of rocket launchers by Sri Lanka and Scud missile launchers by Yemen.”
  11. “The Syrian episode offers a glimpse of the United States’ efforts to prevent buildups of arms — including Scud missiles, Soviet-era tanks and antiaircraft weapons — in some of the world’s tensest regions.”

PSI, U.S. Foreign Policy, Israel, North Korea, China, Iran


Editors, “Obama Presses China to Curb North Korea”, 6 December 2010, Global Security Newswire http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20101206_1522.php Last Checked 23 December 2010.

  1. “The United States has stepped up criticism of Chinese policy toward North Korea.”
  2. “Obama administration officials in recent meetings have criticized Chinese representatives for ignoring North Korea’s flouting of U.N. Security Council resolutions, global commitments and the 1953 armistice agreement with South Korea.”
  3. “Beijing is ‘enabling’ the aspiring nuclear power’s work on uranium enrichment and its military strikes on South Korea.”
  4. “An early version of a joint statement from today’s trilateral meeting would have the three nations denounce the artillery strike and call on Beijing to pressure Pyongyang to meet ‘responsibilities that had been set in the six-party talks.’”
  5. “U.S. Secretary of State Clinton on Friday voiced worries that the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran could lead to arms buildups in their respective regions.”

U.S. Foreign Policy, Nuclear, PSI, China, North Korea


Gertz, Bill, “China Spurns Strategic Security Talks with U.S.” 10 January 2011, Washington Times http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/10/china-spurns-strategic-security-talks-with-us/print/ Last Checked 10 January 2011.

  1. “China’s defense minister on Monday rebuffed an offer from Defense Secretary to hold strategic nuclear talks.”
  2. “Since taking office in 2006, Mr. Gates has tried to persuade China to hold strategic military talks, saying they would reduce mistrust and miscalculation.”
  3. “China’s military is engaged in a large-scale buildup of its strategic nuclear forces, with as many as three new long-range nuclear missiles and an unknown number of nuclear weapons. It also is building missiles that can destroy satellites and maneuver warheads that can target aircraft carriers.”
  4. “China’s military fears such talks will disclose information about its nuclear forces and weapons that would be used in targeting or cyber-attacks during a future conflict.”
  5. “China’s refusal to engage and share information on its military ‘all boils down to the fact that we’ve been way too indulgent with the Chinese,’ Mr. Tkacik said.”
  6. “‘For the past 20 years, we’ve given the Chinese information briefings and tours of our military facilities without demanding any reciprocity. And as a result, we haven’t gotten any reciprocity,’ Mr. Tkacik said.”
  7. “The exchanges were undermined by China’s dispatch of large numbers of intelligence collectors to gather war-fighting information at U.S. military facilities.”
  8. “Congress in 1999 outlawed exchanges that could bolster Beijing’s nuclear and power-projection capabilities.”
  9. “Gen. Liang and Mr. Gates did agree to boost cooperation in nontraditional security areas, such as counterterrorism, peacekeeping, counterpiracy and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.”

China, Military, U.S. Foreign Policy, Nuclear


Gertz, Bill, “Inside the Ring: Sea Law Treaty Push,” 27 July 2011, Washington Times http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/27/inside-the-ring-319113972/print/ Last Checked 27 July 2011.

