North Korea

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2003

Oppenheimer, AndyCBRN Weapons: The Growing ThreatNATO’s Nations & Partners for Peace, Volume 48 Issue 3. Pages 14-23. 2003

  1. “Before and since the September 11 attacks, evidence has mounted that terrorist groups and terrorist-sponsoring nations are developing or acquiring CBRN capabilities.” – page 16
  2. “North Korea created an international crisis in late 2002, when an official admitted to a US envoy that his country had restarted a programme to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU)” – page 16
  3. “The crisis gathered pace when North Korea withdrew from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); expelled inspectors from the United Nations-backed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and announced it had restarted its nuclear reprocessing plant at Yongbyon to produce plutonium.” – page 16
  4. “The world’s attention is now on Iran, on which pressure is mounting from not just the US, but also from the UN, the EU, and Russia, to sign an Additional Protocol to the NPT to allow the IAEA more access to Iran’s nuclear sites.” – page 16
  5. “…Iranians continue to insist that they are developing a nuclear power industry only, claiming it needs to save its vast oil reserves for export.” – page 16
  6. “The actions of North Korea and Iran threaten to consign the NPT to history if they continue in their current nuclear direction.” – page 17
  7. “Iran also has a well-established CBW (chemical and biological weapons) programme… it has stocks of up to 2,000 tonnes of weaponized CW agents, including choking, blister, and blood agents. The US believes that Iran has also produced the nerve agent Sarin.” – page 17
  8. “Syria is believed to have one of the developing world’s most extensive CW programmes, having allegedly received CW assistance and chemical agents from Egypt in the 1970s, and by 1986 had an indigenous capability to produce and weaponise sarin and VX nerve agents, and mustard blister agent.” – page 17
  9. “Unlike several of its Arab neighbors (Iran, Iraq, and Libya), Syria has never tested CW.” – page 17

NPT, WMD, Export Control, Iran, North Korea, Syria

 

Editors, “Practicing to ProvokeThe Economist Newspaper Limited, 20 September 2003, Vol. 368, Issue 8342.

  1. “Ships and aircraft gathered in the Coral Sea off Australia’s Queensland coast for Operation Pacific Protector to rehearse the tracking and boarding of ships suspected of carrying cargoes that could be used in making weapons of mass destruction.”
  2. “North Korea, whose proliferation activities–selling drugs, counterfeit dollars and missiles in order to finance imports of technology and equipment for its nuclear, chemical or biological weapons–make it a prime target for such stop-and-search tactics.”
  3. “North Korea, for example, finding its ships under uncomfortably close watch, is now thought to rely more on air routes across China to the Middle East to ply its weapons-related trade.”
  4. “The UN Security Council may be asked to endorse new restrictions on trade in certain goods and technologies. But for now the emphasis is on tightening existing laws and enforcing them more rigorously.”

PSI, North Korea

2004

Byers, Michael, “Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security InitiativeThe American Journal of International Law, Vol. 98, No. 3 (July, 2004), pp. 526-545.

  1. “Much of PSI involves nothing more than the consistent and rigorous application of existing rights under national and international law. Concurrently, the initiative promotes the development of new legal authorities by way of bilateral and multilateral treaties.” Pg. 528
  2. “A ship may be forcibly boarded on the high seas if it is reasonably suspected of engaging in piracy or the slave trade; lacks a flag (i.e., a single country of registration); or is broadcasting in an unauthorized manner toward, or is registered in, the state that wishes to board.” Pg. 527
  3. “Ships flagged by non-consenting states may be searched when in foreign harbors if reasonably suspected to be carrying armaments that have not been declared.” Pg. 531
  4. “In certain circumstances, customary international law might already allow for the high seas interdiction of suspected WMD or missile-laden vessels flagged by non-consenting states. These circumstances could arise when the vessel posed an imminent threat, either to the interdicting state or to a third state that requested the interdiction.” Pg. 532
  5. “The problem of non-consenting states such as North Korea will remain, leaving those wishing to take high seas action against vessels flying such flags with three options: securing a United Nations Security Council resolution that authorizes interdiction; claiming that the vessels pose a threat that falls within the scope of an existing, or evolving, customary international law right of preemptive self-defense; or simply violating international law.” Pg. 528
  6. “States may choose to breach the rules without advancing strained and potentially destabilizing legal justifications. By doing so, they allow their action to be assessed subsequently, not in terms of the law, but in terms of its political and moral legitimacy, with a view to mitigating their responsibility rather than exculpating themselves.” Pg. 543

PSI, Law Enforcement, WMD, North Korea

2005

Cotton, James, “The Proliferation Security Initiative and North Korea: Legality and Limitations of a Coalition StrategySecurity Dialogue, Vol. 36 Issue 2, pg. 193-211, June 2005.

  1. “Under current norms, the export of missiles by non-MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) countries to non-MTCR recipients does not violate any international agreements or obligations.” Pg. 197
  2. “The PSI lacks sufficient basis in international law to legitimize the interdiction of alleged North Korean WMD and weapons shipments on likely shipping routes.”  Pg. 208
  3. “The vessels in question will most likely be North Korean flagged and will avoid state jurisdictions where these activities may be subject to challenge.” Pg. 197
  4. “If the USA comes to determine that the threat posed by North Korean proliferation is now so great that it cannot await changes to international law or specific UN endorsement, Washington may well seek the backing of a like-minded coalition for more stringent action.” Pg. 204
  5. “It is not yet possible to reconcile the ambitious intentions of the PSI with current international law and practice. Further cooperation with key states will be necessary, and a specific UN Security Council endorsement will be required.” Pg. 201
  6. “If it is supposed that the PSI is especially applicable to North Korea, then any program to restrict the movement of goods in and out of North Korea would require the active cooperation of China and South Korea, given the extensive use of Chinese ports and railways by North Korean commercial entities, and also the extensive and poorly regulated inter-Korean trade.” Pg. 196
  7. “The formation of a truly effective PSI coalition would require the full participation of South Korea. This is the case not only for reasons of geography and because US air and naval units would most likely need to operate from or use bases in South Korean territory, but also because since 2000 South Korea has emerged as North Korea’s most important trading partner and because there have even been some tentative agreements between Seoul and Pyongyang to permit shipping from the North to use South Korean territorial waters.” Pg. 206-207
    *“Only with regime change in Pyongyang will the danger North Korea poses both to the USA and to world order be removed. This is held to be the case since ‘rogue’ regimes do not necessarily operate according to the conventional canons of deterrence, nor can they be trusted not to pass WMDs to terrorists.” Pg. 205

