*Biosecurity Commons Statement on a limited no-fly zone in Ukraine & Non-State Actor Threats
At this moment in time (March 13, 2022), perceptions of NATO’s bright line against intervention in Ukraine may increase the risk to hundreds of nuclear reactors around the world from non-state actors and other rogue nation-states.
Putin is forcing NATO to demonstrate how it reacts to atrocities committed by bad actors with nuclear power –in real-time. Therefore, potential bad actors are watching events unfold very carefully, and policy must be mindful of not only this high-stakes situation, but the potential for other WMD threats in the offing.
Putin will go down in history as the first to hold a nuclear reactor as a dirty bomb threat.
Non-state actor perceptions of NATO’s current line drawn against limited no-fly zone corridors risks increases increasing the potential dirty bomb value of nuclear reactors and countless chemical plants around the world.
However, deference must be given to NATO’s leadership for such grave decisions.
Experts have presented arguments for and against imposing a limited no-fly zone to protect humanitarian corridors:
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Related Publications & Activities:
BG: Cyber4All Fellow, NSF Grant #1516113, 2015-2017
BG: Interview on DIY Science forthcoming in Caijing, a fortnightly magazine based in Beijing, at: http://www.caijing.com.cn/
CS & BG: Gender-based perceptions of the 2001 anthrax attacks: Implications for outreach and preparedness, Security Journal, 2014
BG: Interviewed for Washington Lawyer, “The Rise of DIY Scientists: Is It Time for Regulation?” 2012.
BG: Patent Office as Biosecurity Gatekeeper: Fostering Responsible Science and Building Public Trust in DIY Science, The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law, 2011
Staff.: Biosecurity Commons Review 2011
BG: 6th Annual ODNI Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Summer Seminar, “Biosecurity Commons: Year 1,” National Harbor, MD, August 2, 2010
Staff. Biosecurity Commons Review 2010
BG: Closed Meeting, Dual Use and Code of Conduct, Congress of Scientists—Thomas Wiese GmbH, Berlin, Germany, December 2006
BG: Biosecurity and Secrecy Policy: Problems, Theory, and a Call for Executive Action,I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy, 2006
BG, Invited Panelist, Committee on Scientific Communication and National Security, Planning Meeting, National Academies, October 30, 2006, Washington, D.C. (2006)
BG, Closed Meeting, Preventing Bioterrorism, Interpol, Lyon, France, March 2005.
BG: Balancing National Security and Open Science: A Proposal for Due Process Vetting, Yale Journal of Law and Technology, 2005Biosecurity commons review ISSN 2169-6691
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