  1. “The Obama administration and Sen. John F. Kerry are pushing for Senate ratification of the controversial Law of the Sea Treaty amid heightened tensions over Chinese maritime aggressiveness stemming from the 1982 pact.”
  2. “The treaty gives nations a 200-mile Economic Exclusion Zone.”
  3. “China has used that provision to claim wide areas of international waters as its own, prompting recent clashes in the South China, East China and Yellow seas as well as verbal sparring with the Pentagon over freedom of navigation.”
  4. “The treaty push is part of the administration’s policy of using international agreements as a centerpiece of national security policies.”
  5. “Critics say those policies usually involve signing agreements that constrain the United States, while allowing foreign signatories to violate or circumvent the accords.”
  6. “A main objection of critics of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, its formal name, is that the agreement undermines U.S. sovereignty.”
  7. “Non-navigation provisions would give the United Nations some power to control access to undersea resources and also to intervene in U.S. domestic affairs.”
  8. “Heritage Foundation analyst Steven Groves said a major problem with the treaty is Article 82. The section would force the U.S. government to lose millions by forfeiting royalties from U.S. companies to explore for oil and gas on the continental shelf beyond 200 miles. Instead, a U.N. organization would get a portion of the money.”
  9. “‘It’s the non-navigational provisions — sharing oil and gas royalties with underdeveloped countries, mandatory dispute resolution and the deep seabed mining provisions — that give conservatives heartburn,’ he said.”
  10. “Navy Capt. John Kirby said Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supports the treaty because ‘he believes that by remaining outside the convention, we give up the firmer foundation of treaty law for navigational rights vital to our global mobility.’”
  11. “The White House is using the Navy’s support for the treaty’s navigation provisions to gain the backing of skeptical senators.”

PSI, Jurisdiction, U.S. Foreign Policy, Military


Editors, “NATO Panel Urges Nations To Eradicate All Chemical Arms“, 11 October 2011, GlobalSecurityNewswire, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20111011_9635.php Last Checked 31 October 2011.

  1. “A key NATO panel on Sunday approved a draft text that urges Iraq, Russia and the United States to eradicate their chemical warfare materials in a safe and secure manner, the ACTMedia News Agency reported.”
  2. “The NATO Parliamentary Assembly Science and Technology Committee in Bucharest dismissed an effort by Russia to substitute the call for the three nations to complete chemical demilitarization operations “in due time” with the word “soon.”
  3. “Russia and the United States have announced they do not expect to meet an extended deadline of April 2012 set by the Chemical Weapons Convention to completely destroy their chemical weapons. Iraq also has a small cache of Saddam Hussein-era chemical weapons that it has yet to begin eliminating.”
  4. “The NATO panel chose to keep its original wording on the thinking that Russia and the United States, as the holders of the world’s two largest chemical arsenals, should act as positive role models to other nations in the elimination of their stockpiles.”We are running late and we need to give an example,” said the committee’s vice chairman and author of the resolution, U.S. Representative David Scott (D-Ga.). “We need to act seriously.”
  5. “The resolution additionally urges all nations to notify the international community of any secret arsenals of biological and chemical warfare agents and to halt such military efforts. The committee also pressed NATO members to implement steps to thwart potential biological and chemical terrorist strikes.”
  6. “Terrorists have … largely failed to weaponize biological and chemical agents,” the draft resolution reads.
  7. “Nevertheless, measures to counter biological and chemical threats still have to cope with numerous issues to become truly effective tools of arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation.”

U.S. Foreign Policy, Chemical, Bioterrorism, Russia, Iraq, NATO


Dasgupta, Sunil and Cohen, Stephen, “Arms Sales for India Subtitle: How Military Trade Could Energize U.S.-Indian Relations,” March 2011-April 2011, Council on Foreign Relations Inc., Vol. 90, No. 2.