PSI, Jurisdiction, WMD, North Korea, South Korea, China

2008

Schmitt, Eric, “Panel Fears Use of Unconventioanl Weapon,” NYT, A 11, Dec. 1, 2008. http://www.preventwmd.gov/report/

  1. “An independent commission has concluded that terrorists will most likely carry out an attack with biological, nuclear or other unconventional weapons somewhere in the world in the next five years unless the United States and its allies act urgently to prevent that.”
  2. “the Congressionally mandated panel found that with countries like Iran and North Korea pursuing nuclear weapons programs, and with the risk of poorly secured biological pathogens growing, unconventional threats are fast outpacing the defenses arrayed to confront them.”
  3. “The report is the result of a six month study by the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism.”
  4. “[recommendations include] improved bioforensic capabilities, and strengthening international organizations, like the International Atomic Energy Agency, to address the nuclear threat.  It also calls for a comprehensive approach for dealing with Pakistan.”
  5. “The report calls for conducting a major review of the program to secure dangerous pathogens and tighten oversight of high-containment laboraties.”

Bioterrorism, WMD, Biosecurity, Nonproliferation, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan

 

Delury, JohnNorth Korea: 20 Years of SolitudeWorld Policy Journal Volume 25, Issue 4. Pages 75-82. Winter 2008

  1. “The current framework for dealing with North Korea evolved back in the late 1980s in the wake of two game-changing developments: the end of the Cold War and the birth of the North Korean nuclear weapons program” – page 75
  2. “The last two decades have shown that neither isolating North Korea nor halfheartedly negotiating with Pyongyang works. Instead, North Korea stands as one of the most striking failures of post–Cold War U.S. foreign policy” – page 76
  3. “…my suggestion would be for the Obama administration to dispatch a peace mission to Pyongyang. Vice President Joe Biden has a long record of working on the Korean issue, and might be a good candidate to act as the senior American emissary” – page 77
  4. “Biden would initiate substantive peace talks, including the establishment of a U.S. Liaison Office in Pyongyang. Biden could also pave the way for Pyongyang to do the same in Washington.”- page 77
  5. “The liaison offices would be initial steps in a broader initiative to peel away legal restrictions on travel and commerce between the two countries, with requisite care to restrict drug, counterfeit, and arms trade” – page 77
  6. “We are likely to see Beijing playing a steady, supportive role in the Korean peace initiative” – page 78
  7. “President Obama’s immediate task is to keep that positive momentum going, and enlist Beijing’s leadership in transforming the Six Party Talks into the Korean Peace Process.” – page 79
  8. “The conservative government in Seoul leans toward a “tough” line on the North, and Pyongyang has reciprocated with relentless invective against President Lee Myung-bak since his inauguration in February. This poses an obvious and immediate problem for the United States, as it is crucial to align our peace initiative with the democratically elected government in Seoul” – page 80
  9. “In brokering a peace, we should look for opportunities to nurture the economic synergy between the North, which is rich in mineral resources and cheap labor, with South Korea’s strengths in agriculture, exports, and services.” – page 80
  10. “Involving Japan in the endeavor to alter North Korean relations may prove trickiest of all. Prime Minister Taro Aso is a long standing hawk on North Korea. Japanese public opinion also continues to harden, centering on two concerns—the abduction issue and the security threat.” – page 81
  11. “The solution to the myriad problems created by North Korea’s long isolation is, quite simply, to end the isolation” – page 82
  12. “…a middle course of robust, determined engagement, embracing the bilateral relationship while coordinating the multilateral diplomacy, has the potential to reverse 20 years of failed foreign policy.” – page 82

Nuclear, North Korea, U.S. Foreign Policy, Export Control

2009

Kerr, Simeon,  & Morris, Harvey, Financial Times, August 29, 2009, p. 4.

  1. “The United Arab Emirates has seized a ship secretly carrying embargoed North Korean arms to Iran, say diplomats.”
  2. ”The UAE reported the seizure to the UN sanctions committee responsible for vetting the implementation of measures, including an arms embargo, imposed against North Korea under Security Council resolution 1874…”
  3. ”A UN diplomat whose country is represented on the sanctions committee said the UAE reported the ship was carrying 10 containers of weapons and related items, including rocket-propelled grenades and ammunition. He said the consignment had been ordered by Iran’s TSS, a company said to be linked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and previously subject to international bans on importing weapons-related items.”
  4. ”The vessel, identified by diplomats as the Bahamian-flagged ANL-Australia, … The UN sanctions committee has written to the Iranian and North Korean governments pointing out that the shipment puts them in violation of UN resolution 1874.”
  5. ”The UN resolution, adopted following North Korea’s second nuclear test in May, extended an existing ban on the transfer of heavy weapons and nuclear and missile-related technology to cover all arms exports by Pyongyang.”
    *” The binding resolution authorises states to seize and dispose of items that break the embargo. The resolution also requires states to report to the committee on what action they are taking to implement sanctions.”
  6. ”While most focus is on dual-use technology, diplomats said the clampdown on public dissent after Iran’s contested elections had also raised concerns about supplies of arms to state-linked militias.”

United Arab Emirates, Iran, North KoreaUNSCR 1874, Dual Use, PSI, UN, Australia

2010

Sanger, David, E., Baker, Peter, “Obama to Adopt Narrowed Stand on Nuclear Arms,” NYT, A1, April 6, 2010.

  1. “Mr. Obama described his policy as part of a broader effort to edge the world toward making nuclear weapons obsolete, and to create incentives for countries to give up any nuclear ambitions.”
  2. “[Obama] seeks to reshape the nation’s nuclear posture for a new age in which rogue states and terrorist organizations are greater threats than tradition al powers like Russia and China.”
  3. “For the first time, the United States is explicitly committing not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, even if they attacked the United States with biological or chemical weapons or launched a crippling cyberattack.”
  4. “White House officials said the new strategy would include the option of reconsidering the use of nuclear retaliation against a biological attack, if development of such weapons reached a level that made the United States vulnerable to a devastating strike.”
  5. “But the President said in an interview that he was carving out an exception for ‘outliers like Iran and North Korea’ that have violated or renounced the main treaty to halt nuclear proliferation.”

Nuclear, Bioterrorism, UNSCR 1540, Nonproliferation, Iran, North Korea, Russia, China, NPT

 

Kim, Suk Kyoon, “Korean Peninsula Maritime Issues,”  Ocean Development & International Law, pp 166-185, May 10,2010.