  1. “Obama announced that the United States would sell $5 billion worth of U.S. military equipment to India, including ten Boeing C-17 military transport aircraft and 100 General Electric F-414 fighter aircraft.”
  2. “Although the details are still being worked out, these and other contracts already in the works will propel the United States into the ranks of India’s top three military suppliers, alongside Russia and Israel.”
  3. “With India planning to buy $100 billion worth of new weapons over the next ten years, arms sales may be the best way for the United States to revive stagnating U.S.-Indian relations.”
  4. “Since coming to power, the Obama administration has shifted course, partly on the grounds that Bush gave India too much, especially in regard to the nuclear deal. The Obama administration wants greater reciprocity — including Indian support for U.S. policies on global energy and trade, India’s granting of more freedom of action in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and weapons contracts for U.S. firms. Obama also wants to develop ties more incrementally. One reason is that his administration’s primary interest in the region is stabilizing Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
  5. “Obama’s two years of trying to bring Pakistan on board with Washington’s plans has led only to frustration and has highlighted the importance of renewing cooperation with India in order to make progress on Afghanistan.”
  6. “Russian military suppliers enjoy strong relationships with the Indian military establishment and its research agency, the Defense Research and Development Organization, relationships that were developed during the Cold War.”
  7. “But now, after a decade of rapid economic growth that fattened India’s military budgets, the Indian armed forces have set their sights on buying a range of new weapons, from traditional machinery, such as tanks, ships, and aircraft, to the most advanced innovations, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and the technology for electronic warfare. And India is increasingly turning to Israeli and Western suppliers, especially since its ties with Russian sellers started souring in early 2010, when the Russians forced a repricing of the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov from $1 billion to $2.3 billion.”
  8. “The Indian-Israeli arms trade amounts to more than $2 billion annually, and Israel has become India’s number two military supplier. Like Russia, it offers India access to military equipment without imposing political conditions, and Israeli firms have also been able to woo the DRDO with offers of joint development of high-tech weaponry.”
  9. “The United States clearly has the technological edge to win Indian military contracts, but the U.S. law banning the transfer of technologies that have military uses is a major stumbling block. India’s leaders have made it clear that if they purchase machinery from the United States or U.S.-based firms, they expect to be granted access to the manufacturing processes and technology behind it. On the other side, the U.S. government would have to overcome significant legal hurdles to allow technology transfers to India.”
  10. “There are questions about whether technology transfers would actually motivate India to make the political concessions the United States seeks and worries that Washington would have to keep offering more and more to secure Indian friendship in the future.”
  11. “The Obama administration is apprehensive that getting too close to India would jeopardize U.S. objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially if the Indian military were to use equipment it received from the United States against Pakistan. Even U.S. companies, which hope to profit from India’s military market, are reticent about sharing their prize technologies.”
  12. “In 2009, India’s leaders signed an end-use monitoring agreement that would allow U.S. representatives to periodically inspect and inventory items transferred to India — and they did so despite criticism that the agreement’s terms eroded India’s sovereignty.”
  13. “During his visit to India in November, Obama promised to lift some export-control restrictions on India and to remove some restrictions on trade with India’s space and military research agencies.”
  14. “But some major obstacles remain. For one, India needs to fix its broken procurement system. Although the Indian Ministry of Defense has issued a series of new military procurement guidelines in the last few years, transparency, legitimacy, and corruption problems continue to plague the process. Indian law also requires foreign suppliers to source components and invest in research and development in India, while prohibiting them from creating wholly owned or majority-owned subsidiaries in the country. These two provisions are intended to ensure that the technology used by foreign suppliers will eventually be transferred to Indian companies. But the U.S. government and U.S. companies would not agree to this unless the U.S. law governing technology transfers were relaxed and India began to guarantee the protection of intellectual property rights.”
  15. “The new nuclear liability bill that India passed in August will also have a chilling effect on U.S.-Indian military trade. It holds foreign suppliers responsible for accidents at nuclear power plants for up to 100 years after the plants’ construction. The law applies to companies that supply equipment to the contractors building the reactors, even if these companies do not have a physical presence in India. Progress on the construction of any new reactors under the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal will almost certainly be slowed by this law, as U.S. companies seek to protect themselves from liability.”
  16. “The United States can get around its own legal restrictions on technology transfers by pursuing such ambitious long-term projects, because if a technology does not currently exist, U.S. law does not protect it.”
  17. “Not only would the United States gain a huge foothold in the Indian military market; it could also channel any offset money it is required to invest in India into joint development projects.”
  18. “So far, however, the Obama administration has not wanted to think big and seriously consider joint technology development. This is a mistake. Short-term differences between India and the United States caused their estrangement during the Cold War. A similar rift now would not be in the long-term interest of either country.”