  1. “North Korea, in response, issued a bellicose statement and warned of military provocations against South Korea. ‘We will regard South Korea’s participation in the PSI as a declaration of war against us, and accordingly respond to any hostile acts against our vessels,with a prompt and powerful strike; our army will be no longer bound by the Armistice Agreement and hence legally the Korean Peninsula turns into a state of war and our revolutionary forces will act accordingly; the legal status of South Korea’s five West Islands (Paekryungdo, Daechungdo, Sochungdo,Yeonpyungdo,Woodo) off the maritime border in theWest Sea and the security of vessels off the islands, including naval ships of South Korea, cannot be assured.'” p179
  2. “The South Korean government had wavered on fully joining the PSI given the volatile and unique security situation on the Korean Peninsula.” p. 180
  3. “Because of requests from the United States and others in the international community to join the PSI since South Korea’s participation was considered vital to the success of PSI in relation to North Korea, South Korea agreed to participate in some limited areas: to add an interdiction exercise to joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States, to be briefed about activities concerning the PSI and interdiction exercises, and to send observers to PSI exercises. However, South Korea wavered over providing material assistance to interdiction exercises and becoming a full participant in the PSI.” p.180

PSI, South Korea, North Korea

 

Norris, Robert. “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945–2010“. The Bulletin Of Atomic Scientists. July 2010.

  1. “Nuclear weapon states shield details about their arsenals and generally have only imprecise knowledge about the size and composition of other countries’ inventories; this creates uncertainty, mistrust, and misunderstandings.” (Page 1)
  2. “We estimate that the world’s nine nuclear weapon states possess nearly 22,400 intact nuclear warheads. The vast majority of these weapons—approximately 95 percent—are in the U.S. and Russian arsenals. Nearly 8,000 warheads—nearly one-third of the worldwide total—are operational to some degree (not necessarily fully operational) and ready to launch on relatively short notice.” (Page 1)
  3. “India and Pakistan have a combined total of approximately 150 nuclear warheads, just a few more than what is carried on a single U.S. Trident submarine.” (Page 1)
  4. “We calculate that more than 128,000 nuclear warheads were built since 1945, all but 2 percent by the United States (55 percent) and the Soviet Union/Russia (43 percent).” (Page 2)
  5. “Of the more than 70,000 warheads that the United States has produced since 1945, more than 60,000 have been disassembled—more than 13,000 of these since 1990. However, the United States has retained nearly 14,000 plutonium cores (pits) from its dismantled warheads, storing them at the Pantex Plant.” (Page 3)
  6. “Russia has been decreasing its deployed/operational forces, and at the same time it has been reducing its number of intact warheads via an ongoing dismantlement effort.” (Page 3)
  7. “The majority of India’s and Pakistan’s warheads are not yet operationally deployed. Both countries are believed to be increasing their stockpiles.” (Page 4)
  8. “Despite two nuclear tests and production of enough plutonium for 8–12 nuclear bombs, North Korea has yet to demonstrate that it has operationalized any weapons.” (Page 4-6)
  9. “Yet eight of the nine nuclear weapon states continue to produce new or modernized nuclear weapons, and all nine insist that nuclear weapons are essential for their national security.” (Page 6)

Nuclear, Russia, Pakistan, North Korea, China

 

Editors, “War in the fifth domain”, 3 July 2010 Economist Last checked March 8, 2011.

  1. “After land, sea, air and space, warfare has entered the fifth domain: cyberspace.”
  2. “Mandate is to conduct ‘“full-spectrum”’ operations—to defend American military networks and attack other countries’ systems.”
  3. “Britain, too, has set up a cyber-security policy outfit, and an “operations centre” based in GCHQ, the British equivalent of the NSA.”
  4. “Many other countries are organizing for cyberwar, among them Russia, Israel, and North Korea.”
  5. “Cyber-security, envisages a catastrophic breakdown within 15 minutes.”
  6. “The effects of full-blown cyberwar are much like nuclear attack.”
  7. “Growing dependence on computers increases the harm they can cause.”
  8. “Weakly governed swathes of Africa are being connected up to fibre-optic cables, potentially creating new havens for cyber-criminals.”
  9. “Mr Obama has quoted a figure of $1 trillion lost last year to cybercrime–a bigger underworld than the drugs trade…”
  10. “The ostentatious hackers and virus-writers who once wrecked computers for fun are all but gone, replaced by criminal gangs seeking to harvest data.”
  11. ‘“given enough time, motivation and funding, a determined adversary will always–always–be able to penetrate a targeted system.”’
  12. “China,… wholesale espionage, attacking the computers of… Western defence contractors … taking classified details of the F-35 fighter, …”
  13. “Western spooks think China deploys the most assiduous, and most shameless, cyberspies, but Russian ones are probably more skilled and subtle.”
  14. “Deterrence in cyber-warfare is more uncertain than, say, in nuclear strategy: there is no mutually assured destruction, the dividing line between criminality and war is blurred…”

Cybersecurity, China, Africa, Russia, North Korea, Israel

 

Sang-Hun, Choe, “North Korea Seizes South Korean Boat Near Border“, 8 August 2010, New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/09/world/asia/09boat.html?_r=1 Last Checked 28 October 2010.

  1. “North Korea seized a South Korean squidding boat in waters near their eastern sea border.”
  2. “The South Korean squid ship left Pohang, a port on the east coast of South Korea, on Aug. 1 and was scheduled to return to port on Sept. 10. It made its last daily radio report to the South Korean Coast Guard on Saturday evening.”
  3. “The 41-ton boat was believed to have been detained after entering the North’s exclusive economic zone, where foreign fishing boats are banned.”
  4. “The boat was being towed to Songjin, a port on the eastern coast of North Korea, for interrogation of the crew. Then the communication was cut off, coast guard officials said.”
  5. “Fishing boats from either side have occasionally drifted into the other’s waters, often after engine trouble. How fast they were released often depended on the tenor of bilateral relations at the time.”