Export Control, U.S. Foreign Policy, India, Military


Editors, “U.S. chemical weapons arsenal threatens world peace“ 29 November 2011, Tehran Times, http://www.tehrantimes.com/politics/93083-us-chemical-weapons-arsenal-threatens-world-peace, Last checked 29 November 2011.

  1. “Iran’s representative to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has said that the illegal efforts of the United States to maintain its chemical weapons threaten world peace and security. Kazem Gharibabadi, who is also Iran’s ambassador to the Netherlands, made the remarks in The Hague on Monday during the first day of the Sixteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which opened on November 28 and closes on December 2.”
  2. “He said that the continued existence of chemical weapons stockpiles will endanger international peace and security, and the use of such inhumane and lethal weapons would be a nightmare.”
  3. “Iran’s opposition to chemical weapons is based on certain principles, the legal dimensions of which are based on the articles of the convention and the humanitarian dimensions of which are based on the disastrous impact of the use of such weapons against innocent people, he added.”
  4. “The threats to the world can only be eliminated through complete and sincere commitment to the terms of the convention, Gharibabadi stated. He also said that April 29, 2012 has been set as the final deadline for the total eradication of all chemical weapons, but the U.S., which is the country that has the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons, has officially announced that it will not meet the 2012 deadline and has set 2021 as its target date.”
  5. “The United States’ non-compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention must be addressed by the international community, including the United Nations, because this measure will undermine the only international treaty on chemical weapons, he added. “We doubt the political will of the government of the United States. The U.S. decision to delay the total eradication of its chemical weapons for a long time… has made the world worried,” he stated.”
  6. “On Monday, OPCW Director General Ahmet Uzumcu visited an exhibition of photographs of Iranian victims of Iraq’s chemical weapons attack on Sardasht, West Azerbaijan Province, which occurred on June 28, 1987. Uzumcu said he hoped that catastrophes like the Sardasht attack never occur again. The exhibition is being held in The Hague on the sidelines of the chemical weapons conference.”

CWC, Chemical, U.S. Foreign Policy, Iran


Starr, Barbara, “Military: Thousands of troops needed to secure Syrian chemical sites” 22 February 2012, CNN, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/22/military-thousands-of-troops-needed-to-secure-syrian-chemical-sites/ Last Checked 26 February 2012.

  1. “The U.S. military has calculated it could take more than 75,000 ground troops to secure Syria’s chemical warfare facilities if they were at risk of being looted or left unguarded, CNN has learned.”
  2. “The conclusion comes from a military analysis of options for Syria that the Department of Defense is preparing for president should he request it, according to a senior U.S. official. Securing Syria’s chemical sites would be “extraordinarily difficult” given the scope of the problem, a Department of Defense official told CNN.”
  3. “The U.S. military believes there are 50 chemical weapon and production sites spread across the country with additional storage sites and research centers as well. The cities of Hama, Homs and al Safira, and the port city of Latakia are all believed to house production facilities.”
  4. “The analysis was provided by the United States’ Central Command, which has been considering how the U.S. military would handle potential scenarios should U.S. troops be called in, according to a senior U.S. official with direct knowledge of the situation. While the number is large – nearly as many as are currently serving in Afghanistan – any actual deployment should it ever come to that would undoubtedly be significantly smaller than the planning suggested. U.S. officials continue to insist the American position is to push for a diplomatic solution.”
  5. “The U.S. intelligence community currently believes Syria’s weapons sites are secured by the regime, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told Congress last week.  But the senior U.S. official who spoke to CNN said the “nightmare scenario” is what would happen if that situation changes and the regime suddenly fall apart, or the fighting gets to the point that the international community believes military intervention is necessary to secure the chemical weapons.”
  6. “A defense official told CNN’s Chris Lawrence last week that while the U.S. “continues to monitor the overall situation in Syria,” there are “ongoing discussions specific to the location of, and security around, the various components of their chemical weapons program.” “Syria probably has one of largest programs in the world,” said Leonard Specter with the Monterey Institute of International Studies. “It has multiple types of chemical agents.” Specter said the stocks include World War I-era gases like chlorine and phosgene as well as more modern nerve gases.”
  7. “The United States is paying particular attention to the possibility of the weapons falling into the hands of extremists, in the event the government loses control of certain areas or splinters among itself, the defense official said. “There would be kind of a vacuum that would lend itself to extremists operating in Syria which is particularly troublesome in light of the large network of chemical warfare, (chemcial biological weapons), weapon-storage facilities and other related facilities that there are in Syria,” Clapper said.”
  8. “The senior U.S. official said American military commanders are continuing to strongly advocate for a political and diplomatic option in Syria rather than a military one. Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Clapper have already voiced concerns publicly about arming opposition groups who are not well known to the United States. But the official also notes the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad itself still has military cards to play. So far the regime has not used its chemical or biological capability or any military aviation units against protestors. If Syrian attack helicopters were called in, he said, “that would be very significant.”
  9. “They haven’t demonstrated any interest or any intent to use those,” Demspey said in an interview that aired this weekend on CNN’s “Fareed Zakaria GPS.”