PSI, Jurisdiction, South Korea, North Korea

 

Lieggi, Stephanie; Shaw, Robert; and Toki, Masako. “Taking Control: Stopping North Korean WMD-Related ProcurementBulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 66, issue 5. Pages 21-34. September 2010

  1. “Last year, when two Japan-based traders were convicted for attempting to illegally transport sensitive materials, a larger story unraveled – one that illuminated North Korea’s efforts to obtain technology related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).” – page 21
  2. “Historically, the country acquired much of its WMD-related technology and training from abroad, particularly China and the Soviet Union. Today, North Korea’s procurement network employ a sophisticated mix of front companies, brokers, and transshipment strategies.” –page 21
  3. “Since the early 1950’s, North Korea has both legally and illegally sought to acquire advanced technology and commodities from Japanese entities to improve its military capability.” – page 22
  4. “Pyongyang’s (capitol of North Korea) missile business has developed into an important source of revenue – ranging from #300 million to $1.5 billion annually, according to some estimates – and North Korea has traded missile technology with many countries, including Pakistan, Iran, Syria, and Yemen.” – page 23
  5. “The export violations incidents in Japan involving Toko Boeki and Tadao Morita occurred after the U.N. Security Council passed resolutions in July and October 2006 sanctioning North Korea, and after Tokyo consequently expanded its list of items under embargo to Pyongyang.’ – page 23
  6. “…Japans ‘catch-all’ controls, which mandate a license requirement for certain destination countries if an export is likely to support development of WMD, even if the item is not specifically mentioned on domestic controls list” – page 23
  7. “In early 2009, police in Kanagawa, a suburb of Tokyo, raided the offices of trading company Toko Boeki after the firm attempted to export a magnetometer (a device used to measure magnetic fields) to Myanmar in September 2008 and again in January 2009.” – page 23
  8. “Japanese authorities determined a magnetometer to be a useful tool in the development of magnets critical to the operation of some missile guidance systems, and police suspected a link to North Korea’s missile development programs” – page 23
  9. “The investigation led to the June 2009 arrest – and eventual indictment – of Toko Boeki’s founder and president, Li Gyeong Ho, for his attempts to dodge Japan’s catch-all controls.” – page 23
  10. “Li pleaded guilty and received a prison sentence of two years, matching the request of the prosecutors. However, the sentence was suspended for four years, highlighting Japan’s problem with lenient sentences for proliferation-related offenses. Additionally, Li’s company, Toko Boeki, was fined about $68,000 (6 million yen)” page 25
  11. “In addition to the criminal penalties, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) imposed a complete seven month export ban on both Li and his company.” – page 25
  12. “In May 2009, police in Hyogo, a suburb outside Kyoto, arrested Chong Rin Chae (Tadao Morita), a South Korean resident, for attempting to illegally export two tanker trucks from Japan to North Korea via South Korea.” – page 25
  13. “In July 2009, Morita pleaded guilty to export control violations involving the tanker trucks and the luxury goods and was sentenced to a suspended three-year prison term. His company was also assessed a fine of approximately $55,000 (5 million yen).”- page 26
  14. “In January 2010, six months after Morita’s criminal conviction, METI also imposed a 16-month export ban on Morita and his company” – page 27
  15. “Since METI’s 2002 implementation of catch-all controls, the Japanese government has strengthened legal and administrative provisions specific to curbing the spread of WMD – a process accelerated by North Korea’s recent nuclear and missile tests.” – page 27
  16. “Last year, Japan amended its Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade law, which increased the maximum penalty for export control violations from five to seven years. If a violation involves WMD-related items, however, then the maximum penalty is 10 years” – page 27
  17. “The use of front companies and transshipment destinations reveals a network continuously evolving in response to U.N. sanctions and increased nonproliferation-focused export controls of supplier countries like Japan” – page 30

Export Control, Japan, North Korea, WMD, Military, Nonproliferation, UN

 

Editors, “Experts Meet Ahead of Naval Drills in S. Korea“, 13 October 2010, Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/13/experts-meet-ahead-naval-drills-s-korea/ Last Checked 13 October 2010

  1. “South Korea launched its participation Wednesday in a U.S.-led coalition to intercept ships suspected of spreading weapons of mass destruction, risking the anger of rival North Korea, one of the countries targeted by the program.”
  2. “Seoul said last year it was joining the maritime web after the North conducted its second atomic test.”
  3. “South Korea was hosting a seminar Wednesday among 15 participating nations in the southeastern city of Busan, to be followed Thursday with naval interdiction drills involving South Korea, the United States, Australia and Japan in international waters between South Korea and Japan.”
  4. “The drills also come amid lingering tension on the divided Korean peninsula following the deadly sinking in March of a South Korean warship blamed on Pyongyang.”
  5. “North Korea long has warned it would consider Seoul’s participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative as a declaration of war against the North.”

PSI, South Korea, North Korea, WMD

 

Editors, “North Korean Uranium Plant Stokes Proliferation Worries”, 24 Novemeber 2010, Global Security Newswire http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20101124_4062.php Last Checked 26 November 2010.

  1. “It is believed that Pyongyang — further impoverished by international sanctions and in need of money — might try to support Iran’s nuclear program as the Gulf state has apparently encountered technical hurdles in its enrichment of uranium.”
  2. “In recent years, multiple North Korean-origin weapon shipments have been seized en route to Iran.”
  3. “North Korea and Iran have deepened their military ties and have cooperated in the creation of new missiles, conventional weapons and submarines.”
  4. “Pyongyang might have used China — North Korea’s historic ally and main economic benefactor — as a midshipment location for acquiring prohibited enrichment machinery, the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security said in an October report.”
  5. “Nothing suggests Beijing is ‘secretly approving or willfully ignoring exports’ that would bolster the North’s military nuclear effort, according to the report.”
  6. “London-based proliferation specialist Mark Fitzpatrick said private Chinese citizens and companies are more likely than the government to have supported Pyongyang’s equipment procurement efforts.”
  7. “A high-ranking U.S. official said Washington is aware of the North’s potential for nuclear proliferation, but asserted that heightened U.N. Security Council measures have greatly constrained the aspiring nuclear power’s capacity to move prohibited goods to outside buyers.”

PSI, Nuclear, North Korea, Iran, China

 

Broad, William; Glanz, James; Sanger, David; Lehren, AndrewIran Fortifies Its Arsenal With the Aid of North Korea”, 28 November 2010, NYTimes http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/middleeast/29missiles.html?_r=3 Last Checked 2 December 2010.

  1. “Secret American intelligence assessments have concluded that Iran has obtained a cache of advanced missiles, based on a Russian design, that are much more powerful than anything Washington has publicly conceded that Tehran has in its arsenal, diplomatic cables show.”
  2. “Fragmentary reports surfaced that North Korea might have sold Iran missiles based on a Russian design called the R-27, once used aboard Soviet submarines to carry nuclear warheads.”
  3. “The North Korean version of the advanced missile, known as the BM-25, could carry a nuclear warhead.”
  4. “Intelligence agencies believe that the complete shipment indeed took place, and that Iran is taking pains to master the technology in an attempt to build a new generation of missiles.”
  5. “The cables say that Iran not only obtained the BM-25, but also saw the advanced technology as a way to learn how to design and build a new class of more powerful engines.”
  6. “Many arms control experts concluded that isolated components made their way to Iran, but there has been little support for the idea that complete missiles, with their huge thrusters, had been secretly shipped.”
  7. “The missile intelligence also suggests far deeper military — and perhaps nuclear — cooperation between North Korea and Iran than was previously known.”