Military, Chemical, Syria, U.S. Foreign Policy


Cohen, Bryan, “U.N. concerned that Syria could have chemical weapons” 5 March 2012, BioPrepWatch, http://www.bioprepwatch.com/weapons_of_bioterrorism/u-n-concerned-that-syria-could-have-chemical-weapons/323277/ Last Checked 11 March 2012.

  1. “Ban Ki-moon, the secretary-general of the United Nations, and Ahmet Üzümcü, the director-general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, have warned that Syria may have chemical weapons.”
  2. “General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the U.S. military’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, said last week that Syria has an integrated air defense system and biological and chemical weapons, Reuters reports.”
  3. “In the last 11 months, a crackdown on pro-democracy protestors in the country has led to the deaths of over 7,500 civilians at the hands of Syrian security forces.”
  4. “According to Jeffrey Feltman, the U.S. assistant secretary of state, Washington is also concerned that Syria may have weapons of mass destruction.”
  5. “This is a topic that’s being discussed actively with Syria’s neighbors and with our allies in Europe and elsewhere,” Feltman said, according to Reuters. “We don’t have any indication at this point that these stockpiles have fallen out of the control of the Syrian government, but it’s one of the reasons why a managed transition is so important. We’re watching this. We’re watching it carefully.”

Chemical, Syria, U.S. Foreign Policy


Solomon, Jay and Barnes, Julian E., “World News: U.S., Jordan Discuss Securing Syria Cache — Fears Mount Over Suspected Chemical, Biological Weapons” 9 March 2012, TheWallStreetJournal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203961204577269680793484776.html?mod=googlenews_wsj Last Checked 11 March 2012.