PSI, Nuclear, North Korea, Iran

 

Pomfret, JohnU.S. Asked China to Stop Missile Parts Shipment to Iran”, 29 November 2010, Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/28/AR2010112804391.html Last Checked 1 December 2010.

  1. “U.S. officials have long accused China of failing to crack down on proliferation activities that occur on its territory.”
  2. “For decades, China was a major proliferator of missiles itself, but that activity seemed to slow in the 1990s under U.S. pressure.”
  3. “The United States asked China in 2007 to stop a shipment of ballistic missile parts going from North Korea to Iran through Beijing and indicated that the U.S. government was fed up with China’s unwillingness to crack down on such trade, according to reports Sunday based on U.S. diplomatic cables.”
  4. “Another cable highlighted U.S. concern this year that Chinese firms were supplying North Korea with precursors for chemical weapons – in what would be a violation of U.N. sanctions.”
  5. “In May, Clinton said the United States was concerned that exports by named Chinese firms ‘could be used for or diverted to a CW [chemical weapons] program.’”
  6. “Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton continued to pressure China on proliferation issues, this time because it was apparently turning a blind eye to its own companies.”
  7. “China passed export control laws, but Beijing has rarely, according to U.S. officials and the cables revealed Sunday, actively worked to stop proliferation from occurring on its territory.”

NonproliferationPSI, Nuclear, North Korea, Iran

 

Gordon, Michael and Lehren, Andrew, “U.S. Strains to Stop Arms Flow”, 6 December 2010, NYT http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/world/07wikileaks-weapons.html?_r=2&emc=na Last Checked 12 December 2010.

  1. “Just a week after President Bashar al-Assad of Syria  assured a top State Department official that his government was not sending sophisticated weapons to Hezbollah, the Obama administration lodged a confidential protest accusing Syria of doing precisely what it had denied doing.”
  2. “Wielding surveillance photos and sales contracts, American diplomats have confronted foreign governments about shadowy front companies, secretive banks and shippers around the globe.”
  3. “American officials have tried to block a Serbian black marketer from selling sniper rifles to Yemen. They have sought to disrupt the sale of Chinese missile technology to Pakistan, the cables show, and questioned Indian officials about chemical industry exports that could be used to make poison gas.”
  4. “American diplomats have repeatedly expressed concern that huge cargo planes operated by Badr Airlines of Sudan were flying weapons from Tehran to Khartoum, Sudan, where they were shipped to Hamas, the militant group in Gaza.”
  5. “Sudan insisted that the cargo was farm equipment, but the United States asked countries in the region to deny overflight rights to the airlines. Jordan and several other countries agreed, but Yemen declined.”
  6. “Iran not only was providing $25 million a month to support Hamas but also was linked to a Hezbollah cell trying to smuggle arms from Gaza into Egypt.”
  7. “North Korea has abetted the arms race in the Middle East by providing missile technology to Iran and Syria, which then backed Hamas and Hezbollah.”
  8. “North Korea’s arms industry has conducted many of its transactions through the Korea Mining and Development Corporation, relied on suppliers of machinery and steel from countries including Switzerland, Japan, China and Taiwan, passed money through Chinese and Hong Kong banks and sold weapons to other countries.”
  9. “The newly fortified Hezbollah has raised fears that any future conflict with Israel could erupt into a full-scale regional war.”
  10. “To disrupt the transactions, American officials have prodded and protested. Diplomats raised questions in the spring of 2009, for example, about planned purchases from North Korea of rocket launchers by Sri Lanka and Scud missile launchers by Yemen.”
  11. “The Syrian episode offers a glimpse of the United States’ efforts to prevent buildups of arms — including Scud missiles, Soviet-era tanks and antiaircraft weapons — in some of the world’s tensest regions.”

PSI, U.S. Foreign Policy, Israel, North Korea, China, Iran

 

Editors, “Obama Presses China to Curb North Korea”, 6 December 2010, Global Security Newswire http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20101206_1522.php Last Checked 23 December 2010.

  1. “The United States has stepped up criticism of Chinese policy toward North Korea.”
  2. “Obama administration officials in recent meetings have criticized Chinese representatives for ignoring North Korea’s flouting of U.N. Security Council resolutions, global commitments and the 1953 armistice agreement with South Korea.”
  3. “Beijing is ‘enabling’ the aspiring nuclear power’s work on uranium enrichment and its military strikes on South Korea.”
  4. “An early version of a joint statement from today’s trilateral meeting would have the three nations denounce the artillery strike and call on Beijing to pressure Pyongyang to meet ‘responsibilities that had been set in the six-party talks.’”
  5. “U.S. Secretary of State Clinton on Friday voiced worries that the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran could lead to arms buildups in their respective regions.”

U.S. Foreign Policy, Nuclear, PSI, China, North Korea

 

Katz, Lee, “Counterproliferation Program Gains Traction, But Results Remain a Mystery”, 10 December 2010, Global Security Newswire http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20101208_8526.php, Last Checked 10 December 2010.