  1. “The American and Jordanian militaries are jointly developing plans to secure what is believed to be Syria’s vast stockpile of chemical and biological weapons, U.S. and Arab officials briefed on the discussions said.”
  2. “The groundwork comes amid mounting concerns that Damascus’s arsenal of nerve agents and mustard gas might go loose due to the country’s growing instability. One plan would call for Jordanian special operations units, acting as part of any broader Arab League peacekeeping mission, to go into Syria to secure nearly a dozen sites thought to contain weapons, these officials said.”
  3. “A high-level delegation of Jordanian defense officials visited the Pentagon late last month to discuss the threat of Syrian weapons of mass destruction and other security issues, officials from both governments said. U.S. officials stressed that Washington and Amman don’t foresee unilateral commando raids inside Syria, due to the potential for direct conflict with President Bashar al-Assad’s security forces. But they said that locating and securing the sites will be a central part of any peacekeeping mission that is eventually allowed into the country.”
  4. “Anything of that nature has to be done in a permissive environment,” said a senior U.S. official briefed on the discussions with the Jordanians. “No one is going to want to fight their way in through bad stuff, like chem and bio weapons.”
  5. “Syria is believed to have one of the world’s largest stockpiles of chemical weapons and is one of only seven nations that didn’t sign the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention, the arms-control agreement that outlaws the production, stockpiling and use of such weapons. Other non-signatories include Israel, North Korea, Myanmar and Egypt. Over the past four decades, Syria amassed vast supplies of mustard gas, sarin nerve agent and cyanide, according to declassified reports by the Central Intelligence Agency. Significant quantities of these chemical agents are believed to have been weaponized by the Syrian government in artillery shells, bombs and possibly Scud and SS-21 missiles. Russia, North Korea, Egypt and Iran are among the countries that have assisted Damascus in developing these weapons, current and former U.S. officials say.”
  6. “Experts on Syria’s weapons program said the chemical and biological agents are developed and stored in nearly a dozen sites, largely in northern and central Syria. Some are in cities currently racked by violence, such as Hama and Homs.”
  7. “The Obama administration and its allies have also been seeking to glean more insights into the extent of Syria’s purported chemical weapons program through the use of satellites and interviews with defecting Syrian soldiers. Increasingly high-level officers from the Syrian army have crossed into Turkey and Lebanon to organize against Mr. Assad.”
  8. “The Pentagon believes, though, that Damascus’s arsenal is likely controlled by Mr. Assad’s closest allies. U.S. officials this week said there are no indications that Mr. Assad’s security forces are prepared to use these weapons against Damascus’s political opponents, or that they have gone loose.”
  9. “But the Obama administration increasingly believes the Assad regime will eventually fall. Syria’s neighbors, in particular Jordan and Turkey, have told U.S. officials they are worried about what would become of the weapons under such a scenario. The Turkish and Jordanian officials expressed concern that elements of the Syrian opposition have ties to al Qaeda and other terrorist groups and could seek to use the weapons in terror attacks around the Mideast, a U.S. official said.”
  10. “If left unsecured, it would be, potentially, a very serious threat in the hands of . . . Lebanese Hezbollah,” Adm. William McRaven, head of the U.S. Special Operations Command, told a congressional committee Wednesday. “I think that it’s going to take an international effort when Assad falls — and he will fall — in order to secure these weapons.”
  11. “Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has held extensive discussions on the Syrian WMD threat with President Barack Obama and his national-security adviser, Thomas Donilon, in recent weeks, officials from both governments said. Israel’s government is concerned about militant groups obtaining the weapons and using them to threaten the Jewish state. The Obama administration is coordinating particularly closely with Jordan because of its proximity to Syria and Amman’s strong intelligence and commando capabilities. Jordan also has a history of cooperating with U.S. special-operations teams.”

WMD, Chemical, Syria, U.S. Foreign Policy


Farwell, James P. “Syria’s WMD Threat” 5 April 2012, TheNationalInterest, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/syrias-wmd-threat-6737, Last Checked 8 April 2012.