  1. “The U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative has recently gained key allied help in the ongoing battle to curb North Korea and other would-be proliferators. However, details of its contribution to the global effort to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction remain a closely held secret.”
  2. “South Korea has stepped up its participation to become a major partner in the initiative.”
  3. “October PSI naval exercises in South Korean waters along with a conference last month in the critical region have bolstered the program’s efforts to deter or intercept the illicit movement of unconventional weapons. The situation has so rattled North Korea that the regime warned any actual interception of one of its ships would be considered an act of war.”
  4. “Still, critics say that some vital nations, including China, a major power that has been linked to WMD material proliferation, are absent from the program.”
  5. “Beijing fears that signing on to the program would imply ‘you would allow the U.S. to undertake such actions as necessary in your waters. And that’s the last thing that China wants.’”
  6. “China says its refusal to participate is based on the fact that it considers PSI interdictions illegal under international law.”
  7. “While President Obama has taken a different approach on nuclear and other issues than his predecessor, both the Obama and Bush administrations have promoted the Proliferation Security Initiative as a way to globalize the fight against WMD proliferation.”
  8. “Obama administration officials say the Proliferation Security Initiative is part of a global effort that includes U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, aimed at denying terrorists access to WMD materials. There is an active Resolution 1540 committee at the United Nations to monitor nonproliferation efforts.”
  9. “The Obama administration’s aim is to make the program ‘an enduring effort’ without adding an international bureaucracy, according to the Pentagon official. ‘There’s a need to maintain the voluntary and flexible nature of what everybody signed up to,’ he said, ‘while providing some leadership.’”
  10. “Of the PSI participants, 21 member states form the core of the organization called the Operational Experts Group. These include: Australia, France, Japan, Russia, Singapore, the United Kingdom and United States. South Korea joined the leadership group last month, adding impetus to an experts group meeting in Japan.”
  11. “A joint report by the Defense and State departments to Congress obtained by Global Security Newswire says ‘the U.S. government anticipates participating in seven to 12 U.S.-hosted and foreign hosted’ PSI-related exercises in fiscal 2011-2013.”
  12. “By having nations practice seizing material, PSI exercises such as the recent trials in South Korea can hold value for future WMD challenges. ‘These guys get out there and work together,’ Joseph said. ‘You have Australian and Japanese and now South Korean vessels working alongside American ships. You build important and lasting relationships that way.’”
  13. “Yet the initiative’s actual effectiveness and cost of is hard to measure. The clandestine nature of actual PSI operations along with its loose organization makes it hard for even its supporters to point to actual results or specific dollar costs.”
  14. “With caveats on the difficulty of pinning down actual costs, the report projects PSI spending at slightly less than $1 million dollars annually. Projected spending ranges from $900,000 to $996,000 per year from fiscal 2011 to 2013.”
  15. “‘Quite frankly, there’s no single budget line for PSI,’ said a Pentagon official. ‘A lot of the activities … are sort of integrated with other budgets.’”

PSI, WMD, UNSCR 1540, South Korea, China, North Korea

2011

Editors, “U.S. Fears Chinese Firms Selling WMD Materials to Iran, North Korea” 3 February 2011, Global Security Newswire http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110203_8986.php Last Checked 5 February 2011.

  1. “Recently leaked U.S. cables detail Washington’s worries that Chinese firms in recent years had exported goods to Iran that could be used to produce weapons of mass destruction.”
  2. “U.S. intelligence believed a Chinese branch of a German company had provided Iran with a test chamber usable in missile development.”
  3. “The United States also urged China to look into a possible shipment to North Korea of material usable in chemical warfare materials.”
  4. “Israeli intelligence officials were also worried that French car companies could unknowingly assist Iran’s WMD production program.”
  5. “China insisted that a shipment of weapon-sensitive sodium sulfide was bound for Armenia, despite open-source indications that the material was being delivered to Iran.”
  6. “The Bush administration was sufficiently worried that Chinese weapons and equipment were reaching Iran that the State Department in September 2008 launched a concerted diplomatic campaign to press Beijing to better administer controls on weapon sales to Tehran.”
  7. “The United States provided information to Italy, Spain and six other ‘key allies’ in order to ‘persuade China to enforce its export control laws more effectively’ and to ‘aggressively implement’ U.N. Security Council resolutions on trade in weapons and related goods.”

PSI, Export Control, China, Iran, North Korea, WMD

 

Editors, “North Korea Selling Missiles in Asia, Middle East: U.N. Report” 17 May 2011, Global Security Newswire http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110517_3802.php Last Checked 19 May 2011.

  1. “North Korea has continued efforts to sell ballistic missiles, their parts and related systems to multiple entities in South Asia and the Middle East, an expert report sent to the U.N. Security Council on Friday said.”
  2. “Security Council sanctions passed in the wake of the aspiring nuclear power’s 2006 and 2009 nuclear-weapon tests have left Pyongyang badly in need of funds.”
  3. “‘In an effort to get hard currency and advance its own programs, the country has been actively engaged in the export of complete (missile) systems, components and technology to numerous customers in the Middle East and South Asia,’ the expert report says.”
  4. “The North is likely to have swapped missile technology with Iran.”
  5. “‘The country has also continued to defy the bans on imports and exports of nuclear-related items, of conventional arms and of luxury goods,’ the panel wrote.”
  6. “Pyongyang, however, has taken advantage of gaps and weaknesses in international transportation and cargo regimes to move its weapon to customers.”
  7. “The North has grown more proficient in setting up fraudulent firms and offshore banking operations, and in employing many different fake names to cloak the identities of blacklisted firms and officials, the report says.”
  8. “While international sanctions have not blocked all of North Korea’s nuclear development and weapons sales, ‘they have made it more difficult and expensive for the country to pursue these,’ according to the report.”

North Korea, Nonproliferation, PSI

 

Editors, “China Holds Up Report on North Korean Proliferation” 18 May 2011, Global Security Newswire http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110518_3045.php Last Checked 19 May 2011.

  1. “China on Tuesday prevented the release of an expert report to the U.N. Security Council asserting that North Korea has routinely exchanged ballistic missile equipment with Iran.”
  2. “The expert report said an unidentified third country bordering North Korea was acting as a midshipment point for North Korean-Iranian missile commerce. Multiple anonymous envoys said that country was China.”
  3. “Should the expert panel’s assertions be correct, it would add weight to Western worries that Beijing has not assigned adequate resources to spotting and blocking North Korean proliferation activities.”
  4. “Western diplomats at a Tuesday Security Council discussion of the expert report said they worried about gaps in the U.N. sanctions regime against North Korea.”
  5. “Security Council states from Europe have said they would back adding more North Korean organizations and individuals to the sanctions list.”

North Korea, Nonproliferation, PSI, China

 

Editors, “North Korea Used Black Market to Acquire Nuke Technology, IAEA Says,” 6 September 2011, Global Security Newswire http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110906_9854.php Last Checked 6 September 2011.

  1. “North Korea appears to have employed an illicit network to acquire material needed to establish a uranium enrichment facility at its Yongbyon nuclear complex, the International Atomic Energy Agency concluded in a report.”
  2. “The IAEA report appears to suggest that North Korea obtained assistance from the nuclear proliferation ring once operated by former chief Pakistani atomic scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, which also sold nuclear-weapon technology to Iran and Libya before it was disbanded in 2003.”
  3. “The document concludes North Korea established its uranium facility following the expulsion of U.N. inspectors in April 2009.”
  4. “Assuming no other clandestine network was involved, it would follow that Pyongyang purchased centrifuges from the Khan ring no later than 2003 and kept them a secret from investigators.”
  5. “The U.N. watchdog said it possessed additional information that would indicate other types of enrichment machinery and expertise were acquired by Pyongyang from the Khan ring.”
  6. “The nuclear agency also determined that the North had ‘very likely’ produced the uranium hexafluoride discovered in a container the Khan ring sent to Libya in 2001. That would suggest the Stalinist state clandestinely established its uranium enrichment program more than a decade ago.”

Nonproliferation, Nuclear, North Korea, Pakistan

 

Dilanian, Ken, “Idaho lab concentrates on cyber-security” 1 October, 2011, LAtimes. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-idaho-cyber-20111001,0,6859511.story

  1. “At the Idaho National Laboratory is to find and stop what experts warn is a growing risk to America: a cyber-attack that could disable water systems, chemical plants or parts of the electrical grid.”
  2. “Attacks could come from disgruntled employees or criminal networks intent on extortion, publicity or mischief.”
  3. “China, Russia, Iran and North Korea already have cyber-weapons that can target critical nodes in the U.S. economy, including utilities and private industry.”
  4. “The U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit, a government-sponsored think tank, has concluded that hackers conceivably could crash trains, cause chemical spills, and darken the electrical grid.”
  5. “As more utilities and industries link their computer networks to the Internet, shadowy adversaries regularly probe the control systems that run crucial infrastructure…”
  6. “In an experiment, they hacked the control system for a large diesel electrical generator — the kind used widely in U.S. power plants — causing it to self-destruct.”
  7. “Further proof came with the so-called Stuxnet attack, computer malware that targeted and caused centrifuges to spin out of control at a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, Iran.”
  8. “Stuxnet was a “game changer,” said Marty Edwards, who leads the cyber-security effort at the lab. It made people recognize the destructive potential of cyber-attacks on industrial control systems.”
  9. “The sophisticated malware took advantage of previously unknown vulnerabilities in the Windows operating system and targeted a specific type of Siemens controller used to run Iran’s centrifuges.”
  10. “More than 90% of U.S. infrastructure is in private hands, and except for nuclear power plants, no regulations govern how to secure systems against cyber-attacks.”
  11. “Many cyber-attacks go unreported, experts say, because companies fear the financial and public relations consequences of disclosure.”
  12. “The Obama administration has proposed requiring companies and utilities to hire commercial auditors to assess cyber-security risk and mitigation plans.”
  13. “The proposal faces an uphill battle in Congress, where several cyber-security bills are pending.”
  14. “An attack that damages crucial infrastructure is inevitable. “It’s a matter of time.””

Cybersecurity, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea

 

Miller, J. Berkshire, “North Korea’s Other Weapons Threat“, 12 November 2011, The Diplomat, http://the-diplomat.com/2011/11/12/north-korea’s-other-weapons-threat/, Last Checked 15 November 2011.

  1. “North Korea’s latent nuclear weapons program is rightfully the main point of concern for its neighbors and the international community. But far less publicized is Pyongyang’s ongoing efforts to build upon its capabilities to produce and maintain chemical and biological weapons (CBW). “
  2. “North Korea’s expansion of these programs is no secret to intelligence agencies around the world, and there are a number of reports detailing sites across the country dedicated to the production of CBW.”
  3. “North Korea isn’t a state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and has never been subject to inspections of its chemical industry facilities or sites believed associated with its CW program. Regardless, there’s little debate about the existence of the North’s CW program, with intelligence assessments from Russia, Britain, the United States and South Korea all indicating that Pyongyang continues to produce CW stocks.”
  4. “Much less clear is the scope of the CW program and its level of advancement. Most assessments concur that the North has produced all of the main chemical agents such as nerve (including VX gas), blood, blister and choking agents.  There’s less certainty regarding the amount of chemical agents stockpiled by the regime, although estimates range from 1,000 to 5,000 tons. However, even if the North’s program is at the low end of estimates, its capacity is bolstered by the fact that its military has a variety of sophisticated delivery vehicles for CW attacks including missiles, artillery and airborne bombs.”
  5. “While Pyongyang publicly denies the need for transparency on its CW program, its production of biological weapons is muddied and concealed by weak international non-proliferation standards. Unlike the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which has robust verification standards, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is plagued by the failure of its members to agree on a universal verification mechanism that would adequately ensure that all state parties are held to account for their treaty commitments.”
  6. “States at the BWC have been engaged in talks to come to an agreement on a suitable verification arm, but these efforts were cut short after the United States withdrew its support back in 2001. At the time, George W. Bush’s administration insisted that such a mechanism would require considerable financial capital with little pay off in security terms. The Pentagon also stressed that it was concerned about diverting precious resources on combating BW to a multilateral organization that would in turn take away funds from its successful biodefense programs. But perhaps the largest hurdle is to overcome U.S. and other members’ concerns that a strict verification regime may impose heavy restrictions on the biotech industry.”
  7. “Regardless, Pyongyang has taken advantage of the BWC’s verification gap by using its position as a state party to the BWC in order to blanket accusations that it continues to produce and maintain biological weapons.  The South Korean Defense Ministry claims that North Korea has possession of several biological agents such as anthrax bacterium, botulinum and smallpox – all of which can be weaponized.”
  8. “The thorniest issue between members of the BWC relates to the dual-use nature of biological agents and how to determine whether a program is peaceful or intended for nefarious purposes. The global science industry relies on the research conducted by studying biological materials. However, from an international security perspective, there’s the potential that this dual-use research could be diverted into a biological weapons program.”
  9. “There’s also the terrifying possibility that the government may – or already has – traded chemical or biological agents and suitable delivery vehicles to terrorist groups, which could weaponize them to use in an asymmetric attack. The improved ability of intelligence agencies around the world to determine weapons forensics would in theory deter such an illicit transfer, but it can’t be guaranteed”
  10. “South Korean officials have recently claimedthat their intelligence confirms that CBW factories were constructed in the North Korean province of Chagang last year. In response to this, the South Korean government has indicated that it will continue to pour millions of dollars into programs aimed at detecting, deterring and protecting their citizens and soldiers from a possible CBW attack from an unpredictable regime in the North.”
  11. “However, while the government is satisfied with its CW prevention efforts, Seoul has largely neglected creating a sufficient biodefense infrastructure. Korean parliamentarian Shin Hak-yong recently outlinedthis, stressing that the country’s“military defense has been excessively focused on preparedness for North Korea’s chemical attacks, rather than for its biological attacks.”
  12. “Seoul’s new biodefense strategy has three central prongs. The first relies on detection, and has been supported by the government’s planned implementation of scanning technology at ports of entry that will be able to detect ten separate disease threats. The second pillar focuses on deterrence, which is based on South Korea’s continued investment in its hard power resources, such as medium and long range surface-to-air missiles. The final ingredient is the much needed investment in protecting South Koreans in the event of a biological attack through the development and stockpiling of vaccines.”
  13. “Beginning a serious dialogue on CBW with North Korea is necessary, and could facilitate an opening for a smoother resumption to the stalled Six Party Talks on the regime’s nuclear weapons program.”
  14. “Kim Jong-il’s regime has displayed its insincerity and belligerence on several previous occasions when such talks resumed. Attempting to include CBW in the Six Party Talks would be counterproductive and would give Pyongyang more avenues to stall and launch salvos against Korea and the United States.”