  1. “Buoyed by the loyalty of his Alawite community, Bashar al-Assad has acted ruthlessly to crush dissent in Syria. His brutality has outraged the international community, but that has not deterred Assad. And the worst may lie ahead.”
  2. “Although fears of Iraq’s chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRNE) capability were also questioned, the Syria situation is different. No one doubts that Syria possesses a modern chemical-weapons capability and thousands of rockets capable of downing passenger aircraft.”
  3. “Syria’s past behavior is disturbing. It is a non-nuclear-weapon state, party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and it has a comprehensive nuclear-safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Yet after Israel destroyed what was probably a plutonium-production reactor at al-Kibar in 2007, an IAEA investigation found Syria had breached its obligations under the NPT.”
  4. “More recently, Lt. Abdulselam Abdulrezzak, who once worked in Syria’s chemical-weapons department, made (unverified) claims that chemical weapons were employed in Bab Amr against protesters.”
  5. “All this points to a shared international interest in containing Assad’s CBRNE arsenal. Using these weapons against his own citizens would constitute a war crime. And the weapons falling into the hands of terrorist groups would enlarge the threat.”
  6. “The nonpartisan Nuclear Threat Initiative assesses that Syria has one of the most sophisticated chemical-warfare capabilities in the world. It has mustard gas and sarin, possibly the VX nerve agent and Scud-B and Scud-D ballistic missiles capable of being fitted with chemical warheads. Some estimate it holds between one hundred and two hundred Scud missiles already loaded with a sarin agent and has several hundred tons of sarin agent and mustard gas stockpiled that could be used for aircraft bombs or artillery shells.”
  7. “It is one of only eight nations that is not a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention outlawing the production, possession and use of chemical weapons. Its agents are weaponized and can be delivered. Although most believe that the arsenal is in working order, we should not presume that is true. It could possibly be in a significant state of deterioration, which would intensify the hazard and suggest it must be dealt with sooner rather than later.”
  8. “Reports differ as to Syria’s biological-warfare capability. German and Israeli sources believe it possesses bacillus anthracis (which causes anthrax), botulinum toxin and ricin. American sources believe the capability is “probable.” In 1972, Syria signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, but it has never ratified it.”
  9. “The international community seems prepared to act. Russia, which values Syria as an arms customer and worries Assad’s fall would reduce its influence in the Middle East, has taken pains to separate itself from Assad’s possible use of WMDs, strongly denying that it has helped Syrian forces use chemical weapons against the opposition. Even while aiding Syrian efforts to crush the protests, Iran denies transferring chemical weapons to any third party.”
  10. “The U.S. State Department has sent a diplomatic demarche to Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia warning against the possibilities that WMDs may cross their borders. In August, the Wall Street Journal revealed that the United States and its Mideast allies were intensifying surveillance of Syrian chemical and biological depots through satellites and other equipment. The United States has offered to help any post-Assad government secure Syria’s stockpiles of chemical weapons and anti-aircraft missiles.”
  11. “Potential loss of control over WMDs may pose a threat, considering the terror groups that would like to get their hands on them. Col. Riad al-As’ad, head of the opposition Free Syrian Army, says al-Qaeda is not operating in Syria. But al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has reportedly ordered followers to infiltrate the Syrian opposition. Sunni radicals associated with the Islamic State of Iraq, an umbrella group that includes al-Qaeda, have urged fighters to go to Syria. And one should not doubt al-Qaeda’s determination to acquire WMDs—Osama bin Laden once professed that acquiring chemical or nuclear weapons is “a religious duty.”
  12. “WMDs could be smuggled into Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, the West Bank or elsewhere. In the past, Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have all attempted to acquire chemical or biological weapons. In a sign of precisely how destabilizing some view this threat, Israeli officials have warned that Syria transferring chemical weapons to Hezbollah would constitute a declaration of war.”
  13. “The Friends of Syria, a coalition of over fifty nations that has met in Tunis to discuss forming an international peacekeeping force backed by U.S., EU and Gulf-nation airpower, should ratchet up pressure on Assad to step down. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and other Islamic nations have clamored for ousting Assad. That’s a promising sign. Arab nations, not the West, should take the lead in dealing with Assad’s brutality.”
  14. “Securing Syria’s CBRNE arsenal poses a uniquely serious challenge. NATO, Russia and China should join these Arab nations in demanding that Assad immediately secure his stockpile, then show he has done so.”
  15. “President Obama has said the United States won’t commit troops to a military intervention. But there are other options. Allied partners could mount coordinated special operations to secure or destroy Assad’s arsenal.”
  16. “Whether it is better to mount such an operation before or after Assad falls is a decision for military and political experts. But international leaders must think through the options and be prepared to act. All nations—but particularly those in the neighborhood—have a vital stake in containing these instruments of death and destruction. Now is the time for them to exert the leadership to ensure that happens.”

WMD, Bioterrorism, Nuclear, al-Qaeda, Military, Chemical, Syria, U.S. Foreign Policy





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