Chemical, Biodefense, BWC, CWC, North Korea, South Korea, Dual Use

 

Miller, J. Berkshire, “North Korea’s Other Weapons Threat“, 12 November 2011, The Diplomat, http://the-diplomat.com/2011/11/12/north-korea’s-other-weapons-threat/, Last Checked 15 November 2011.

  1. “North Korea’s latent nuclear weapons program is rightfully the main point of concern for its neighbors and the international community. But far less publicized is Pyongyang’s ongoing efforts to build upon its capabilities to produce and maintain chemical and biological weapons (CBW). “
  2. “North Korea’s expansion of these programs is no secret to intelligence agencies around the world, and there are a number of reports detailing sites across the country dedicated to the production of CBW.”
  3. “North Korea isn’t a state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and has never been subject to inspections of its chemical industry facilities or sites believed associated with its CW program. Regardless, there’s little debate about the existence of the North’s CW program, with intelligence assessments from Russia, Britain, the United States and South Korea all indicating that Pyongyang continues to produce CW stocks.”
  4. “Much less clear is the scope of the CW program and its level of advancement. Most assessments concur that the North has produced all of the main chemical agents such as nerve (including VX gas), blood, blister and choking agents.  There’s less certainty regarding the amount of chemical agents stockpiled by the regime, although estimates range from 1,000 to 5,000 tons. However, even if the North’s program is at the low end of estimates, its capacity is bolstered by the fact that its military has a variety of sophisticated delivery vehicles for CW attacks including missiles, artillery and airborne bombs.”
  5. “While Pyongyang publicly denies the need for transparency on its CW program, its production of biological weapons is muddied and concealed by weak international non-proliferation standards. Unlike the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which has robust verification standards, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is plagued by the failure of its members to agree on a universal verification mechanism that would adequately ensure that all state parties are held to account for their treaty commitments.”
  6. “States at the BWC have been engaged in talks to come to an agreement on a suitable verification arm, but these efforts were cut short after the United States withdrew its support back in 2001. At the time, George W. Bush’s administration insisted that such a mechanism would require considerable financial capital with little pay off in security terms. The Pentagon also stressed that it was concerned about diverting precious resources on combating BW to a multilateral organization that would in turn take away funds from its successful biodefense programs. But perhaps the largest hurdle is to overcome U.S. and other members’ concerns that a strict verification regime may impose heavy restrictions on the biotech industry.”
  7. “Regardless, Pyongyang has taken advantage of the BWC’s verification gap by using its position as a state party to the BWC in order to blanket accusations that it continues to produce and maintain biological weapons.  The South Korean Defense Ministry claims that North Korea has possession of several biological agents such as anthrax bacterium, botulinum and smallpox – all of which can be weaponized.”
  8. “The thorniest issue between members of the BWC relates to the dual-use nature of biological agents and how to determine whether a program is peaceful or intended for nefarious purposes. The global science industry relies on the research conducted by studying biological materials. However, from an international security perspective, there’s the potential that this dual-use research could be diverted into a biological weapons program.”
  9. “There’s also the terrifying possibility that the government may – or already has – traded chemical or biological agents and suitable delivery vehicles to terrorist groups, which could weaponize them to use in an asymmetric attack. The improved ability of intelligence agencies around the world to determine weapons forensics would in theory deter such an illicit transfer, but it can’t be guaranteed”
  10. “South Korean officials have recently claimedthat their intelligence confirms that CBW factories were constructed in the North Korean province of Chagang last year. In response to this, the South Korean government has indicated that it will continue to pour millions of dollars into programs aimed at detecting, deterring and protecting their citizens and soldiers from a possible CBW attack from an unpredictable regime in the North.”
  11. “However, while the government is satisfied with its CW prevention efforts, Seoul has largely neglected creating a sufficient biodefense infrastructure. Korean parliamentarian Shin Hak-yong recently outlinedthis, stressing that the country’s“military defense has been excessively focused on preparedness for North Korea’s chemical attacks, rather than for its biological attacks.”
  12. “Seoul’s new biodefense strategy has three central prongs. The first relies on detection, and has been supported by the government’s planned implementation of scanning technology at ports of entry that will be able to detect ten separate disease threats. The second pillar focuses on deterrence, which is based on South Korea’s continued investment in its hard power resources, such as medium and long range surface-to-air missiles. The final ingredient is the much needed investment in protecting South Koreans in the event of a biological attack through the development and stockpiling of vaccines.”
  13. “Beginning a serious dialogue on CBW with North Korea is necessary, and could facilitate an opening for a smoother resumption to the stalled Six Party Talks on the regime’s nuclear weapons program.”
  14. “Kim Jong-il’s regime has displayed its insincerity and belligerence on several previous occasions when such talks resumed. Attempting to include CBW in the Six Party Talks would be counterproductive and would give Pyongyang more avenues to stall and launch salvos against Korea and the United States.”

Chemical, Biodefense, BWC, CWC, North Korea, South Korea, Dual Use

 

Yoon-mi, Kim, “Nuke summit to discuss everyday radioactivity,” Korea Herald, Dec. 13, 2011 http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20111213000766 Last checked 12/27/11

  1. ”The upcoming 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit’s agenda will include how to ensure the safety and security of radioactive materials widely used in people’s daily lives, a government official said Tuesday.”
  2. ”Korea will host the summit on March 26-27 as a continuation from the first nuclear security summit in April 2010, led by U.S. President Barack Obama, to prevent nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists.”
  3. “’Terrorism using nuclear materials such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium would have a massive impact, but the probability is low. While terrorism using radioactive materials, widely used in hospitals, would have a smaller impact but the probability is high,’ a foreign ministry official said.”
  4. ”Fifty-one leaders ― 47 heads of state and the heads of the U.N., IAEA, EU and Interpol ― are expected to attend the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.”
  5. ”President Lee Myung-bak repeatedly has said he welcomes Pyongyang to join the summit in March if it shows the international community its sincerity about giving up its nuclear ambitions.”
  6. ”South Korea’s hosting of the nuclear security summit, inviting 47 national leaders, will positively impact the security of the Korean Peninsula, the ministry official said.”

Nuclear, South Korea, North Korea, Law Enforcement, Dual Use

2012

 

 

 

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